<a href=www.artnewsonline.com>Art News Online June 2003 By Roger Atwood Making up for decades of neglect, North American museums are bolstering their commitment to buying, showing, and studying everything from Mexican colonial portraiture to Chilean Surrealism

The Museo del Barrio's upcoming exhibition "MoMA at El Museo" features some of the Museum of Modern Art's Latin American holdings, including Beatriz Milhazes's 1996 Succulent Eggplants. ©Beatriz Milhazes/Courtesy Museum of Modern Art, New York "No one came," says the museum’s director, James Ballinger.

How times have changed. Now the museum’s sole Kahlo painting, El suicidio de Dorothy Hale (1939), a copy of which appears prominently in the Salma Hayek movie Frida, is one of the prize holdings of the museum, which has been steadily building its modern and contemporary Latin American collection. The institution is now searching for its third full-time curator to run the ten-year-old Latin American division. "I don’t think we could even do a show like that now, because of insurance and the value of the paintings," says Ballinger. "But if we could, we would have lines down the avenue. There is curiosity now about what’s going on in Latin American art and a lot of energy going into bringing it to the public."

American museums, long accustomed to regarding Latin American art as an appendage of other divisions or to ignoring it altogether, are bolstering their commitment to buying, showing, and studying everything from Mexican colonial portraiture to Chilean Surrealism. Two major institutions, the Houston Museum of Fine Arts and the Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA), have recently appointed their first chief curators for Latin American art. Others have held major Latin American shows, including "Brazil: Body and Soul" at the Guggenheim in New York and a survey of South American abstraction at Harvard University’s Fogg Museum. Museums across the country have established community groups aimed at drumming up support and interest for their Latin American programs, and dealers say the institutional push into Latin American art is adding momentum to the market.

New York’s Museum of Modern Art has been dusting off some of its lesser-known Latin American holdings for a show of about 100 works at the Museo del Barrio in New York, called "MoMA at El Museo." The show, which opens September 25, is being curated by a team from both institutions including the Museo del Barrio’s chief curator, Fatima Bercht, and MoMA’s chief curator of drawings, Gary Garrels. It is no reprise of MoMA’s sprawling Latin American survey of 1993 but rather a review of the museum’s own holdings, which originated with Abby Aldrich Rockefeller’s donation of a Diego Rivera painting in 1936. Interest in these has ebbed and flowed with political tides and tastes ever since. Curators exploring a MoMA warehouse are discovering one forgotten jewel after another, most acquired in the 1950s, ’60s, and ’70s, and many never before shown to the public.

"We’re finding things that no one has set eyes on for 40 years," says Garrels. Coming upon Maya Women (1926), a painting by Mexican modernist Roberto Montenegro, who died in 1968, "was this moment of revelation," he notes. Works by Argentine artist Jorge de la Vega, who died in 1970 at the age of 41, and Brazilian painter Antonio Dias, among others, will hang in the show alongside prominent works by Roberto Matta, Joaquín Torres-García, and Wifredo Lam, as well as acquisitions by newer figures like Brazilians Lygia Pape and Beatriz Milhazes and the Argentine Guillermo Kuitca. "It really is the story of a collection, how MoMA developed the whole notions of modern art and Latin American art, and how those notions are now being revisited," says Julian Zugazagoitia, El Museo’s director.

Outside the United States, the Tate appointed its first associate curator of Latin American art in October—National University of Mexico art historian Cuauhtémoc Medina. And in Spain the Museo Reina Sofía just wrapped up a retrospective of paintings by Kuitca. A major show of pictorial work by Mexican-based multimedia artist Francis Alÿs is on view at the Reina Sofía through August 18.

The strongest pitch has been in the U.S. Southwest, where museums are reaching out to the large and fast-growing Hispanic communities that they confess they have neglected. "The ethnic makeup of Houston is becoming strongly Latin American, and I want to make sure that the institution stays rooted in its community—because when it becomes disconnected, it starts to die," says Peter Marzio, director of the Houston MFA. "We’re late getting into this, but from the point of view of geography and demographics it makes a lot of sense. It’s been staring us in the face for so long that we just didn’t see it." Marzio’s museum created a department of Latin American art in May 2001, under the direction of University of Chicago–trained art historian Mari Carmen Ramírez, and has been aggressively acquiring on the high end of the market, including two major works by Torres-García. Acquisitions are coming in "every way you can imagine," says Marzio. "We’re going through dealers, collectors—purchasing some wonderful things—and then we’ve got innumerable sources south of the border, an extremely diverse group of artists and galleries."

The museum’s Latin American department kicked off in March 2002 with a well-received show of works by the late Venezuelan sculptor Gertrudis Goldschmidt, known as Gego. Her delicate abstract figures made of wire, string, and drill bits—she called them "drawings without paper"—are far from the Latin American stereotype of stooped peasants and whitewashed churches.

LACMA bounded into the big leagues of Latin American art with the donation in 1997 of more than 2,000 works by collectors Bernard and Edith Lewin, focusing on 20th-century Mexican painting. Over the past few years, the museum opened a 4,000-square-foot wing to house the collection, appointed a chief curator of Latin American art, Ilona Katzew, and planned an ambitious round of acquisitions. "The idea is to get as wide a spectrum as possible of works from the whole hemisphere," says Katzew. The gaps she is looking to fill are "not particularly inexpensive" and include works by Matta, of whom the museum now has only a few drawings, and Lam.

Meanwhile, curators are also grappling with an array of questions that were more or less settled generations ago in other fields. Many issues are being reexplored, starting with the very idea of "Latin American art" as a collecting area. Debates are simmering over ghettoization, over where—if anywhere—to draw the line between Latin American and U.S. Hispanic art, over whether collections should be organized by national origin as opposed to chronology, theme, style, or medium. All this makes Latin American art one of the most stimulating fields in the art world, say curators.

"We’re in this honeymoon now, but I think certain tensions will emerge later," says Gabriel Pérez-Barreiro, curator of the large and well-established Latin American collection at the Jack S. Blanton Museum of Art at the University of Texas. Slapping together vastly disparate kinds of Latin American art is bound to create a strain, he says. "If you’re looking at art from Argentina you might as well be looking at art from Russia, and yet there it is being bunched together with things from Mexico or Cuba." Pérez-Barreiro is critical of the approach some museums are taking in expanding their Latin American holdings. "Directors see a gap; they have no idea what to do about it; and instead of addressing it institution-wide, they form whole Latin American departments, which helps fund-raising but doesn’t fix the problem," he says. "The risk is that when other departments are formed on a medium basis, like paintings or drawings or sculptures, and then you add a department called ’Latin America,’ with all mediums included in it, it becomes a form of tokenism."

Interest in Latin American art at U.S. museums has come and gone like Latin dance crazes over the decades. Mexican muralists Rivera and José Clemente Orozco were celebrities before World War II, but their work "looked a bit old and out of step after the war," says Marzio. A brief spurt of acquisitions in the late 1940s and early 1950s focused on the Chilean Surrealist Matta, who influenced the U.S. Abstract Expressionists, and on a few artists then in vogue who have since slipped in critical esteem, such as Oswaldo Guayasamín. But museums failed to build on those foundations, and Latin American art was relegated to the basements and warehouses. A kind of curatorial estrangement set in, and it didn’t lift until the 1990s.

MoMA’s erratic relationship with Latin America is a case in point. It started with gifts from the Rockefellers in the 1930s, followed by an infusion of Rockefeller money early in the course of World War II, with the explicit strategic intent of shoring up support for the Allied cause among South American elites, who in Argentina and, to a lesser extent, Chile, sympathized with Fascism. Arts patron Lincoln Kirstein toured Latin American galleries and garrets, buying scores of works as he went. Some were featured in a 1943 show and have not been seen publicly since.

MoMA’s show at the Museo del Barrio (created at the latter’s initiative) "proved to be the perfect catalyst" for MoMA’s long-standing desire to bring more of its vast Latin American holdings to the public, says Garrels. MoMA planned a retrospective of the work of Venezuelan painter Armando Reverón, known for bleached landscapes evoking the intensity of tropical light, for late 2004, but political turmoil in Venezuela has put the show on indefinite hold. Garrels insists the museum remains committed to it. "There’s a chance it will be the first major show" at MoMA’s new building in Manhattan in 2005, he says.

But don’t expect MoMA to create a Latin American department, says Garrels. "We’re not working like that. We’re very actively building a collection and folding it into each individual department. It’s part of the reinterpretation of what constitutes modernism and where its edges are. Matisse and Picasso are going to remain very much the heart of the museum."

Most museums are buying Latin American art partly on the assumption that they should "reach out" to Hispanics, yet the notion that Latin American immigrants and their descendants prefer to see art from their homelands is itself the subject of some bracing debate. Do Hispanic immigrants necessarily want to see Latin American art more than, say, French Impressionism?

"Yes, it is an assumption, but it’s an assumption based on the understanding that this community not only has a sense of pride in its culture but wants to make North Americans more aware of the riches of that culture," says the Houston MFA’s Ramírez. "We’re doing this not as a reaction to pressure to be politically correct but as an organic movement within the museum." A new private endowment supports her curatorial post, a signal to everyone, she says, "that this department is here to stay and that everything we do in terms of Latin American art is part of a long-term commitment." The Blanton Museum’s Pérez-Barreiro cautions against assuming that Latin American art will bring Texas’s highly heterogeneous Hispanic community into museums. "It’s a strange assumption to make. You’re sort of sending people back to where they came from."

A Rivera show at LACMA in 1999 drew huge crowds, giving a sense of the potential for high-quality Latin American shows, says Katzew. "It’s a tricky thing. You can accept that the Hispanic community wants to see Latin American art but also accept that it might want to see European art, for example," she adds. To puncture the ghettoization charge, she placed a piece called Armoire by the three-man Cuban collective Los Carpinteros in the museum’s modern-and-contemporary gallery, giving the work a larger resonance.

Many museums are farther along in collecting Latin American photography than in acquiring painting and sculpture, particularly Mexican work from the first half of the 20th century. The Getty Museum in Los Angeles mounted a show of about 100 photographs by Mexican master Manuel Alvarez Bravo in late 2001, based mostly on gifts and loans to the museum. Works by contemporary photographers Sebastião Salgado and Sergio Larraín and early Peruvian master Martín Chambi are also in demand, say specialists. Adding to the spark in Latin American art is the fact that comparatively little critical, analytical, or historical scholarship has been done on the subject. "We’re confronting this incredible lack of art-history research and scholarship," says Ramírez. Poor infrastructures in Latin American libraries and research centers has only worsened matters, she says. At the same time, the lack of serious work in museums until now has meant that auction houses such as Sotheby’s and Christie’s have taken outsize roles in defining tastes and styles, she says.

"That’s what creates a lot of the energy in Latin American art, this amazing sense of discovery about it," explains Phoenix’s Ballinger. "The lack of scholarship is a penalty, no question, but it opens up a sense among collectors and the public that there is much left to learn about Latin American art, unlike in other fields where you’ve got book after book after book on all the major figures." The appearance of more serious public venues in Latin America, like the new Museo de Arte Latinoamericano de Buenos Aires, has helped form a sense of evolution and volume in Latin American art and aided research, say curators.

Instead of the usual inquiries into modernism’s influence on Latin America, scholars are now going in the opposite direction—looking at the depth of Matta’s legacy to midcentury U.S. art, for example. Research by Bronx Museum curatorial associate Amy Rosenblum Martín traces the way Latin American esthetics found their way into the work of Camille Pissarro and Paul Gauguin, who each spent a part of his childhood in Venezuela and Peru, respectively; and of Manet, who visited Brazil. "Latin America is a neglected strand in the development of modernism," she says.

The push by museums into Latin American art is helping sustain prices throughout the current recession, particularly for titans like Matta, Rufino Tamayo, and Fernando Botero. At the same time, the steady rise in value of Latin American art makes donations more attractive because donors can deduct the appreciated value. "There are a lot of private collectors holding major pieces of Latin American art in this country for which they paid very little money," says Marzio. "This is one time when the tax code is our friend." The result is that donations are driving acquisitions to an unusual degree. The Boston Museum of Fine Arts developed a respectable Latin American collection overnight last January with a donation from the late New York doctors Melvin Blake and Frank Purnell. Included in the gift of 60 works focusing on Spanish realists were 12 works by Chilean-born realist Claudio Bravo, whose canvases have sold at auction for $1.4 million, and a pair of nudes by Botero.

The trade is feeling the momentum, says dealer Mary-Anne Martin, whose New York gallery pioneered some major Latin American artists in the early 1980s but is now one in a crowded field. "It’s been kind of all or nothing—20 years ago I don’t think any museums were buying Latin American art," she says. "Part of the change is that some of the most sought-after artists and photographers these days happen to be Latin American. Gabriel Orozco, Ernesto Neto, a few others—these are names on the must list for any museum. We’ve definitely broken the ghetto barrier."

Roger Atwood is a Washington correspondent for ARTnews.

June 3 (<a href=quote.bloomberg.com>Bloomberg) -- Brazil's currency rose for the first day in three after Banco Bradesco SA, the country's third-largest bank, sold $150 million of debt, raising investors' expectations capital flows to the country will rise.

The real rose as much as 1.5 percent to 2.9345 per dollar in Sao Paulo trading after Bradesco sold the bonds, raising three times the originally announced amount of 18-month bonds. The real was at 2.9440 per dollar, or 1.1 percent stronger than yesterday's close, at 3:59 p.m. New York time.

The real, which has gained 20 percent this year against the dollar, the best performance of the world's 16 most traded currencies, was also bolstered after Fitch Ratings raised its outlook on Brazil's debt to positive from stable.

The flows remain strong,'' said Daniel Vairo, a trader with Opportunity Asset Management Ltda., a Rio de Janeiro-based company that manages about 7 billion reais of bonds and stocks. As much as $200 million to $500 million could come in the next two weeks.''

Brazilian banks and companies have sold more than $5 billion of foreign-currency debt in 2003, taking advantage of U.S. interest rates at four-decade lows to borrow abroad and invest at home where rates are at 26.5 percent a year or more. Banco Bradesco SA, Brazil's third-largest bank, completed its sale today.

The yield on 2-year U.S. Treasury bonds, a benchmark for U.S. borrowing fell to 1.198 percent, the lowest in more than 53 years. Rates in Brazil are at four-year highs. The Bradesco bonds will pay interest of 4.8 percent.

Hedging Bet

Such flows may be enough, Vairo added, to limit the effect of yesterday's central bank auction of interest-rate swaps, a contract used by investors to insure against declines in the real against the dollar.

Last week the government ended its promise to refinance all of its $100 billion of interest-rate swaps, known in Brazil as ``cupom cambial.'' At yesterday's auction, it sold 77.8 percent of the total of swaps and dollar-indexed debt maturing June 12, a move that some believe will force companies to buy dollars in the spot market to hedge against currency risk.

So far demand for hedge is not materializing,'' said Carlos Gandolfo, a partner at Pioneer Corretora de Cambio Ltda., a Sao Paulo currency brokerage that handles about a third of all currency trades in Brazil's spot market. Exports and other capital flows to the country are strong, and that's helping the real today.''

Tipping Point

The debt-rating upgrade by came after the government of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva implemented policies to control spending and pass changes to the pension and tax systems aimed at reducing the country's $400 billion debt, Fitch said in a statement.

An alliance between Lula's Workers' Party and the Democratic Movement Party, or PMDB, was also a factor in the change, Fitch said.

The alliance with the PMDB puts them over the tipping point to win a constitutional amendment that would allow passage of pension and tax reforms,'' Morgan Harting, sovereign risk analyst for Fitch in New York. We think default risk has been reduced, there is less uncertainty about Lula today than there was a few months ago.''

A higher credit rating would make the country more attractive to some investors and could lower the cost Brazil must pay to borrow from investors abroad.

Brazil's B long-term sovereign credit rating means investment in the country's debt is highly speculative'' and that financial commitments are currently being met; however, capacity for continued payment is contingent upon a sustained, favorable business climate,'' according to Fitch ratings definitions.

Debt, Outlook

Today, Brazil sold 5.82 billion reais of fixed- and floating- rate debt at its regular Tuesday bond auction. It sold 3.32 billion reais of floating-rate notes, known as LFT's, and 2.5 billion reais of fixed-rate Treasury notes, known as LTN's.

The real rose in the futures market. The U.S. dollar contract for July 1 settlement, the most traded on Sao Paulo's BM&F commodities and futures exchange, fell 1.4 percent to 2.990 reais to the dollar.

Brazil's 8 percent bond maturing in 2014 rose 0.56 cent to 89.56 cents on the dollar, paring the yield to 10.59 percent, according to J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.

Regional Currencies

Mexico's currency weakened for the second day in three after yields on the benchmark 28-day Treasury note fell to a record low at the central bank's debt auction today.

The peso fell 0.4 percent to 10.2745 per dollar from 10.2470 yesterday, paring its gains in 2003 to 0.8 percent, the 12th-best performance of the 16 most widely traded currencies.

Mexico's benchmark one-month Treasury bill yield fell to 4.72 percent from 4.91 percent a week ago at a government debt auction. The 91-day bill's yield fell to 5.11 percent from 5.43 percent a week ago, the central bank said on its Web site.

Chile's peso fell for the first day in four, pacing the price declines of the country's biggest export, copper.

The peso fell 0.3 percent to 713.05 per dollar from 711.10 yesterday as copper declined for the first day in four in New York trading.

Argentina's peso gained for a third day, rising 0.4 percent to 2.8375 per dollar to boost its gain in 2003 to 18 percent, the second-best performance among 59 currencies tracked by Bloomberg.

Colombia's peso weakened for the first day in three, declining 0.1 percent to 2,848.73 per dollar. Peru's new sol was little changed at 3.4922 per dollar from 3.4932 yesterday. Venezuela fixed its bolivar at 1,598 per dollar this year.

The Washington Post Friday, May 30, 2003; 7:15 AM

The long-sought beginning of the end of President Hugo Chavez's "Bolivarian revolution" is at hand. On Thursday, Chavez's government signed a plan brokered by the Organization of American States that could conclude his contentious reign by December.

The agreement, which some liken to a virtual suicide pact for the Venezuelan president, requires Chavez to submit to a binding referendum on his tenure. If he loses the referendum and is then not allowed on the ballot in a new presidential election, he will be out of office halfway through his current term. That is, if Chavez intends to comply and not simply use the agreement to dupe the international community into going away and further weaken his already battered opponents.

U.S. officials and others in the international community--as well as the Venezuelan opposition--say they will press Chavez relentlessly to abide by the outcome of the agreed-upon "electoral exit." And so they should. But this time they should really be careful not to overplay their hand.

With Chavez's political end in sight, the temptation for the opposition will be to denigrate anything and everything that he represents. But such actions risk alienating his supporters and ignore the opposition's own end of the bargain, which in both cases could help Chavez survive or give him an excuse to withdraw from the agreement.

Disillusioned with politicians that ignored their plight for years, millions of Venezuelans turned to Chavez and his promise to end the cruel irony of dirt-poor life in an oil-rich land. On these sentiments alone, Chavez remains popular among the disaffected. Personalizing opposition to him or offering little to the poor directly will cement their commitment to Chavez.

According to the agreement, the opposition must refrain from actions that may incite more violence, and also concentrate efforts to ensure that the media will play an impartial role in the events to come. Any backtracking by the opposition or Chavez will only make things worse for the country now.

The Bush administration's policy on Venezuela has caromed clumsily between two regrettable extremes: benign neglect and diplomatic blunder. More recently, it seems to be echoing the Venezuelan opposition's doubts that Chavez will stick to the plan if he believes he may not come out victorious.

With that in mind, some observers outside the administration have begun to suggest threatening an oil boycott to keep him from balking. After all, the thinking goes, the United States is Venezuela's No. 1 customer, and as such carries one "big stick" to pummel Chavez into compliance.

But so far there is no indication the Bush administration is considering such an ill-advised tactic that would mostly hurt those Venezuelans already at the bottom, those who already suspect that Washington never fully trusted their ballots democratically cast for Chavez.

Viewed from here, their situation has hardly improved under Chavez. His social vision had merit, yet after more than four years in office, often appearing more concerned with antagonizing his enemies than with governing, he has strayed far from the path of responding to popular needsand discontent.

Chavez has presided over the worst economic contraction in his nation's history. Last Friday, Venezuela's Central Bank reported a 29 percent drop in the country's gross domestic product during the first quarter of this year. At its worst, Argentina's GDP dropped 20 percent in four years.

A great measure of the blame also falls on the shoulders of the opposition that organized a destructive strike at the end of last year aimed at forcing Chavez out, regardless of the economic cost to the country. With elections imminent, now is the time for the opposition to prove that it stands for something and not just against Chavez.

Opposition forces have begun efforts to gain ground among Chavez's supporters and to show commitment to a social agenda. Yet the initial, tragic results have only proved the complications of the task. One person died and many others were injured during a rally organized by one opposition party last weekend in a Caracas slum.

Ironically, the first phase of Chavez's "electoral exit" may be the easier one for the opposition--winning the referendum. A scant 30 days later, opposition forces would then have to unite behind a candidate. If they fail, and if Chavez gets on the ballot through Supreme Court intervention, the opposition's actions might prove to be its own undoing. This week's agreement then would have been merely a beginning with no end in sight.

Marcela Sanchez's e-mail address is desdewash(at symbol)washpost.com.

<a href=www.hispanicbusiness.com>HISPANIC BUSINESS

WATERBURY, Conn., June 3 /PRNewswire/ -- Known throughout Latin America for its customized water resources solutions, Haestad Methods today announced the details of its latest tour to the region. Beginning on June 3, the tour promises to attract more than 500 clients from the continent's leading water utilities and consulting firms, who are eager to participate in the presentations, localized training, and on-site visits.

Haestad Methods will launch the tour by showcasing its complete suite of water, storm, and sanitary sewer modeling software at the Aquatech Fitma Brazil exposition in Iberapuera, Sao Paulo on June 3-5. The main attraction will include demonstrations on Haestad Methods' groundbreaking WaterGEMS(R) for ArcGIS(TM), the most powerful GIS (geographic information systems) software designed for efficiently modeling, managing, and protecting water distribution infrastructure.

Responding to the continuous demand for hydrologic and hydraulic training, Haestad Methods will lead several new training programs throughout the region. Training will take place in Sao Paulo, Brazil on June 9-13; Mexico City, Mexico on July 21-25; and Bogota, Colombia on September 1-5. Participants will earn an A+ Modeler Certificate for each two-day course completed on water distribution and sanitary sewer design and modeling. Following each set of training sessions, Haestad Methods will sponsor an Open House, where attendees have the opportunity to view demonstrations and presentations on cutting-edge technologies for water resources modeling.

For over a decade, Haestad Methods has provided its Latin American clients with customized products and services including Spanish and Portuguese versions of WaterCAD(R) water distribution modeling software and on-line discussion forums. Just a year ago, Haestad Methods had the privilege of training more than 300 water resources professionals from the most influential companies based in Chile, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama, Uruguay, and Mexico.

"Much excitement has been generated on behalf of the civil engineers, professors, and consultants who are planning to participate in this customized tour," said Norelis Florentino, Latin American Markets Director for Haestad Methods. "Our team looks forward to providing its Latin American clients with the resources they require to continue building cost-effective and efficient water and wastewater systems."

Professionals interested in attending an upcoming training event can view complete course and registration information by visiting www.haestad.com/ced/workshops, calling +1-203-755-1666, or e-mailing international@haestad.com. Haestad Methods' water resources discussion groups can be accessed by visiting www.haestad.com/lists.

About Aquatech Fitma Brazil 2003:

Aquatech Fitma Brazil is the most complete and important event for the water and environmental sector in Brazil and Latin America. Its 3rd annual event will take place on June 3-5, at the Pavilhao da Bienal in Ibirapuera, Sao Paulo. Aquatech Fitma reaches new and higher levels of prestige, evidenced by the growing number of participants, among exhibitors, visitors, and those attending simultaneous events. Aquatech Fitma Brazil provides one of the best forums in the world for exhibiting the latest technologies for the water and wastewater industry. For more information on Aquatech Fitma Brazil 2003, visit www.aquatechtrade.com.

About Haestad Methods:

Haestad Methods has been in the business of providing engineers with technology for 25 years and is internationally recognized as the world's leading water resources software company. Haestad Methods provides more than 125,000 civil engineers in over 170 countries with hydrologic and hydraulic modeling software, services, continuing education workshops, and publications. Haestad Methods' complete suite of engineering software products for water, stormwater, and wastewater modeling and management includes WaterGEMS(R), WaterCAD(R), PumpMaster(TM), Darwin(TM), WaterSafe(TM), SewerCAD(R), StormCAD(R), PondPack(R), FlowMaster(R), CulvertMaster(R), and HEC-Pack(TM). Haestad Methods trains thousands of engineers each year. It is duly authorized to award CEUs and PDHs and is licensed by Sandia National Laboratories to conduct RAM-W(SM) (Risk Assessment Methodology for Water Utilities) Training.For more information, call Haestad Methods at 1-800-727-6555 (USA or Canada) or +1-203-755-1666 (worldwide), e-mail info@haestad.com, or visit www.haestad.com, www.watersecurity.org, or www.civilquiz.com. Haestad Methods

CONTACT: Christine Byrne, Public Relations of Haestad Methods,+1-203-805-0432, cbyr@haestad.com

Web sites: www.haestad.com http: www.watersecurity.org

Source: PR Newswire

<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela's Electronic News Posted: Tuesday, June 03, 2003 By: Coletta Youngers

FPIF Policy Report by Coletta Youngers: From Chile to Cuba to Mexico, Latin American countries united behind Washington in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The Organization of American States (OAS) issued a declaration stating, "Individually and collectively, we will deny terrorist groups the capacity to operate in this Hemisphere. This American family stands united." Yet despite this overwhelming show of solidarity, the Bush administration has largely turned its back on its Latin American allies. Most disturbingly, it is unilaterally waging war against its own Latin American "axis of evil" -- the Colombian "narcoterrorists," Cuba's Fidel Castro, and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez -- with little if no effort to take into account the concerns of Latin American leaders, reach regional accords, or engage the OAS.

Yet another country was added to the "axis of evil," according to conservative Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), with the election of Luiz Inacio ("Lula") da Silva in Brazil. Upon taking office, Lula pledged to eradicate hunger in the region's largest country ... a far greater threat to most Latin Americans than international terrorism, prompting Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to proclaim an "axis of good."

US policymakers have long considered the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay a hotbed of Arab radicalism, concerns fueled by bombings carried out by Hezbollah in Argentina in 1992 and 1994.

The 2001 State Department report on terrorism still refers to the region as a "hub for Hezbollah and HAMAS activities, particularly for logistical and financial purposes," concerns echoed again in the 2002 report. Arab populations in Latin America are now under close scrutiny by US intelligence officials, raising serious civil rights concerns. However, alleged terrorist activity in this area of the world pales in comparison to other US global priorities. In short, Latin America is near the bottom of the US anti-terrorist agenda.

The one exception is Colombia. Home to three groups on the US State Department's list of foreign terrorist organizations and the 3rd-largest recipient of US military aid in the world, Colombia remains the centerpiece of US counter-terrorist efforts in the hemisphere. In the post-September 11 worldview of most Washington policymakers, the distinction between terrorists and drug traffickers operating in Colombia and other places has been obliterated. "Terrorism and drugs go together like rats and the bubonic plague," proclaims US Attorney General John Ashcroft. "They thrive in the same conditions, support each other and feed off of each other." The United States has consequently collapsed its anti-drug and counter-terrorism efforts into a single offensive.

US Policy Toward the Region

Across Latin America, a general malaise has set in due to the never-ending and escalating economic crisis, deep-rooted corruption, and the inability of democracy to truly take root. Years of following Washington's prescribed free-market economic policies have not only failed to pay off, the region has moved backward -- poverty has increased, privatizations have led to rampant corruption and often skyrocketing prices for basic services, and inequality is worse than ever. The combination of economic and political instability can be deadly for weak governments, as was so brutally illustrated in the protests in Argentina in December 2001 that brought down the de la Rua government. Yet the Bush administration's response to the Argentina crisis is symbolic of its present approach to the region. Like an angry father, Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill scolded Argentina and suggested that it get its own house in order, and the rest of the Bush administration largely adopted a similar tone. Not even the surprise victory of former president Carlos Menem in the first round of voting in presidential elections--or his quick withdrawal weeks later -- provoked significant comment from Washington foreign policymakers, almost single-mindedly focused on the occupation of Iraq.

The trend toward disengagement with the Latin American region evident since September 11 has been exacerbated in the wake of the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. Tensions are likely to increase as well; Latin American leaders across the political spectrum opposed the US administration's actions in Iraq, for ideological or economic reasons. The economic impact on the already fragile region is likely to be devastating, as already evident in increased gasoline prices.

Moreover, the Bush administration has made clear that it now favors those few neighbors who joined the "coalition of the willing." Because of their prominent roles in the UN National Security Council in opposing immediate military action, Chile and Mexico in particular have borne the wrath of Washington. In explaining the recent delay in moving forward with the free trade agreement with Chile negotiated last year, US Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick said that "people are disappointed… We hoped for their support in a time that we felt it was very important." Mexican President Vicente Fox has also faced growing hostility from hardliners in the Bush administration, which went so far as to cancel this year's festivities to celebrate Cinco de Mayo, a prominent Mexican and Mexican American holiday.

The present situation stands in stark contrast to President Bush's stated intentions upon assuming office, when he promised to develop a special relationship with Latin America and with Mexico in particular. Encouraged by Mexican President Vicente Fox and fueled by the desire to capture more of the Hispanic vote at home, the Bush administration began moving in the direction of a radical reform of US immigration policy, which could have significantly reshaped not only US-Mexican relations, but US-Latin American relations more broadly. All of this, however, was derailed by September 11.

US policy toward the region in the wake of September 11 has largely returned to the "rollback" framework adopted by the Reagan administration at the height of the cold war. Latin America is viewed as a region where "terrorist" threats are to be eliminated, particularly in the tumultuous Andean countries and communist Cuba. As such, the region is viewed not as an opportunity for constructive international engagement, but as a threat. This strategy was unleashed full-force in the wake of September 11. Speaking of Colombia, Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), chairman of the House International Relations committee went so far as to warn that "three hours by plane from Miami, we face a potential breeding ground for international terror equaled perhaps only by Afghanistan. The threat to American national interest is both imminent and clear."

• Nonetheless, since September 11, very little engagement by high-level US officials -- with the occasional exception of Colombia -- has occurred.

The Bush administration's approach departs somewhat from that of its predecessor. While the Clinton administration also adopted a get-tough approach to "narco-terrorists" and dramatically increased US military involvement in Colombia, it at least rhetorically limited the mission to counter-narcotics and paid lip service to the Colombian peace process. More broadly, it placed greater emphasis on multilateral mechanisms and regional consensus-building in approaching conflict situations and issues such as the environment that are not on the Bush administration's radar screen.

Greater continuity is evident in the pursuit of US economic interests, despite the recent setbacks in Chile. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations have pursued free trade agreements to ensure US economic dominance of the hemisphere and to promote US business interests. The Bush administration also views the region as a source of oil and oil profits. In both Mexico and Venezuela, it has encouraged changes in legal and constitutional restrictions on foreign investment in domestic oil production and has sought to increase imports to the United States. Mexico has responded cautiously to such overtures, while Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez has repeatedly rebuffed them.

The Venezuela Debacle

Indeed, the Bush administration's first major foreign policy debacle in the region took place in Venezuela as a result of an apparently military-led coup against President Chavez. Several days of business and labor protests in that country culminated in a massive march on April 11, 2002 in which unidentified gunmen killed at least 18 people. Chavez' foes moved against him later that night, taking Chavez prisoner and announcing his resignation from office. Business leader Pedro Carmona was asked to head the unconstitutional, military-installed government. Carmona's rise to power, however, was short-lived. Within two days, Chavez ... who claimed never to have resigned ... was back in the presidential palace.

In stark contrast to most Latin American governments, the Bush administration immediately accepted the illegitimate Carmona government, issuing an unusually undiplomatic statement on April 12 that blamed Chavez for his own fall.

US involvement in the coup attempt itself is not at all clear; however, it does appear that the administration had decided that Chavez had to go.

As the 4th-largest supplier of US crude oil to the United States, Venezuela has been an obvious target for US hegemonic designs, particularly in light of Chavez's preferred policy of cutting production to keep prices high. Moreover, Chavez had angered many in Washington with his overtures to "rogue" rulers in Iraq, Libya, and particularly Cuba.

Months prior to the coup, a steady stream of Venezuelan opposition leaders made their way to Washington, many with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and right-wing think tanks. They met with a range of US officials who, while maintaining opposition to an outright coup, likely made it clear that they would very much like "Chavez to go away," ideally via a constitutional maneuver ... a strong message of support for some sort of action was sent.

The Bush administration's quick embrace of the short-lived Carmona government was criticized across the region, providing "Latin Americans cause to wonder," according to analyst David Corn, "if the United States is continuing its tradition of underhandedly meddling in the affairs of its neighbors to the south."

It also sent a dangerous message about the weak US commitment to democratic principles. The US stance toward Chavez, as well as interventions in electoral campaigns in Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Brazil in favor of or in opposition to particular candidates, sends the very clear message that Washington supports electoral democracy -- as long as its candidate wins.

President Chavez, however, has weathered the political storm to date. He emerged victorious from the 2-month work stoppage in December and January, having shown his ability to hang onto power and maintain significant popular support. Divisions within the opposition, on the other hand, were accentuated by its failure to oust the president. Venezuela's future remains volatile, but it is increasingly likely that Chavez will indeed make it to the end of his presidential term.

Castro's Cuba

The impact on the Bush administration of Chavez' relations with Cuba's Fidel Castro cannot be underestimated. The appointment of Otto Reich as President Bush's first Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America was widely interpreted as a payback to the conservative, Miami-based Cuban-American community for its support of Bush in the Florida recount, as well as "pay-forward for their continued support in the 2002 gubernatorial and congressional elections."

A Cuban-American and former lobbyist for Bacardi, Reich has strong ties to that community.

Despite growing support on Capitol Hill at the time of Bush's inauguration for a reform of US policy toward Cuba, the Bush administration adopted a firm commitment to the US economic embargo and to continued isolation of the Cuban government, with no significant policy change likely in the foreseeable future.

In an explosive speech before the Heritage Foundation on May 6, 2002, John Bolton, under secretary for arms control and international security, went even further, bluntly stating: "The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited offensive biological warfare research and development effort. Cuba has provided dual-use biotechnology to other rogue states." He also noted that Castro had recently visited Iran, Syria, and Libya, all states designated by Washington as sponsors of terrorism. Administration officials frequently repeat a statement allegedly made by Castro on his visit to Iran that operating together, Iran and Cuba could "bring America to its knees." Bolton offered no evidence to support his assertions of biological warfare, which were quickly deflated by former President Jimmy Carter's historic May 2002 trip to Cuba. Carter said that he was told by US officials that "there was no evidence linking Cuba to the export of biological weaponry," and while in Cuba, he was given complete access to the country's biomedical facilities.

These sorts of accusations take on greater urgency on the island now that the Bush administration has illustrated its willingness to take pre-emptive military action against its perceived enemies. Though Cuba has not yet made it into the "axis of evil," there are certainly those within the administration who would like it to be there. "To Castro," notes scholar William Leogrande, "who has been the object of US efforts at regime change for 44 years, this is ominous."

This -- combined with the country's growing economic crisis and hence increasing popular discontent -- likely explain Castro's harsh actions of late. In March, 75 people -- including political dissidents, journalists, and human rights activists -- were arrested, essentially charged with treason and given sentences ranging from 6 to 28 years. Then, in April, the Cuban government executed three individuals accused of hijacking a ferry to flee to the United States. The Washington Office on Latin America, the Center for International Policy, and other leading NGOs active in the Cuba debate widely condemned these actions. Ultimately, Castro's recent moves play into the hands of administration hard-liners seeking to further restrict US policy toward Cuba.

The Colombian Quagmire

The US government is seeking to expand its hegemonic reach across the Andean region, driven in part by the political and economic instability of all of the Andean countries and the potential for "spill-over" of the Colombian conflict into bordering countries. Otto Reich, later named special envoy to the Americas, likes to point out that if the so-called narco-guerrillas were to "ever gain control over larger parts of Colombian territories, I think there is no doubt that they will take their business, which is narcotics and terrorism, to other countries." In short, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have become the Al Qaeda of Latin America.

As noted, three of the 28 groups listed by the State Department as foreign terrorist organizations are in Colombia: the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the right-wing paramilitary coalition, the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC).

In 2001, more kidnappings took place in Colombia than any other country in the world. According to the US State Department's most recent report on global terrorism, between 1980 and 2002, the FARC killed at least ten American citizens and three more remain unaccounted for. The threat to US operatives in Colombia has received widespread press attention since three Americans, civilian contractors, were captured by the FARC last February, after their plane crashed in southern Colombia. Two other crew members, an American and a Colombian, were apparently killed by the rebels. All told, five American civilian contractors have been killed in Colombia in 2003.

Former US Ambassador to Colombia Curtis Kamman sums up: "The terrorists who operate in Colombia have not explicitly declared the United States to be their target ... but their political and economic objectives are incompatible with our values, and they could ultimately represent a force for evil no less troublesome than Al Qaeda or irresponsible forces possessing weapons of mass destruction."

US interest in Colombia began long before September 11 ... in the name of the war on drugs, the US government provided Colombia with $1.7 billion as part of "Plan Colombia."

However, in the wake of September 11 and congressional acquiescence to combat terrorism abroad in virtually any form, the administration moved quickly to expand the mission in Colombia to provide direct counterinsurgency assistance and intelligence. It requested for fiscal year (FY) 2003 almost half a billion dollars in aid to Colombia, 70% of which is for the nation's military and police forces.

A central component of the expanded mission would protect US oil interests in Colombia. The administration intends to provide $98 million for the army to protect the Cano Limon-Covenas pipeline, operated by the California-based Occidental Petroleum and carrying oil for export to the United States. While details of the plan are still sketchy, military officials at the embassy confirm that US advisers plan to train three well-equipped 100-man army units "to act as rapid deployment forces" when guerrilla forces attack the pipeline. The pipeline, to be protected by what the Bush administration has dubbed the "Critical Infrastructure Brigade," provides Occidental Petroleum with profits from 35 million barrels of oil a year, for which it pays about 50 cents per barrel in security costs. The cost to the US taxpayer amounts to $3 a barrel--in short, a rather hefty taxpayer subsidy for Occidental Petroleum.

The US Military Fills Political Vacuum

Colombia is not the only country in the region subject to expanding US military might. As the Pentagon and the State Department bicker over who should take the lead for constructing democracy in post-war Iraq, the US military has already become the unofficial yet uncontested force behind US foreign policy much closer to home. The US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) -- with well over a $100 million budget and more staff dedicated to Latin American issues than the Departments of State, Commerce, Treasury, and Agriculture combined -- has stepped into the vacuum created by a distracted congress and an otherwise preoccupied administration to impose its Latin America agenda on US and regional policymakers. By distorting the debate on terrorism, SOUTHCOM is encouraging Latin American militaries to take on greater roles in the internal affairs of their own countries.

From Capitol Hill to Miami to Montevideo, SOUTHCOM Commander General James Hill has been sounding the alarm about potential terrorist threats in the hemisphere. According to Hill, "Narcoterrorism is spreading increasingly throughout the region. Narcoterrorist groups are involved in kidnappings in Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Paraguay. They smuggle weapons and drugs in Brazil, Suriname, Guyana, Mexico, and Peru, are making inroads in Bolivia, and use the same routes and infrastructure for drugs, arms, illegal aliens, and other illicit activities."

In reality, his alarmist language appears to be a thinly veiled attempt by SOUTHCOM to stay relevant in an age where security threats are largely found outside our hemisphere. By equating crimes like money laundering and human trafficking with terrorism, Hill is trying to open the door for the regions' militaries to take a more active role in domestic law enforcement. That door is already half open. Unlike in the US, in most of the region militaries are not clearly prohibited from domestic police and intelligence work. In his regular visits with Latin American civilian and military officials, Hill even advocates that laws and constitutions be changed to remove already weak restrictions on military participation in law enforcement.

Human rights and other progressive NGOs strongly oppose US efforts to encourage the region's militaries to take on larger internal roles. The last time the US government did so, military dictatorships cropped up all over the region -- and the people of Latin America are still struggling to recover from the horrors of those abusive regimes and to overcome the corruption engendered by governments lacking transparency and accountability. Latin American governments are struggling with many serious problems, including poverty, inequality, corruption, impunity, and human rights abuse. Effective civilian institutions, not the military, should respond to those problems.

A Political Alternative?

The shift in US policy toward Colombia coincided conveniently with changing political winds in Colombia. As the faltering peace process embarked upon by former President Pastrana finally collapsed and FARC violence escalated, Colombians voted overwhelmingly for hard-line candidate Alvaro Uribe, who promised to wage all-out war against what he calls terrorism by armed groups. Quietly backed by right-wing paramilitary groups, Uribe, as expected, has not taken significant action against either their attacks on civilian populations perceived to be supporting the guerrillas or the elements of the military that support them. Since taking office in August 2002, he has steadily sought to roll back civil liberties and human rights protections in the name of his domestic war on terrorism.

Yet in embarking upon a purely military strategy, Uribe risks repeating the failed strategies of the past. Nearly four decades of civil conflict have shown that the war will not be won on the battlefield. Each day that a political settlement is postponed, dozens of Colombians are killed, disappeared, or internally displaced. While there is no quick-fix to the conflict, the two fundamental pillars of any long-term solution are a political accord and socioeconomic development programs that address the underlying causes of violence.

For its part, Washington should take a cold, hard look at the long-term implications of its decision to slide down the slippery slope of direct involvement in Colombia's brutal civil war. As aptly noted by Republican Congressman Ron Paul (R-TX), "I can't conceive of us sending tens of thousands of soldiers down there. But we are down there because we are determined to get involved in their civil war, and it could become a little Vietnam."

Washington needs to adopt a dramatically different approach to Latin America, one that turns around the asymmetrical balance of power between the two and incorporates Latin American viewpoints into US foreign policy. Were they to do so, US policymakers would quickly recognize that the greatest threat to hemispheric peace and security is persistent poverty and inequality. Poverty elimination and the provision of economic assistance -- in a way that allows countries to determine their own economic and development policies -- should be the centerpiece of US policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean. Perhaps most importantly, the challenge for US policymakers is to move beyond containing and rolling back perceived threats and work instead toward the construction of a common vision of what could be: a hemisphere united around shared prosperity, respect for basic human rights, and citizen participation in democratic government.

Coletta Youngers is a senior associate at the Washington Office on Latin America and a member of the Foreign Policy in Focus Advisory Committee. This policy report is a revised version of an essay that appears in the Foreign Policy in Focus book Power Trip: US Unilateralism and Global Strategy After September 11 edited by John Feffer and published by Seven Stories Press. You may email Coletta Youngers at cyoungers@wola.org

Endnotes

Letter to President George Bush by House International Relations Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, 27 October 2002, in which he refers to Cuba, Brazil and Venezuela as a potential "axis of evil" in the Americas.

US Department of State, 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism, p. 48.

Nancy Dunne and James Wilson, "Colombian Rebels Indicted," The Financial Times, March 19, 2002.

Michael Shifter, "A Shaken Agenda: Bush and Latin America," Current History, February 2002, p. 55.

Paul Blustein, "Trade Accord Becomes a US Foreign Policy Tool," The Washington Post, April 29, 2003.

Peter Hakim, "Bush's Game of Revenge," The Los Angeles Times, May 11, 2003.

Author's interview with Jason Hagen, July 16, 2002.

William E. Gibson, "Plea for More Military Aid to Colombia Met with Doubt," Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, April 12, 2002.

Michael T. Klare, "Global Petro-Politics: The Foreign Policy Implications of the Bush Administration's Energy Plan," Current History, March 2002, p. 104.

David Corn, "Our Gang in Venezuela?" The Nation, August 5/12, 2002, p. 27.

Ibid., p. 26.

Author's interview with Rachel Farley, August 13, 2002.

Judith Miller, "Washington Accuses Cuba of Germ-Warfare Research," The New York Times, May 7, 2002.

Audrey Hudson, "Officials insist Carter not briefed on Cuban arms," The Washington Times, May 15, 2002.

William M. Leogrande, "Castro's Iron Fist Suggests a Brittle Grip on Power," The Los Angeles Times, May 9, 2003.

Harold Olmos, "US: Colombia Needs Free Trade," Associated Press, July 9, 2002.

US Department of State, 2002 Patterns of Global Terrorism, p 4.

Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, March 13, 2002.

Adam Isacson, "Colombia Peace in Tatters," NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. XXXV, No. 5, March/April 2002, p. 11.

Steven Dudley, "War in Colombia's Oilfields," The Nation, August 5/12, 2002, p. 31.

Isacson, pp. 12--13.

WOLA Associate Laurie Freeman contributed significantly to this section.

General James T. Hill, Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee," March 12, 2003, p. 5.

Joseph Contreras, "A 'Little Vietnam'?" Newsweek International, June 15, 2002.