mapage.noos.fr por Manuel Malaver

Viendo a Chávez a mediados de semana discursear por televisión en la actitud del pulpero que vendió de contado -o sea, pleno de optimismo, seguridad y confianza- no he evitado recordarme de  dictadores como Alberto Fujimori y Slódoban Milosevic, que precisamente en la etapa crepuscular de sus mandatos era cuando parecían más convencidos de que se la estaban comiendo y habían llegado para quedarse. Espejismo que se derivaba del hecho de que siendo las dictaduras sistemas que sobreviven como resultado de la implementación de controles crecientes, siempre se tiene la sensación de que en el último momento, en los meses, semanas y días finales, es cuando mejor se tiene  agarrada la sartén por el mango. El sonriente Chávez del jueves, en efecto, era “el presidente todo control”, el mago que al fin tenía a los empresarios y dueños de medios; periodistas, gerentes y trabajadores de PDVSA; empleados públicosy profesores  universitarios en el puño y como en trance de decirles: “Hey, silencio, que si se portan mal, no hay caramelos”. El mapa parecía sencillo: ahora soy el dueño de la FAN, de PDVSA, y de los dólares, por lo que, ni economía privada, ni medios de comunicación; ni Fedecámaras, ni  CTV; ni bancos, ni compañías de seguro van a poder disfrutar de una muerte lenta y larga, en sus camas y previa administración de los santos óleos, a menos que yo lo ordene. Deducción rayana en la indolencia mental que no se esperaría de  dictadores de verdad verdad, de los que hacen sus cuentas auscultando las señales de la realidad, sino de autócratas improvisados, de utilería y pacotilla, ya que la experiencia con los regímenes totalitarios que proliferaron durante el siglo XX reveló, que los hombres no son reductibles por el hambre, y que, si se trata de arrebatarles la libertad, no hay más remedio que hacerlo acudiendo a la represión, la tortura  y la muerte. Se demostró en la Alemania de Hitler, la Rusia de Stalin, la Italia de Musolini, la China Mao, el Chile de Pinochet, y la Argentina Videla, donde las dictaduras fueron también eficientes maquinarias especializadas en el crimen, liberticidas y humanicidas. Y se continúa corroborando en las subespecies totalitarias que resistieron a la caída del Muro de Berlín y pueden todavía exhibir especímenes en Africa, Asia y América latina, aunque en trance de desaparecer. Sumun al cual no pudieron acceder el Suharto de los últimos años, y mucho menos dictadores de rango más reciente, y hasta inferior, como Fujimori y Milosevic, y no solo porque había desaparecido el mundo bipolar, sino porque el extraordinario desarrollo de las tecnologías multi comunicacionales ya no permitían asesinar en capilla, a la sombra y sin exponerse a  protestas desestabilizadoras. De modo que alguien que se empeñe en implementar proyectos totalitarios en el siglo XXI tiene que inventar otras fórmulas, ya que al final se expone a morir de asfixia política, incapaz de contener la arremetida de quienes, ni siquiera ante la amenaza de la muerte, son capaces de contener el instinto hacia la libertad. En descargo de Hugo Chávez debemos señalar que desde el momento en quese decidió a participar en las elecciones del 1998 intuyó este complejo asunto y compró disfraz y vocabulario nuevos para ver como contrabandeaba el proyecto, con el resultado de que la realidad le dijo rápidamente que por esa vía podía llegar hasta un punto y solo hasta un punto. Se empeñó en cruzar la raya, vinieron los enfrentamientos con la sociedad civil y democrática, fue negando más y más derechos,  más y más garantías, la represión moral, ideológica y judicial se convirtió en su arma favorita,  y el rostro del tradicional dictador latinoamericano es lo que está quedando de la comedia. En este momento ya estamos en el tramo que precede al control total de la economía y  la política: los controles de precios y de cambio; y la carta bajo la manga del chavismo es que una administración discriminatoria de los dólares, el cierre de los medios, la quiebra generalizada de empresas, y la amenaza de lanzar a  la calle a todo el que tenga un empleo y no acate los dictum de la revolución,  logren el milagro que no logró el “carisma” del líder: que la sociedad civil y democrática se rinda y caiga de rodillas. Fue Trostky quien escribió una vez -y no sin aquellas sombras de amargura que caracterizaron los años finales de su experiencia revolucionaria- que Stalin había transformado el principio marxista de que “el que no trabaja no come” en la orden totalitaria de que “el que no obedezca no come”, y por ahí anda ya nuestro sargento revolucionario, preparándose a colocarle una soga en el estómago a los rebeldes venezolanos, y si después de apretar y apretar no pasa nada, pues se la pone un poco más arriba, en el pescuezo, y aprieta igual. Por eso lo vi el jueves sonriente y controlando, amenazando, y con la euforia del pulpero que vendió de contado, sin duda que colgado de la ilusión de que ante la amenaza de morirse de hambre, o de irse de este mundo de una manera menos amable, los venezolanos no tendrán otro recurso que rendirse. Pero ¿será verdad tanta belleza? ¿No pasará con los controles lo que pasó con los discursos del “comandante”, que en cuanto dejaron ver su filo represivo, extorsivo e intimidatorio prácticamente se le arrojaron en la cara? ¿Es posible que Chávez, que se vanagloria, más allá de lo permisible, de su familiaridad con la Biblia, no haya internalizado aquello de que “no solo del pan vive el hombre” y que forzado a pronunciarse por valores que le son intrínsecos los hombres, no solo son capaces de sacrificar su bienestar, sino también libertad y vidas? Venezuela cuenta con ejemplos a granel, pues si hay un país en América latina que hizo de  su historia el campo de batalla de sus luchas por la libertad es este que, no a pesar de, sino a causa de, también ha visto proliferar caudillejos que asidos de los más peregrinos pretextos no dejan de reciclarse en la política, como esas pandemias que el tiempo hace resistentes a los antibióticos.  Debemos convenir, sin embargo, que la actual es especialmente virulenta, ya que su agente transmisor usa las ventajas de una tecnología que se creó de los libres y para los libres, pero aún así no me cabe la menor duda que ni con discursejos, ni represión; ni con el hambre, ni con la muerte aniquilará en los venezolanos este destino de ser libres y democráticos que no aniquilaron, sino alimentaron, dictadores que figuran entre los más eficientes de todos los tiempos: Juan Vicente Gómez y Marcos Pérez Jiménez. Venezolanos serios, de poco hablar y menos reir, concentrados en la realización de proyectos que podemos adversar, pero no menospreciar, como que al fin al cabo trajeron un poco de orden en el caos. Sin nada que ver con este circo que llaman “revolución “bolivariana” y que si no fuera porque los payasos cargan el hacha escondida bajo los blusones, sería un espectáculo exitosísimo, ya que también vale desternillarse de risa hasta de los chistes malos.

mapage.noos.fr by  Heinz Sonntag(*)

  Paradox: "A statement or sentiment that is seemingly contradictory or opposed to common sense and yet perhaps true in fact." WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

What is it that makes the situation in Venezuela during the last 18 months -- with accusations against president Hugo Chávez as non-democratic and even tyrannical, the subsequent massive protests, strikes (the most recent lasting more than six weeks), and partial stoppages of the country’s decisive oil-industry -- seemingly contradictory, given the origins of a regime democratically elected by a broad margin? This question goes to the heart of the current crisis and embraces several elements barely recognized or perceived by international public opinion, knowingly hidden or silenced both by journalists and other writers of the "left" in the region, in European and North-American countries, and by Latin American and Caribbean political leaders, as well as by politicians of the developed countries.

The first element is the most obvious and reiterated: Chávez is not the first and will certainly not be the last political leader to use democratic procedures to seize power for non-democratic purposes, supposedly to "renew democracy" or to "establish a real democracy." Intending no analogies, some prominent examples might be remembered: King Victor Emmanuel III had to appoint Mussolini prime minister of Italy in 1922 because a majority of the voters had given his party the strongest fraction in the parliament. Hitler became chancellor of the Weimar Republic in January 1933 because the voters, through their representatives in different parties, made possible a coalition, which obliged the president of the German Reich to nominate him. Vargas in Brazil and Perón in Argentina became presidents in 1934 and 1946, respectively, because they won the masses’ votes through their mobilization and organization.

Hugo Rafael Chávez, a former Lieutenant Colonel who had tried twice to topple the Venezuelan democratic government in 1992: once in February as the leader of an attempted coup; the second time in November as an inspiring actor, based his campaign, like those preceding him, on the promise to solve all of society’s existing problems, first of course those that worried the majorities: from poverty, unemployment, the lack of adequate health care, educational services, housing, and their own marginality, to the shortcomings, failures and corruption of the socio-economic order and the political system. As his overall instrument he invoked a new Constitution for a "really participatory and protagonist democracy." As a result of the deterioration of the socio-economic, political and socio-cultural climate during the previous – say – 15 years, and very much as in the cases mentioned above, this push toward change was well received by broad social sectors, including the working classes of the modern economy (particularly the oil industry), the middle sectors, segments of the bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia. Chávez’s popularity rose quickly to about 80 %.

The evening the result of the elections was announced (December 6, 1998), the majority of Venezuelans celebrated in the streets and plazas of the cities, towns and villages. Chávez’s speech had a moderate tone, reiterating that he would fight poverty, promote a "true" democracy through a new Constitution, be "the president of all Venezuelans, also of those who did not vote for me." He would eliminate corruption within one year, live a modest life, renouncing to "all the paraphernalia that surrounded the previous presidents’ lifestyles," and even transform some of the presidential residences into schools. The mass media praised the speech and the elected president’s promises the following day.

A second element is more intricate: not only did Chávez win the presidential election by a landslide, he also won the following three referenda on the constitutional process during 1999 and, finally, his own "re-legitimizing" election in July 2000 "with overwhelming majorities." This is regularly presented as a proof of the unquestionable legitimacy of the regime. The results, however, had a systematically muffled flaw: all of them reflected a high rate of abstention of registered voters: 38 % in Chávez’s presidential election; 62 % in the referendum on the appropriateness of a Constituent Assembly in April; 54 % in the election of its members in July; 56 % in the vote on the new Constitution in December; and 54 % in the re-legitimation vote of July 2000. High voter abstention does not necessarily destroy the legitimacy of a democratic regime. It does, however, certainly weaken it, generating a curious mixture of rational and charismatic legitimacy (M. Weber), by focusing on the "popularity of the leader." This is particularly certain and problematic in democracies that, like the Venezuelan, do not have a tradition of civic culture and of strong cohesive and consensus-stimulating institutions. About half of Venezuela’s citizens, thus, showed little interest in, and actually did not vote for, Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution (though they would later express some sympathy in the opinion polls, especially in the first 18 months or so).

A third factor is structural and has several dimensions. The exercise of political power by Chávez had, from the very beginning, some features which, both in the short and long run, tended to put his popularity in question and, consequently, to further threaten even more the democratic elements of his legitimacy, though not affecting his charismatic appeal. He polarizes the people into "friends" and "enemies" in an extremely aggressive manner, roughly along the divisions between the social classes, as he (erroneously) understands them. Enemies are dubbed the squalid ones or the oligarchy, independently of their real socio-economic and political status; friends are the dignified ones. This pattern, evident from the very beginning of his political career, even during his campaign, has been steadily reiterated in the Sunday allocutions that came after his victory (136 to date, with an overall duration of more than 1.000 hours).

Chávez militarized the public administration by appointing active and recently retired military officers to practically all important positions, from ministers (few), vice-ministers (many) to officials (a lot) in charge of "essential" programs, such as the Plan Bolivar, a financially megalomaniac social plan, and a no less gigantic house building plan. He assumed control over nearly all institutions of political society: the Supreme Court, the National Electoral Council, the Offices of the General Attorney and the Ombudsman, the state organizations for social policies, the Central Bank, filling them with his allies. He also tried to impose his will on the civil society, with reasonable success in cultural institutions like museums, the national library, the two state-owned publishing houses (Monte Avila Editores and Biblioteca Ayacucho), one TV and several radio-stations, the arts schools, and theaters, but with little or no success in the trade unions, the major part of the Catholic Church, the autonomous public and private universities, the entrepreneurial organizations and most of the mass media: they resisted this bringing into line by the process (as Chávez’s followers call the Bolivarian Revolution).

In addition, Chávez presented himself as "the candidate (and later president) of the poor." The economic and social policies of his government, however, were and are basically those of previous governments, subject to structural adjustments and neo-liberal reforms, even as his ideological and political discourse condemns them (and capitalism in general) as savage, anti-humanist and exploitative. This contradiction between discourse and praxis was, and is, accompanied and mirrored by a slowdown of economic growth and an increase in unemployment and poverty, the first from about 12 % to roughly 20 % in three years; the latter, from about 48 to 70 %, in spite of high windfall profits in the oil industry during 2000 and part of 2001. Indeed, the availability of funds from this sector surpassed anticipated state revenues for the 2000 budget by 47 %.

In spite of this favorable financial situation, the economy experienced growing deterioration. The number of companies that went bankrupt, particularly of medium and small size, increased from year to year. There were no policies for the re-activation of the internal economy. The inflation is among the highest of the region (around 30 %.) The real per capita income declined more than 11 % in three years. During 2002, the economy contracted by 7 %. The savings rate, and with it the capital formation, is currently one of the lowest of all Latin American and Caribbean countries. The national currency has been devaluated by more than 100 % since October 2001, mainly due to Chávez’s disastrous policies, and the resulting lack of confidence of the investors who prefer to transfer a considerable part of their assessments and incomes abroad.

Chávez’s regime has been described as one of the most inept, chaotic, and ineffective administrations in the history of the country since the achievement of its political independence more than 170 years ago. Since there is no internal coordination between the different governmental agencies and no external accord between these and the different collective actors, the ship of the state drifts in an eternal zig-zag without any clear course, subject to the arbitrariness of Chávez’s decisions and, secondarily, those of his closest "collaborators" (who often do not respect the Constitution of 1999). This anarchy, at least partially a consequence of the militarization of the state apparatus referred to earlier, engenders a growing corruption, compared to which that of the "really existing democracy" in place up to 1998 appears relatively benign. It is focused of course mainly in the high and middle rank military officers with bureaucratic jobs. Scandals like the disappearance of about $ 3.7 billion, legally destined to a macroeconomic stabilization fund, or the illegal use of currency exchange profits of the Central Bank, were neither explained, investigated, nor punished. Since the comptroller and the chief of the Central Bank are followers of Chávez, there is no real control of the state’s expenditures. These are but a few examples that throw light on the nature of this peculiar "government."

Chávez’s foreign policy would deserve an article of its own. Be it sufficient to highlight his early friendship with Fidel Castro, whose "paradise" he would like to import to Venezuela (his own words!), and specially his messianic belief that his destiny, his teleological mission consists of fighting and negotiating for the "second independence" of Latin America and the Caribbean.

National, regional and international defenders of the regime blame the hostility of the mass media for the broad resistance against the president. But, as is so often the case with this regime, this is only a part of the truth. Chávez’s triumph in the elections of 1998 was actively and until the end of 1999 enthusiastically celebrated by the mass media, both by their owners and their journalists, as by a majority of the population; as a matter of fact, Chávez owed his landslide victory largely to the media. The president and his entourage had ample accessto tv- and radio talk shows and dominated the headlines of the tabloid press. He was seen and thus presented as the incarnation of a much desired political and socio-economic change. During practically the entire constitutional process, from February 1999 to the re-legitimation elections of July 2000, the mass media were in favor of the government and its measures, mainly the reform of the political system and its constitutional framework, though they occasionally made criticisms against abuses, some policies and isolated scandals (which is, after all, one important function of the fourth estate).

The way in which these criticisms were received brought the first disappointments with the regime. Instead of giving coherent explanations or accepting responsibility for their wrongdoings, Chávez and his followers attacked the media, committing the additional error of personalizing these attacks by focusing on certain journalists and media owners. Since the scandals became more and more frequent, the investigative journalism of the press and the audiovisual media, highly developed in Venezuela, insisted on trying to uncover other scandals, irritating the government, particularly the president, and provoking him to make increasingly aggressive attacks, such as his condemnation of the anti-social mass media. So a spiral was born, which escalated very quickly as journalists published growing proofs of governmental gaffes, errors, misdeeds, and corruption. In addition, the promises of Chávez’s inaugural speech the night of his victory were quickly forgotten. The president discovered the pleasure of elegant suits of Saville Row, when he doesn’t rig out (illegally) with his military uniform, and Cartier watches. Seldom had a previous president surrounded himself with such impressive military and civilian security. He and his entourage indulged in a luxury lifestyle. The repair of the swimming pool of the presidential residence in Caracas cost more than $ 1 million. The government also bought a new airplane for the president for $ 65 million, plus $ 6 million for "extras" of the design and equipment of the interior cabins. These facts irritated the media even more.

It became progressively evident that the freedom of information and opinion had become formal, that is to say, had no real influence on the regime’s measures and policies. It was the first time since 1958 and the (re)establishment of democracy after the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez that the media would see themselves deprived of any real influence on governmental policies and the dynamics of the political system, experiencing only their own impotence. In short, the freedom of the press existing in Venezuela is today nothing more than a chimera, a sort of farce, which implements the wishes of the government in its desperate attempts to demonstrate its "democratic" nature. The state owned channel and radio station were converted into, and continue to serve, as a kind of "propaganda machine" à la Goebbels.

During the years of the worst deterioration of democracy, between approximately 1980 and 1990, with the riots of the Caracazo of February 27, 1989 as its most emblematic expression, the dissolution of the internal cohesion of Venezuelan society had reached its peak. With Chávez’s victory in 1998 there was widespread hope that this state of anomie (normlessness) could be overcome by the changes he proposed. His aggressive political style and his tendency to conceive political and social dynamics only within the limits of a friend-enemy framework (in which the enemy is the other and has to be destroyed), very much in accordance with the 1920s theories of the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt, have made nearly impossible the reconstruction of a set of rules that facilitate an orderly society, respect for "the other" as a fellow citizen yet particularly as a human being, even under conditions of (inevitable) controversy about the goals and characteristics of this order between the different collective actors. His polarization of political (and civil) society has resulted in polarizing the opposition, so that in the end no negotiation is feasible. Even the attempts of international organizations (OAS, UNDP, CARTER CENTER) to foster a climate of negotiation have failed, primarily because Chávez and his government deny any concession to the opposition, even a non-binding advisory referendum about the acceptance or rejection of his permanence in the presidency.

As if this were not enough, Chávez, in addition, began to found Bolivarian Circles across the country, neighborhood and shanty-town (barrio) groups for both the local organization of his allies and the defense of the Bolivarian Revolution. Though a few of these circles develop significant community work, most are dedicated full-time to attacks on the political enemy. Investigative journalists have noted that the members of these latter circles are paid and armed by the government and it is obvious that they attempt to intervene and fight the opposition’s demonstrations, especially in the last months.

In brief, the political polarization nurtured by Chávez, the incapability and inefficiency of his government, the tremendous corruption, the failure to accomplish his campaign promises, the contradiction between his policies and his discourse, his tendency to monopolize political and even social power, have ultimately undermined his popularity and have been producing an unexpected result: those who say they will not abstain in the next election or referendum have decreased to less than 12 %. Since mid-2001, the resistance against the president grows steadily, among practically all sectors of the population. The first to express resistance were the bourgeoisie and the middle sectors, in whose social circles Chávez had had a favored place. When he tried to suppress the traditional trade unions, he lost the support of the working classes of the modern economy (including the oil industry), particularly when he attempted, once more via referendum at the beginning of 2001, to eliminate the unions and create a workers’ organization within the framework of his political party (remember Mussolini and Hitler?). In more recent times, he is even losing the support of the poor, the nourishing soil of his "revolutionary" project. This explains the fall of his popularity from 80 to 27 %, among all social strata, maintaining figures of about 30 % only among the most marginalized (more than 60 %, of these same people, nonetheless, doubt, that Chávez will solve their problems or that their future will be any better under his leadership).

This also explains the quantitative and qualitative growth of the opposition. It is a peaceful opposition, its demonstrations big, frequent and powerful. Even Chavez’s temporary ouster in April 2002 during a massive demonstration is no proof of the opposition’s "violence," since it is an episode in which the details and particulars still remain opaque and unclear. In the nation’s capital of about 4.5 million inhabitants alone, the demonstrations have grown from some 100.000 in December 2001 to 1.2 million people during the current strike. Though at its beginning on December 2, 2002, the opposition still asked only for a consulting referendum (foreseen in his custom-made Constitution) on whether Chávez ought to remain in the presidency or not, there are now more and more calls for immediate new elections.

The opposition movement is composed by members of all social classes, of all ages, of all regions, with a specially notable number of women participating. Although there is a coordinating group of entrepreneurial, workers’ union, and political, civil, and NGO leaders, the movement is highly spontaneous. For Latin America and the Caribbean, where mass movements are often manipulated, this one has more of a grass-roots character, mostly independent of formal leadership, and with a considerable degree of autonomy.

The reason for this special growing movement is the perception that Chávez is destroying the economic, social, and cultural bases of the society. Relatively independent analysts (i.e. committed to neither of the contending parties) have been making calculations about the time it would take to reconstruct Venezuela’s material and socio-institutional structures. Their most optimistic estimate is about 15 years.

The most recent demonstrations were violently disturbed by members of the Bolivarian Circles, producing casualties and numerous injured. Chávez threatens with the declaration of a state of exception. For now, he appears to be in control of the armed forces, despite rumors about the growth of their institutional sector, hostile to being used in Chávez’s personal project. So he has still the money (but, with the oil strike, until when?) and the arms (with the institutional officers, again, until when?) to maintain himself in power.

Venezuela is not (yet?) a dictatorship or a tyranny. But there is a notable and growing discrepancy between the formal character of the regime and its real content in terms of political practices and policies. In parliamentary democracies, this discrepancy also occurs, but then new elections are being called. In a presidential-authoritarian democracy, the Constitution becomes a strait jacket, which eliminates the sovereignty of the citizenry, particularly if it contains many nearly totalitarian elements.

Like for any other paradox, there is no solution to the Venezuelan predicament, save the eventual overcoming of the contradictions by the triumph of one contender or the other (since there is by now no possibility of any compromise). But what seems clear is that the contradictory aspects will continue to go unrecognized or unperceived by regional and international public opinion, for basically two reasons. First, many members of the regional, North-American and European "left" with influence in some mass media support and defend Chávez’s regime: either because of their absolute ignorance about what is going on in Venezuela; or as a result of their incapacity for thinking beyond the limits of their obsolete ideological framework; or maybe even because it can be profitable to write and speak as they do; or for all these reasons together. The second reason is that many Latin American and Caribbean leaders, as well as politicians of developed countries, have vested interests in hiding the true character of the situation. They recognize that the possibility of questioning the discrepancy between the formal character of a regime and its real content in terms of political practices and policies in a specific case could very well open the eyes of their own peoples. And collectively open eyes are dangerous to any pretension to maintain their dominion. In the meantime, they delegate the mediation to the OAS, whose Secretary General is currently moderating a "Round-Table of Negotiations" of government and opposition, which for more than five weeks has produced no results.

Still, even a round-table without results can prove convenient to our political leaders and heads of state, by hiding their inactivity behind the veil of a seemingly collective defense of "constitutional regimes." The "Group of Friends of Venezuela," just constituted by Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, and the USA during President Gutierrez’s inauguration in Ecuador (1/15/03)--despite Chávez’s attempts to deny membership to the United States--has to be seen in the same light.

Amherst, MA, January 2003

(*) The author is a retired Professor of Sociology at the Central University of Venezuela and former director of its Center for Development Studies – CENDES, where he is still a research fellow. His next book is on social exclusion in a comparative perspective.

mapage.noos.fr por Luis DE LION Sábado, 8 de Marzo 2003

Sin duda que para cualquier pichón de dictador que pretenda en la actualidademular a Fidel Castro o Pinochet - por solo citar a dos - se va a encontrar con la infranqueable barrera de un mundo cada vez más globalizado. Dicho impedimento junto a la - por ahora - guerra tibia de la lucha antiterrorista, pueden resultarle tan incómodo al anteproyecto de dictador venezolano, como lo son el someterse a elecciones, o el convivir con una prensa libre, entre otros estorbos democráticos. Ese retoño de dictador, se valió de unos inocentes e iletrados electores para acceder al poder; pero felizmente dichos electores, ya no son tan inocentes y dejaron de practicar ayuno político. La tan detestada - por el minidictador - herencia democrática venezolana ha hecho que quienes se oponen a Chávez, lejos de hacer trincheras, estén conformando un poderoso muro de contención. Pieza fundamental de ese muro es la internacionalización - querida o no - de la crisis y del respectivo socorro que los venezolanos le exigen a la comunidad internacional. Un primer paso fue la presencia de Gaviria en Caracas, luego vino el grupo de países amigos y en el interim el paro cívico-petrolero, que sin duda atrajo a la prensa y demás organismos internacionales; y mientras millones de venezolanos tomaban la calle, se fue activando en el mundo la red de redes de venezolanos en el extranjero, quienes valiéndose de un arma, solo mata dictadores como lo es Internet, contribuyen en el difícil trabajo de hacerse escuchar por quienes ejercen influencia sobre las respectivas opiniones públicas internacionales. Fue así, como recientemente Le Monde le dedicó dos páginas a la oposición y The New York Times, acaba de publicar un excelente artículo de Moisés Naím.

En ese mismo orden, dicha red de redes se aprestaba éste domingo 9 de marzo a una jornada mundial en repudio a la violencia y los abusos del gobierno de Chávez, en 38 ciudades en el mundo. PROVEO, Lucha Democrática, RECIVEX y SAVE Venezuela, han unido esfuerzos no solo creativos sino de divulgación - a través de Internet - con la finalidad de que los venezolanos que residen fuera se agrupen y organicen una misma protesta, el mismo día.

Sin embargo, algunos personajes de esos que se enquistaron en el servicio exterior y en otros cargos de la administración pública, de la IV y V República y que solo la metástasis que constituye la revolución chavista los dejó fuera del guiso; pretenden hoy regenerarse unos, repotenciarse otros, utilizando descaradamente a las activas asociaciones de venezolanos en el extranjero.

Sin embargo, la indetenible y ahora globalizada centrífuga democrática que generan los grupos de venezolanos en el extranjero pondrán más temprano que tarde en su sitio, a estos miserables, quienes en su precariedad intelectual no perciben que ya no hay más espacio para sus vicios, corruptelas y amiguismos. En fin, se trata de la misma precariedad y problema de percepción que va a terminar catapultando a Hugo Chávez y los suyos fuera del poder.

www.veninvestor.com March 8-9, 2003 Good Day,   During the past few days, the United States has stepped up pressure on the Venezuelan government to set a timetable for elections. Yesterday, the US State Department issued a press release with comments by U.S. Under Secretary of State Alan Larson, who spoke at a March 4 energy conference in New York. "Conflict in Venezuela has damaged its reputation as a reliable oil supplier, and all parties to the ongoing political turmoil there must work together to restore confidence, stability and rule of law" The United States is signaling to Chavez that it will not support Venezuela's oil industry if he does not agree to elections.  ""And when the Venezuelan parties show a commitment to seek reconciliation and restore their position as a reliable partner of the United States, they will find a willing and ready partner in the United States."   Under Secretary Larson also said that the US planned to continue seeking energy alternatives, to diminish dependence on a volatile oil market. "In the long run we need new technologies that can fuel our economy without posing threats to the environment or our national security."  Finally, Larson said that the US was seeking new oil suppliers around the world, once again to diminish the impact of crisis from countries such as Venezuela. "We intend to engage intensively with energy partners all over the world to diversify supplies, improve investment opportunities and assure that market forces work as transparently and efficiently as possible."      Further,  during his daily press briefing, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said that in a phone conversation between President Bush and Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo, "a close friend and ally"  both presidents "expressed concerns about threats to democracy in the Andean region", as well as "the need to support Organization of American States Secretary General Gaviria in finding constitutional, democratic, peaceful and electoral solutions to the crisis in Venezuela."    Yet another group of seven US State representatives wrote a letter condemning the Venezuelan government, following this week's letter to Colin Powell by US State Representative Diaz Balart and six other Republicans, yet another group of seven US House representatives presented a letter critical of the Chavez regime. The letter, (see below) is directed at Chavez and states: "We are disturbed by the recent punitive actions taken by your government against the leaders of the opposition to you, and we are particularly concerned by the recent murders of people identified with that opposition." The letter is signed by the same US Congressmen who wrote a letter to President Bush condemning any US "involvement in any unconstitutional effort to overthrow [Chavez's] government."  The letter was a blow to Chavez, who said this week that Diaz-Balart's letter only the reflected the opinion of one person, as well as "international conspiracy" against his government, while claiming that other US Congressmen supported his government.    Finally, Associated Press reports that the U.S. ambassador to Venezuela said Friday that "The United States is concerned that international terror groups have established bases in all Latin American countries."  Shapiro's statements follow comments earlier this week in Miami by the U.S. Southern Command's Gen. James Hill, who said that "that terror organizations, including the militant Lebanese group Hezbollah, were operating in border areas of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay and on Venezuela's Margarita Island."   The Associated Press reports: "The Organization of American States and other mediators have so far failed to get the two sides to agree on the new elections sought by the opposition or to convince the political rivals to curb their harsh rhetoric." She states that the Carter proposals "failed to give impetus to the talks," which are in their fourth months of little progress.  The only agreement reached so far, to curb violence, was violated almost immediately with the gruesome slayings of three dissident soldiers and one political activist, and "the Feb. 18 arrest of opposition leader Carlos Fernandez and bomb blasts outside Spanish and Colombian diplomatic missions last week have further complicated the impasse."     Opinions   Today's opinion is an article in Business Week, titled "Oil and War", which describes all the reasons besides a war with Iraq why oil prices have increased. "First is Venezuela. After a devastating strike, it's still producing far below its previous output, and it may not come back for months or years, if ever."    Our second opinion article is "la oposicion se radicaliza", by Luis de Lion. (www.luisdelion.net)

E-mails   Our e-mails today both concern the Bolivarian Circles. Sydney Hedderich of Toronto describes the formation of a Bolivarian Circle in Toronto, and Liz Mata provides a letter that she wrote to the Miami Herald's Andrea Elliott, who featured them in yesterday's edition.     Events   On March 6, Dr. Margarita Lopez Maya of the Universidad Central de Venezuela will offer a talk titled "Venezuela on the Brink: Popular Protest and Civil Society in a time of Conflict" at 4:00 PM - 6:00 PM at The Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. Lucha Democrática, Resistencia CiviI de Venezolanos en el Exterior (RECIVEX) , SAVE Venezuela and PROVEO would like to invite all Venezuelans to participate in the "Global Day in Repudiation of the Violence and Abuses of the Hugo Chavez Regime", which will take place on March 9 in cities around the world, including Washington DC and London. For upcoming events, please check www.11abril.com, www.proveo.org, www.aveny.com and www.veninvestor.com.   I hope you are safe, content, and peaceful, wherever this e-mail finds you,   Alexandra Beech   Research Staff Carlos Penug (international news) Sol Maria Castro (local news) Conchita Fernandez (Research and Translations)

www.kansascity.com Posted on Sun, Mar. 09, 2003 By KEN BROWN and THADDEUS HERRICK The Wall Street Journal

In a stock market starved for earnings growth, you would think investors would love an industry that is minting money now and could be flush with profits by year's end.

But shares of oil companies were down during the past six months, even as prices have soared on war fears and the strike in Venezuela.

Since its recent low in November, oil is up nearly 50 percent, yet the stocks of oil companies are up about 1 percent, slightly ahead of the overall market, which is flat for that time period. April contracts on U.S. light, sweet crude reached a post-Gulf War high Feb. 27 in New York, settling at $39.99 a barrel.

Investors, in effect, have refused to give the oil companies any credit for higher oil prices. The reason is simple: The last time there was a war in Iraq, oil prices collapsed minutes after the first bombs started to drop, from a peak of $40 a barrel in 1990 to under $20.

The conventional wisdom goes something like this: The United States attacks Iraq, oil prices collapse, the stock market soars and oil stocks lag far behind. No wonder investors have been ignoring the big earnings gains of companies such as BP PLC, ChevronTexaco Corp. and Exxon Mobil Corp.

The problem is, in the fog of war and the fog of the stock market, few scenarios play out exactly as expected.

For instance, conventional wisdom did not anticipate the stock market rally that started once the Persian Gulf War commenced in 1991. Moreover, a growing number of investors and analysts are saying that oil prices may stay higher than expected this year and oil stocks may be more attractive than people believe.

Indeed, the basic assumption of the current conventional wisdom -- that a war in the region will make oil more plentiful and therefore cheaper -- is questionable. Other wars in the Middle East, including the Iran-Iraq war and the conflicts between Israel and its neighbors, all have hurt supply and driven up oil prices, sometimes by huge amounts.

"I think the conventional wisdom is because this is what happened in the Gulf War, as soon as the first shot is fired, you run for the hills," said T. Rowe Price energy analyst Tim Parker, referring to investors selling oil and oil stocks. "But what people forget is, the war before that (Iran-Iraq), when the shooting started, (oil) did the opposite. It went to the moon."

The weak stock prices of oil companies show that even if many investors doubt the consensus view, they aren't buying.

Why? Because even if they believe oil stocks will be higher six months from now, they think the shares will get cheaper when the war starts, and they would rather wait until the stocks touch bottom before laying out money.

"We'll be clamoring down there for that good price and the good price will disappear," Parker says. "I just feel like sometimes we get a little too cute with ourselves."

Investor sentiment is also lagging behind government data.

The Energy Department's Energy Information Administration says low global inventories and dwindling spare-production capacity will keep prices above $30 this year. But an informal poll of 25 money managers based in Boston done by research firm International Strategy and Investment put the price at $27 a barrel at year's end. A mid-January poll by information company Reuters of oil analysts and consultants put the average price of oil at $22.81 this year.

What is clear is that at $30 a barrel or so, oil company earnings will be solid. "Oil companies are in fat city," said Fred Leuffer, a Bear Stearns oil industry analyst. "They're going to coin so much money in the first quarter, I don't think any of us analysts can go higher."

Leuffer, who remains generally bearish on oil and oil stocks, raised his oil price estimate from $18 a barrel to $22 and boosted his 2003 earnings estimates for ChevronTexaco 18 percent to $5.90 and ConocoPhillips by 20 percent to $5.10. He more than doubled his estimate for exploration-and-production firm Kerr-McGee Corp. to $3.75. But, he added, "The market doesn't pay for short-term windfall profits."

Oil averaged $25.03 a barrel in 2002 and $24.86 in 2001. Oil bulls give several reasons why prices can top that this year.

First, commercial inventories are considerably lower than they were in 1991. The International Energy Agency, a watchdog for oil-consuming nations, says stocks of crude oil and refined products are 2.1 percent lower than at the end of 1990, having fallen to 2.541 billion barrels from 2.611 billion barrels more than a decade ago. In the United States, the world's largest oil consumer, crude oil stocks are 12 percent below the five-year seasonal average and 16 percent below year-ago levels.

In addition, analysts don't expect Venezuela to get back to full production anytime soon following the strike there. And demand, driven in part by the cold winter and sport-utility vehicles, has stayed strong. The latest report from the Energy Information Administration showed that demand for petroleum products in the four-week period ended Feb. 21 is up 3.7 percent over the year-earlier period. Demand for distillate, which includes heating oil and diesel fuel, is up 20.9 percent.

"This is the biggest gas-guzzling economic slowdown I've ever seen," said analyst Phil Flynn of Alaron Trading Corp.

Persistently high oil prices could have broad implications for the stock market and the economy. Economists, including the director of energy economics at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, say high oil prices could push the economy's sluggish growth rate toward zero this quarter.

In addition, the costs weigh on consumer spending and corporate earnings. For consumers, spending more on gasoline, electricity and heating oil means less money for wide-screen televisions, vacations and cappuccinos. "Energy prices go up, the consumer chokes and boom we go right back into recession," said Merrill Lynch equity strategist Richard Bernstein.

For the stock market it means the majority of companies earn less, some a lot less, because of energy costs. That could push stocks down.

But it also means oil companies earn more, some a lot more. Analysts say most major oil companies are priced for oil between $22 and $25 a barrel. So if oil prices stick anywhere above $28 a barrel, earnings will soar, either pushing the stocks up or leaving them very cheap.

Bear Stearns' Leuffer calculated that oil exploration and production companies such as Kerr-McGee, Amerada Hess Corp. and Occidental Petroleum Corp. would get the biggest boost to their earnings from rising oil prices. Among the major oil companies, ConocoPhillips, ChevronTexaco, and BP would see their earnings rise the most.

If oil prices fall from their lofty heights but stay relatively high, the biggest beneficiaries could be the oil refiners, companies such as Tesoro Petroleum Corp. and Valero Energy Corp. These companies' earnings would rise as margins increase because the cost of oil would fall faster than the price they get for gasoline and other refined products.

The problem is, investors know this and have driven up shares of the refiners by more than 20 percent since they bottomed in October, well ahead of both the market and the big integrated oil producers.