US critics must either act or hold their peace
Washington has shown itself to be more than resolute on Iraq, but not so those countries so ready to condemn its actions.
DOUG BANDOW
`We will not take part in a military intervention in Iraq,'' German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder has said. Whether his government will oppose war when the UN Security Council votes is less clear, though he has promised not to ``agree to a resolution that legitimises war''.
France also offers resolute ambiguity, threatening but not promising a veto. French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin plans to use the summit of European Union foreign ministers to build a coalition against war.
Yet Washington doubts that its critics are serious. US Secretary of State Colin Powell said he hoped ``the French will come to the understanding of the need for such a strategy''. That is, he expects Paris to give in as it always does.
Even the refusal of Nato to approve America's request for assistance is seen as temporary. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the problem as one of ``old Europe'', asserting that most European nations were with the US.
America has heard tough talk from its allies before. Last autumn, in fact.
Mr Schroeder won re-election by running against the Bush administration's plan for war in Iraq, but later promised to send German troops to Turkey to crew Awacs planes sent by Nato. Paris similarly criticised the US, but subsequently agreed to the Security Council resolution demanded by Washington.
Nor is that all. Over the years, Washington has learned that it can browbeat and bully most nations into submission on most issues. America's critics are paper tigers.
The inspectors' positive assessment of Iraqi cooperation merely delays a showdown over Iraq. Still, that debate will give war opponents another chance to block Washington. But simple criticism, whether from angry demonstrators or frustrated diplomats, will not dissuade the Bush administration from attacking Iraq. Concrete practical steps are needed.
First, US allies must look after their own interests. For instance, South Korea and Japan are understandably focused on the prospect of North Korea restarting its nuclear programme. But war in Iraq makes war in Korea more likely.
Although President George W. Bush has proclaimed his pacific intentions in the peninsula, no one should take him at his word. Once the conquest of Iraq is complete, there will be rising demands within and without the administration for military action against the North. At that point, opposition by Seoul and Tokyo may be too little too late.
Australia has strongly backed the Bush administration. Yet war against Iraq, by creating additional Muslim grievances and encouraging the use and transfer of whatever weapons of mass destruction Baghdad possesses, increases the likelihood of a future, more devastating, Bali-like bombing. Countries ranging from Thailand to Taiwan also could be affected.
Second, France must do more than bluster. Only by vetoing any UN war resolution can France hope to stop the Bush administration's war plans. And only by making a commitment and sticking to it will Paris be able to encourage China and Russia to join it.
A veto by two or three of the Security Council's permanent members, supported by the negative votes of Germany and perhaps other states, would demonstrate a shocking lack of international support.
Third, Germany's Mr Schroeder must prove that opposition to Washington is more than a cheap election stunt. The administration, appropriately, has nothing but disdain for a supposed ally that offers criticism while yielding on substantive issues.
Put bluntly, the US doesn't need Berlin's approval if the Schroeder government nevertheless allows unfettered American use of German airspace, permits Washington to shift forces from bases in Germany, and even mans Awacs planes supporting the war. If the chancellor believes Washington's Iraq policy to be misguided, even dangerous, he must say so _ and vote against any Security Council resolution, bar the use of German troops in any fashion, and deny Washington use of German airspace and bases.
Fourth, France and Germany must encourage other governments to join with them. No single nation is likely to face down the globe's hyper-power. But a veto by three nations is easier to sustain than a veto by one. A protest by several European states carries more weight than criticism by one or two. An opposition that included Pakistan and Syria _ like Germany, temporary members of the Security Council _ as well as India and several Asian states would be more impressive still.
Fifth, if America's critics, especially Berlin and Paris, aspire to greater international influence, they should encourage Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, where a new government faces a public that oppose war by a nine-to-one margin, to stand firm against any war. A little bridge-building with Ankara would be particularly useful, given the perceived snub over EU membership.
Sixth, the British Labour party must say no to war in its name. Prime Minister Tony Blair is supporting Bush administration policies, but this will not be Tony Blair's war. It will be the Labour government's war.
Verbal criticism by backbenchers matters little. A public revolt before any vote might force the prime minister, who has already temporised by urging that the inspectors be given more time, to withdraw his unconditional support for Washington.
Lastly, other governments must warn Washington that they will not bail it out after any war. Almost all analysts believe that the occupation will be more difficult than the invasion. The Bush administration is counting on European nations to furnish many of the tens of thousands of troops who will be needed for years to preserve some pretence of order among Baathists, Kurds, Shiites and returning emigres. Berlin, Paris and others should tell the US that not only will this be its war, it will be its peace.
If, instead, war opponents back down after publicly criticising American policy, they will reinforce the justifiable contempt in which they are held in Washington. Retreat now and war opponents ensure that US administrations will continue to ignore them in foreign crises. And they encourage the American government to believe not only that what Washington says goes but what Washington says other nations will eventually, if reluctantly, obey. And who could blame US policymakers for doing so?
The credibility of Washington's critics is at stake. If nations like Germany and France give in _ especially if they end up voting for and give military support to the Bush administration _ after taking such strong positions, they will feed Washington's conviction that it can impose its will without constraint.
The Iraq process will inevitably repeat, with North Korea or Iran the next military target, or with a plan for coercive ``regime change'' in Saudi Arabia or Venezuela, or perhaps to forcibly disarm Pakistan.
It will be difficult to stop Washington's rush to war. But united foreign opposition offers the only hope of doing so. Denied the fig-leaf of UN approval, aid from Nato, and use of bases in neighbouring Middle Eastern states, Washington would truly have to go it alone. And do so in the face of opposition from many of the globe's most important players.
That might change President Bush's mind. Other nations can play a leading role in shaping policy towards Iraq. If they are truly serious about doing so.
*Doug Bandow is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington. He is a former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation and author and editor of several books.