MYTH #1: President Chavez fights for the poor.

FACTS: Life has become much worse for the poor under President Chavez’ administration. President Chavez’s “revolution” has collapsed under the weight of mismanagement and corruption. President Chavez has destroyed many worthwhile social programs that helped the poor. When Mr. Chavez has to choose between scoring an ideological point and helping people, he chooses ideology. Mr. Chavez’s revolution is no longer about helping people – it is about keeping him in power.

MYTH #2: President Chavez believes in democracy and the rule of law.

FACTS: Mr. Chavez violates his own constitution with impunity. The undermining of independent institutions means there is no way to hold President Chavez accountable for his many crimes… and means that constitutional rights are not available to opponents of the government. Mr. Chavez’s efforts to consolidate control over the Supreme Court continue. Venezuelans are afraid President Chavez will block all constitutional avenues to early elections.

MYTH #3: Freedom of speech is flourishing in Venezuela.

FACTS: The Venezuelan media work in an atmosphere of intimidation and violence. President Chavez incites attacks on individual members of the press. Mr. Chavez uses the government to wage war against the media. Mr. Chavez has proposed a new law to restrict freedom of speech.

MYTH # 4: The tough economic times are due to the strike.

FACTS: The Venezuelan economy was imploding well before the strike. President Chavez has never presented a coherent economic plan, nor has he governed in a way that inspires confidence. The strike was an expression of frustration with (among other things) Mr. Chavez’s gross mismanagement of the economy – it was the result, not the cause, of the failing economy.

MYTH #5: Early elections would set a bad example for the rest of Latin America.

FACTS: Venezuelans face a unique predicament. President Chavez is not your average Latin American lefty. Venezuelans are working within their constitution to achieve early elections.

MYTH #1: President Chavez fights for the poor.

FACTS:

• Life has become much worse for the poor under President Chavez. Since Mr. Chavez first took office, the percentage of people in extreme poverty has risen more than 17%, so that the extreme poor now comprise 34 percent of the population. The price of food has soared. And before the strike, more than 940,000 people had lost their jobs during President Chavez’s rule. In addition, skyrocketing crime – which disproportionately affects the poor – means more people living in fear. In August 2002, 80% of Venezuelans said they thought Chavez had made the country more violent and unsafe. And no wonder – under Mr. Chavez, the number of homicides has nearly doubled.

• President Chavez’s “revolution” has collapsed under the weight of mismanagement and corruption. Mr. Chavez is a disaster when it comes to governing: he has simply been unable to translate his vast executive powers (the executive branch was made much stronger under his new constitution) and record-high oil revenues into any positive changes for Venezuela. In the four years since he took power, he has made 58 Cabinet changes (47 individuals have held Cabinet posts) and appointed four different Vice-Presidents. There have been seven different Ministers of the Interior and Justice, five different Finance Ministers, five different Ministers of Infrastructure, six different Ministers of Commerce, and six different Presidents of state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela (PdVSA).

The chaos in his government has been accompanied by numerous corruption scandals, earning him sharp criticism from Transparency International. And the amounts of money at stake in these scandals are staggering. One example: Venezuela has a rainy day fund called FIEM, in which oil revenues exceeding a certain amount are to be deposited. In 2001, Chavez failed to deposit Bs. 2.3 trillion (the equivalent, at the time, to US$2.9 billion) into the fund, as required by law. He claimed that he needed the money to pay public salaries and year-end bonuses – expenditures already taken care of by line items in the federal budget. So where did that money go?

• President Chavez has destroyed many worthwhile social programs that helped the poor. Mr. Chavez not only failed to turn his grandiose promises into programs that help the poor, he destroyed many worthwhile programs that the poor had relied on. Existing programs that feed school children and poor families, provide school uniforms, and provide daycare for the children of working mothers have either been cancelled or transferred to the Fondo Único Social (FUS), a military-run government institution which has been at the heart of several corruption accusations. Even the Comptroller has admitted to irregularities at the FUS.

• When President Chavez has to choose between scoring an ideological point and helping people, he chooses ideology. After the worst floods in Venezuela’s history, in which thousands were killed and thousands more left homeless, Chavez refused the help of hundreds of American military engineers, ordering that the ship carrying them to Venezuela reverse course and return to the United States. The coastal road that the engineers were to reconstruct, a critical corridor for the region’s commerce, is still largely unusable, affecting the quality of life in the region, damaging the potential for tourism and commerce, and creating an enormous barrier for the region’s socio-economic recovery.

• President Chavez’s revolution is no longer about helping people – it is about keeping him in power. He has admitted as much, telling Venezuelans that it doesn’t matter if they are naked or hungry, as long as the revolution survives.

Mr. Chavez is overseeing a “revolution” in which he can justify spending $65 million on a new presidential jet, even while many Venezuelans sink deeper into grinding poverty.

MYTH #2: President Chavez believes in democracy and the rule of law.

FACTS:

• President Chavez violates his own constitution with impunity. Functioning democracies require more than free elections, they require strong and independent institutions. Yet Mr. Chavez gutted Venezuela’s system of democratic checks and balances by installing top government officials – including the Attorney General, the Comptroller General, the Human Rights Ombudsman, and the Supreme Court justices – without following procedures laid out in the 1999 constitution drafted by his own supporters.

Noted Venezuelan scholar and former Inter-American Court of Human Rights judge Asdrúbal Aguiar has documented 34 constitutional violations by the Chavez government, ranging from Chavez’s removal of all judges and replacing them with provisional judges to ordering the military to disregard any judicial decisions contravening his direct orders.

In her new book “Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism,” Marina Ottaway of the Carnegie Endowment describes Chavez: “He shows no respect for the independence of the judiciary. He prefers legislating by decree to respecting the separation of powers and letting the… National Assembly do its job. In general, he has little respect for institutions… (and) the presence of the military in the government and administration has become pervasive.”

• The undermining of independent institutions means there is no way to hold President Chavez accountable for his many crimes… There are 27 cases against Mr. Chavez pending before the Supreme Court, including charges related to various human rights violations, the April 11th killings, and the receipt of millions of dollars in illegal campaign contributions. It is not clear if any of these will receive a fair hearing – or any hearing at all.

• …and means that constitutional rights are not available to opponents of the government. On January 22, 2003, citing a technicality, the Supreme Court suspended a February 2nd non-binding referendum on Chavez’s rule. Referenda on “matters of national interest” are provided for in the Constitution , and this particular referendum had been requested by two million citizens and approved by the National Electoral Council. The decision was first announced not by the Court itself, but by Chavez’s Vice-President, José Vicente Rangel.

The Constitution is Mr. Chavez’s favorite prop – he holds it up at every opportunity, and loves to proclaim: “Everything within the Constitution, nothing outside the Constitution.” (Of course, he just as frequently vows to stay in office until 2021, which would clearly violate this very same Constitution. ) But Mr. Chavez recently announced that he plans to simply ignore the numerous petitions signed by millions of Venezuelan citizens in “El Firmazo.” Could it be that for President Chavez, the Constitution is nothing more than a useful prop?

• President Chavez’s efforts to consolidate control over the Supreme Court continue. On January 14, 2003, members of Mr. Chavez’s political party introduced a new law in the National Assembly, Chapter III of which would add ten new justices to the Supreme Court. While this is an organic law, and thus requires two-thirds vote to pass according to the Constitution, watch for President Chavez’s attempts to push it through by a simple majority vote.

• Venezuelans are afraid Chavez will block all constitutional avenues to early elections. Given President Chavez’s deplorable track record when it comes to following his own Constitution, many Venezuelans fear that his promise to hold a recall referendum this August is nothing more than smoke and mirrors.

MYTH #3: Freedom of speech is flourishing in Venezuela.

FACTS:

• The Venezuelan media work in an atmosphere of intimidation and violence. Last May, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that “while it is possible to criticize the authorities, criticism brings on intimidation, which limits the possibility of free expression… in the particular case of journalists, the commission found repeated verbal and physical attacks.”

• President Chavez incites attacks on individual members of the press. While describing a particular member of the press he was vilifying, Chavez said, “We must identify the enemies of the revolution…the people need to know who they are and see their faces, know their names -- and here I am, unmasking one of them.” His violent rhetoric has had its intended result: In 2002, there were more than 130 physical attacks on journalists, and independent lawmaker Alberto Jordan has counted more than 60 assaults and threats against reporters in January 2003 alone and more than 600 since Mr. Chavez took office. On December 9th, 2002, in what was clearly a coordinated effort, more than 26 news outlets were attacked, terrorized or vandalized. Mr. Chavez, whose government said the Commission’s efforts were “an attempt to interfere in Venezuela’s internal affairs, rebuffed efforts by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to ensure the freedom and safety of a particular reporter.”

• President Chavez uses the government to wage war against the media. Mr. Chavez’s war on the media includes numerous threats to withdraw broadcasting licenses: the government has begun “investigations” of the nation’s four private TV networks. The international media organization Inter American Press Association called the recent measures “a prelude to definitive censorship that seeks to silence the media… each day the spaces of opinion in Venezuela become narrower; journalist are attacked, threatened, including one being killed, the media are being watched and subjected to constant pressure.” The OAS special rapporteur for freedom of expression, Eduardo Bertoni, has condemned the government’s behavior, stating basic human rights regarding freedom of speech have been violated.

• President Chavez has proposed a new law to restrict freedom of speech. The law (which the government intends to pass as a non-organic law in order to avoid the need of a two-thirds vote in the National Assembly – contravening the Constitution) regulates the content of television and radio programming through subjective criteria and restrictive qualifications. The “Content Law” requires information to be "timely, truthful, plural and impartial." It dictates content and establishes strict schedule restrictions which could prevent the networks from transmitting live news. The law will be enforced by a government-appointed committee.

MYTH # 4: The tough economic times are due to the strike.

FACTS:

• The Venezuelan economy was imploding well before the strike. When President Chavez took office, the price of oil was US$9 per barrel and the public debt was Bs. 2.3 trillion. Four years later – in the months before the strike began – oil prices had risen to US$27 per barrel – yet public debt had skyrocketed to Bs.14 trillion. Between 1998 and October 2002, 5,000 businesses closed up shop. Over the same period, both consumer and wholesale inflation exploded, and unemployment soared, rising from 11 percent in 1998 to 17 percent just before the strike. In 2002 alone, prior to the strike, the Venezuelan economy contracted by 8.6 percent.

• President Chavez has never presented a coherent economic plan, nor has he governed in a way that inspires confidence. Investors know that he is simply not up to the task of overseeing an economy or governing a nation. Since Chavez took office, Venezuela has lost over $33.1 billion in capital flight , an amount equal to 30 percent of GDP.

More than just a simple protest, the strike was a dramatic expression of frustration towards Chavez’s gross mismanagement of the economy and his open despise towards democratic values – it was the result, not the cause, of the worst economic and political crisis ever confronted by Venezuela.

MYTH #5: Early elections would set a bad example for the rest of Latin America.

FACTS:

• Venezuelans face a unique predicament. The effort to achieve early elections in Venezuela is not a matter of simply wanting to get rid of a leader whose policies are unpopular. In Venezuela, we have a President who has violated our Constitution with impunity. We have a President who has not answered for billions of missing bolivares. We have a President who refuses to allow further investigation or prosecution of the April 11th killings. And we have no untainted or impartial institutions to process and give fair hearing to these charges. Thus, the people of Venezuela have come to believe that their ballots are the best way to hold President Chavez accountable or coaccountable for the many crimes, transgressions and violations.

• President Chavez is not your average Latin American lefty. In the many articles about the new wave of Latin American leaders with left-leaning policies, there has been a tendency to lump Mr. Chavez together with leaders such as Lucio Gutierrez of Ecuador or Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil. But make no mistake about it – President Chavez belongs in a category by himself. Michael Shifter of the Inter-American Dialogue described Lula and Chavez as “polar opposites”, noting in particular Lula’s efforts to reach out and build bridges. A recent Los Angeles Times editorial denounced Chavez’s rhetoric as “a hateful message driven by anger” and summed up the differences between the two leaders this way: “Lula has presented a responsible plan to mitigate social ills. Chavez wants to replicate Fidel Castro’s Cuba across the hemisphere.” And Lucio Gutiérrez has himself stated that attempts to link him with Chavez are part of “a campaign by the corrupt sectors of Quito to muddle (his) image in the international community.”

• Venezuelans are working within their constitution to achieve early elections. If President Chavez had a better track record when it came to his own constitution, Venezuelans would not need to seek outside support for their efforts to exercise their constitutional rights. But already there are indications that the millions of petition signatures collected in the February 2nd “Firmazo” will be ignored by the government , in contravention of the constitution. We hope and pray that international leaders advise Mr. Chavez that breaking his own laws and ignoring the voices of millions of Venezuelans will not be tolerated, nor will it go unnoticed to the watchful eyes of the international community.

As Venezuelans we love democracy and peace. We truly appreciate our multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, and socially diverse condition. We understand we have problems and are aware of the many missed opportunities throughout our history. But we are also convinced that Democracy is the only path to prosperity. We do not wish a Venezuela in a constant epic struggle. We neither believe nor wish for magical, short-term solutions. Our efforts are inspired in the desire and right to a bright future. We are determined to find, through democratic means, a solution to our many troubles. And to that end we build upon our values: freedom, solidarity, participation, equal opportunities, progress and justice.

We strive for a country with justice, prosperity and dignity, a Venezuela where no title is more important than that of “Citizen.”

www.veneconomy.com

Los representantes del gobierno parecen no inmutarse ante la crítica realidad económica del país. Ningún ser pensante puede prever una caída en el Producto Interno Bruto de sólo 2% para este año, si durante 2002 el decrecimiento fue de 8,9% con niveles de producción petrolera de 3,3 millones de b/d y un promedio de $22,18 por barril. Es prácticamente imposible que con una capacidad de producción significativamente disminuida y una profundización de la recesión consecuencia del paro nacional, de la destrucción de PDVSA, de la imposición de controles de precios y de cambio y del deterioro del clima político, la caída del PIB pueda ser de apenas 2% como lo estima Felipe Pérez, ministro de Planificación. Existe casi un consenso entre los expertos del sector privado en que la contracción económica no será menor a 15%, lo que representaría el peor comportamiento desde que se llevan estadísticas. Si para los representantes del gobierno es difícil admitir la realidad, parece que lo es más ponerse de acuerdo en torno a las cifras. Mientras Felipe Pérez sólo reconoce un decrecimiento de 2,07%, Tobías Nóbrega, ministro de Finanzas, piensa que no habrá ni crecimiento ni contracción, es decir, cero crecimiento. Lo que no se explica es que si los ministros piensan así, por qué en el presupuesto de la nación se estipula un crecimiento de 3,7%. La situación de las finanzas públicas luce terriblemente comprometida. Mientras que los ingresos petroleros han mermado de manera importante, la recaudación fiscal también se ha reducido como consecuencia de la crisis. El monto de la deuda interna alcanzó el récord de Bs.14,4 billones al cierre de 2002, tras ubicarse en Bs.2,3 billones al cierre de 1998. Incluso se duplicó en términos de dólares. Cuando el ministro encargado de Finanzas, Jesús Bermúdez, reconoció el año pasado en una interpelación en la Asamblea Nacional que el gobierno se había financiado en bolívares porque sabían que la devaluación de la moneda venía en camino, nunca imaginó que la principal fuente de ingresos del país sería desmantelada. Hoy en día, ni el beneficio de una devaluación contribuirá a reducir el enorme peso de la deuda interna. De hecho, ya hacia finales del año pasado y ante la imposibilidad de honrar sus compromisos, el gobierno se vio obligado a refinanciar deuda con la banca nacional. De seguir complicándose el entorno político y económico, Venezuela podría –incluso– verse imposibilitada para cumplir con sus obligaciones del servicio de la deuda pública.

caracaschronicles.blogspot.com By Francisco Toro

So, Carlos Fernández got arrested – what’s the big problem? Listening to his speeches during the General Strike, it’s hard to argue he didn’t break some laws. In particular, when he urged people not to pay their taxes, isn’t it obvious that that’s incitement? And it’s not like Chávez went and arrested him personally: a court ordered his arrest. Isn’t that what courts are for?

It’s an argument you might find compelling, but only if you know nothing about the Venezuelan justice system. The story of Venezuela’s courts in the last four years is the story of a systematic, thorough political purge. By now, the vast majority of Venezuela’s judges have been handpicked by presidential cronies – a good number are clearly presidential cronies themselves. Take, for instance, the judge who initially heard the Fernández case. He’s a long-time chavista activist with a murder conviction on his police rap-sheet who, just a couple of months ago, was serving as defense council for one of the chavista gunmen videotaped emptying his gun into an opposition crowd back in April. He’s far from the exception.

It all started in 1999. It’s hard to believe now, but just four years ago Hugo Chávez had 80% approval ratings and the political capital to do just about anything he pleased. As part of his pledge to reinvent the state from the ground up, Chávez launched a so-called “Judicial Restructuring Committee” charged with overhauling the court system. It was a popular decision back then, and understandably so: years of old regime cronyism had left the courts riddled with political picks who took their marching orders from their respective party patrons. The courts were badly in need of a shake-up, and after years of railing against the political subordination of the judiciary, Chávez seemed like just the man for the job.

But the exercise went wrong from the start. Daunted by the prospect of having to investigate each and every judge one by one, the Judicial Restructuring Committee adopted a highly dubious expedient. They decided to just suspend all judges who had eight or more corruption complaints pending against them. Obviously, it was a quick-and-dirty shorthand. Just as obviously, it demonstrated appalling contempt for the procedural rights of the judges involved. While the move certainly cleared away many of the worst cases of judicial abuse, it doubtlessly also included all kinds of “false-positive” – honest judges who’d accumulated several spurious complaints against them and found themselves booted from the bench with no chance to defend themselves. Indeed, some 80% of Venezuelan judges had that many complaints pending against them, and it’s hard to believe that all of them really were corrupt.

The Restructuring Committee had the power to replace the suspended judges with “provisionally appointed judges.” To keep the purge from bringing the court system to a halt altogether, these provisional judges were hired after a superexpedited selection process. And that’s where the trouble started. In typical form, Chávez had named only personal supporters to the Restructuring Committee. Not surprisingly, they selected only chavistas as provisional judges. The result was a mass swap of politically motivated magistrates: out went the adecos, in went the chavistas.

But the abuse went further than that. A normal Venezuelan judge, under the old system, was terribly hard to get rid of. This created some problems – bad apples were hard to dump – but solved others – honest judges were hard to pressure. Though many judges clearly supplemented their income with bribes, and many answered faithfully to their political patrons, at least they didn’t have to worry that they’d lose their jobs if they handed down a decision that displeased their higher ups.

Provisional judges are different: they have no special labor protections. In fact, they can be removed just as quickly and easily as they were appointed by the same people who initially chose them. So by the end of 1999, not only were the vast majority of Venezuelan judges chavistas, but they were chavistas who knew their job security was totally dependent on their willingness to follow the orders handed down by their political masters.

The president and his cronies soon developed a taste for this new brand of judiciary, chuck-full as it was of defenseless provisional judges. The system made it much easier to keep judges on the straight-and-narrow. So provisional appointments – which, as the name suggests, were initially supposed to last only a few months while regular judges could be selected – became, in fact if not in law, permanent. Today, four years after the restructuring drive started, a whopping 84% of the nation’s 1380 judges are provisional appointments.

Keep this in mind the next time you read a story about a Venezuelan judge ordering an arrest of a political leader. The scrupulously neutral language of international journalism contributes to the appearance that these decisions are based on at least a minimum of democratic legality. But when it comes down to it, these judges are not any harder for Chávez to appoint or remove than his minister, and just as beholden to him.

The situation is just as bad in the Supreme Tribunal, though there the story is a bit more complex. Chávez continually says it’s absurd for people to charge him with controling the Supreme Tribunal, because the tribunal has ruled against him on a couple of high-profile cases. That, he implies, is living proof that he’s purer than pure and never set out to subjugate the court. The truth is far less flattering than that: he did try, it’s just that he was too clumsy to pull it off.

Following the approval of the new constitution in 1999, the old Supreme Court was fired en masse, and a brand new Supreme Tribunal was selected. The appointments required a two-thirds majority in parliament, which Chávez didn’t have. He had no choice but to cut a deal with some of his opponents in the National Assembly to select a new court. To their eternal shame, Acción Democrática and Proyecto Venezuela decided to play ball.

The parliamentary deal to select a new tribunal was old regime politics at its worst - a stereotypical smoky room deal. Between them, the three parties had the required 2/3rds of parliament needed for the appointments, so they more-or-less divvied up the court the way a butcher might cut up a salami. Since MVR had about 70% of the three-party-coalition’s seats, they claimed 70% of the 20-member court: 14 magistrates. AD had about 20% of the seats, so they got to pick their four magistrates. Proyecto Venezuela, as the junior partner, got to pick two. This is not speculation: I’ve heard AD leaders, who were later excorciated by the opposition for playing along on this, defend themselves publicly by saying that only by cutting a deal could they block Chávez from appointing a 100% court. “At least we have a few magistrates,” they say.

Each of the Supreme Tribunal magistrates selected in this way know precisely which party they owe their appointment to, and which party they have to take orders from. Years of angry chavista denunciations against these sorts of shenanigans were left by the wayside. It was, as one pundit memorably put it – “more of the same, but worse.”

The problem is that Chávez screwed it up. Big time. He outsourced the task of picking “his” magistrates to Luis Miquilena, who was his then right-hand man back then. He thought he could trust him. But Miquilena picked personal buddies for the job, some of whom obviously saw him, and not Chávez, as the real boss. Eventually, as Chávez’s governing style became more erratic and authoritarian, Miquilena jumped ship. And when he did, he dragged some of the Supreme Court justices along with him.

That, in essence, is why Chávez has lost some cases before the court: Miquilena has enough pull over a few of the magistrates to turn them against Chávez on selected occasions. So, in a sense, Chávez is right: he doesn’t totally control the tribunal – not anymore. But that’s hardly because either he or the magistrates underwent some sort of mystical conversion to Montesquieu’s liberal vision. The magistrates are still puppets, it’s just that one of the puppeteers switched sides.

Of course Chávez finds this situation intolerable: the very notion that an important branch of government could fall outside his control runs directly counter to the autocratic spirit that animates his whole government. So he’s had his cronies at the National Assembly hatch a plan to expand the number of magistrates from twenty to thirty, together with expedited new methods for appointing magistrates that would allow him to pick ten new, this time reliable, candidates to solidify his wavering majority in the tribunal. It’s shameless court packing. But then, shame is in short supply in Caracas these days.

The move would also solidify his control of the lower courts. Since the new constitution came into force, the Judicial Restructuring committee was wound down and responsibility for managing the nation’s courts now lies with the Supreme Tribunal, through something called the Executive Directorate of the Magistracy – DEM, after its Spanish acronym. Control of the Supreme Tribunal means control of the DEM, and through it, of all the lower courts. So packing the Supreme Tribunal allows Chávez to strengthen his control of the lower courts, and to continue to pack them with provisionally appointed cronies.

In short, the judicial system has become, like the rest of the Venezuelan state, a presidential plaything. The orders to arrest Carlos Fernández and the PDVSA strike leaders are patently, transparently political decisions, bits extracted whole from presidential speeches. These courts, which act with such frightful celerity when it comes to prosecuting the president’s opponents, slow to a glacial pace when it comes to prosecuting the president’s friends, even when those who have been videotaped shooting into crowds of unarmed civilians. To summarize the government’s judicial philosophy: if you call an opposition march you go to jail, but if you empty your gun into that march, you’re a revolutionary hero, and your lawyer is appointed judge.

www.time.com

The U.S. horse-trades; a grassroots war on French products By ROBIN BANERJI

THE ROAD TO WAR Horse Trading on Iraq When the Turkish parliament declined last week to let U.S. troops use Turkey's military bases in a war on Iraq, the decision came with a steep price. Turkey endangered billions of dollars in promised U.S. aid, a role in Iraq after the war — which angered the Iraqi opposition — and even a trade concession that would have had U.S. troops wearing Turkish textiles, breaking the Pentagon's long-standing "Buy American" policy. The U.S. still needs nine out of 15 votes to pass a new resolution in the U.N. Security Council, and member countries are lining up for perks:

Bulgaria One of the U.S.'s staunchest backers on Iraq has already received a nice thank-you. On a tour to tell Eastern Europe "how much we appreciate them" for their support, Commerce Secretary Donald Evans last week gave Bulgaria a special treat: the U.S. now officially considers the country a "market economy," opening a welcome mat to investors.

Guinea A crucial swing vote, the African nation and former French colony has received U.S. military training and support for the West African peacekeepers in charge of preventing rebel groups from crossing the borders. But that may not be enough to sway the country's ailing President, Lansana Conte.

Mexico President Vicente Fox wants Washington's help on a measure granting legal status to undocumented Mexicans working in the U.S. And the U.S. is a crucial trading partner, accounting for 80% of Mexico's exports. But antiwar sentiment in Mexico is high, which may weigh heavily.

Chile This council member has argued for giving more time to the U.N. inspectors. But it has a trade deal with Brie? Non, Merci! Are Americans really ready to give up their Dior gowns to protest French policy on Iraq? The answer mostly seems to be non. Women's Wear Daily reports no drop-off in sales of luxury French designers like Chanel at New York City department stores. The town of Paris, Texas, which proudly displays its French connection, left, says it hasn't seen any backlash. And IHOP says anti-French fervor has not hurt its new breakfast menu item, Stuffed French Toast. "French toast really has nothing to do with France," notes an IHOP spokesman. "This has been our most successful new product." But what about other French fare? — By Harriet Barovick Freedom Fries Cubbies, a restaurant in Beaufort, North Carolina, has dropped the French from its fries, and French salad dressing is now "liberty" dressing francestinks.com This week the website, whose raison d'être is to punish countries labeled part of the "Axis of Weasels," will launch a campaign urging Americans to dump their French wines and champagnes aux toilettes French Wine Pennsylvania, state representative Stephen Barrar suggested barring sales of French wines. But top New York City wine seller Sherry-Lehmann says French bottles are selling well French Cheese Some restaurants have put their Bries and Camemberts on the back of the shelf. High-end cheese seller Fromages.com reports a 15% decline in sales to the U.S. in recent weeks Washington that needs congressional approval.

Angola Recovering from a long civil war, it wants U.S. help in finding donors to rebuild. But two can play this game: France is promising a home in exile for Angola's President. — By Marguerite Michaels and Karen Tumulty

BRITAIN Kicking The Anthill British authorities filed charges of conspiracy to produce a chemical weapon against a group of Islamists arrested during the past four months, including Rabah Kadre, an Algerian apprehended in November amid media reports that he planned a cyanide attack on the London Underground — a plot denied by the British government. Continental police services suspect Kadre of having directed al-Qaeda's European networks. The case of Abu Hamza is trickier. The fiery imam, a naturalized British citizen and outspoken supporter of jihad against the West who formerly preached at London's Finsbury Park mosque, may risk losing his British passport under an impending law allowing revocation of citizenship where there is dual nationality for acts "seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of Britain." In Spain, 16 North Africans arrested in January on a tip from French officials may soon be released. The men were found in possession of false identity documents and chemical substances that might be intended for use in terror attacks. Those substances turned out to be cleaning solvents. The Spanish operation was still a valuable "kick to the anthill," says one French terror official, which provided "new information on how Barcelona has become the point of passage for jihadists moving between Europe and Chechnya." — By Bruce Crumley/Paris

THE NETHERLANDS Crime, Punishment The international war-crimes tribunal in the Hague sentenced former Bosnian Serb President Biljana Plavsic, 72, to 11 years in jail for aiding the persecution of Catholics and Muslims during the 1990s. Plavsic's age, contrition and cooperation with the court all helped to reduce her sentence. Meanwhile, ultranationalist Serb Vojislav Seselj handed himself in to the court but ridiculed its proceedings and refused to enter a plea. He is accused of inciting racial hatred and forming a militia that committed atrocities from 1991 to 1993.

AUSTRIA Facing the Past Austrian Jews had to pay for their own deportation to Nazi death camps, according to a report commissioned by the government. The 14,000-page document details how thousands of Austrians stole homes, businesses and personal items from their Jewish neighbors, who later died in concentration camps. Turkey Not Welcome Yet In a blow to U.S. war plans, Turkey's parliament rejected a bill that would have allowed 62,000 U.S. troops to deploy to Turkish bases. More M.P.s voted for the bill than against, but a number of abstentions meant that it fell short of a majority. The vote signaled rebellion in the ranks of the ruling pro- Islamic Justice and Development Party, despite pressure from its leaders to agree to U.S. deployment in exchange for $30 billion in loans and grants. More than 90% of Turks oppose war, fearing it will cripple the economy and cause chaos on Turkish borders.

ISRAEL Tough Decision Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced his new coalition and cabinet, with rival Benjamin Netanyahu agreeing to a demotion from Foreign Minister to Finance Minister. Netanyahu's first task will be to cope with an economy still reeling from the effects of the intifadeh. But peace seems a distant prospect. Sharon's new coalition, which contains the ultra-right National Union Party, sees no reason to make land concessions to the Palestinians.

PAKISTAN Target: U.S. A gunman wounded a policeman guarding the U.S. consulate in Karachi, took his submachine gun and opened fire. Two policemen were killed, and six people, including one civilian, were wounded before the assailant was arrested.

NORTH KOREA Congratulations As South Korea marked the inauguration of President Roh Moo Hyun, its northern neighbor was not in a celebratory mood. First, it test-fired a long-range missile into the Sea of Japan. Then it restarted its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Some analysts read the moves as attempts to pressure the U.S. into direct talks. But there's also growing consensus that the nuclear program may be more than a bargaining chip — the regime seems to have decided that nukes will ensure survival.

VENEZUELA Explosive Charges Bombs damaged Spain's embassy and Colombia's consulate in Caracas, just 48 hours after President Hugo Chávez criticized the countries for meddling in Venezuelan affairs. Officials denied any connection with Chávez's remarks. Meanwhile, a judge cracked down on those who allegedly helped organize a general strike, ordering the arrests of seven ex-managers in the state-owned oil company.

FOR THE RECORD Cairo Some 100,000 Egyptians rallied against U.S. war plans. The rare, government-sanctioned protest was the biggest in the Arab world outside Iraq.

Xinjiang A powerful earthquake killed at least 268 people, injured more than 4,000 and reduced 10,000 homes to rubble in China's far west.

Lagos Commerce in Nigeria came to a standstill as severe fuel shortages crippled the oil-rich country. Officials blamed an oil workers' strike, soaring prices and panic buying.

Washington, D.C. The U.S. House of Representatives voted to ban human cloning, but the bill could stall in the Senate because it lacks exceptions for research.

Outer Space After 31 years the Pioneer 10 spacecraft, below, one of NASA's most successful missions, fell silent, an estimated 12.2 billion km from Earth.

MEANWHILE Stars in Our Eyes Scientists have finally managed to capture some of the stuff Hoagy Carmichael sang about and after which David Bowie named one of his most compelling personas. Stardust was scooped up by NASA aircraft flying at an altitude of 20 km and spotted with state-of-the-art microscopes. All matter in the universe can be traced to the elements forged in stars. Now scientists must reveal whether stardust actually twinkles.

biz.yahoo.com Reuters Sunday March 2, 2:42 pm ET

CARACAS, Venezuela, March 2 (Reuters) - Venezuela's crude output remained stunted over the weekend after state oil firm Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) was forced to shut in 450,000 barrels per day (bpd) of production last week, dissident oil workers said.

The government, battling to restart the country's strategic oil sector amid a strike that began Dec. 2, temporarily reduced flows from eastern Venezuela by nearly 500,000 bpd on Friday due to an export slowdown.

As shipments decreased, crude stocks at lifting terminals built up and eventually caused oil to be shut at the wellhead.

Dissident PDVSA workers, thousands of whom were fired by President Hugo Chavez during the two-month strike, reported Venezuela was pumping only 1.09 million bpd over the weekend, about 40,000 bpd below Friday levels.

But Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez told state news agency Venpres on Sunday that output was 2 million bpd, flat with levels before the shutdown. But PDVSA managers admitted last week that eastern output had been reduced, although they said fields could be restarted quickly when tankers drained crude stocks.

The OPEC member nation's exports have been held to about half of the nearly 2.7 million bpd shipped before the strike in recent weeks despite government efforts. Oil sales provide 50 percent of state revenue.

Normally the world's No. 5 oil exporter, Venezuelan production has been slashed from 3.1 million bpd in November to under 150,000 bpd at its lowest point during the stoppage, which also cut domestic refinery runs.

Ramirez said an attempt was made on Friday to sabotage a natural gas pipeline feeding the giant 940,000 bpd Amuay-Cardon refinery. However, he said the Cardon plant was still producing 60,000 bpd of gasoline, and that the Amuay plant was on track to restart 140,000 bpd of gasoline production this week.

With the restoration of Amuay-Cardon gasoline units, the government hopes to once again be self-sufficient in fuel supplies by the middle of March. Due to strike-related disruptions, Venezuela has been importing gasoline to meet domestic demand of about 200,000 bpd.