Friday 11.04.2003, CET 05:42 <a href=www.swissinfo.org>swissinfo April 9, 2003 8:05 PM   Ahmad Chalabi is widely expected to lead a post-war Iraq (Keystone Archive)

The chief of the Iraqi National Congress, Ahmad Chalabi, has been billed as Washington’s favourite to head a post-Saddam administration.   But his past is clouded by unsavoury financial dealings in Switzerland.

In Brief

Chalabi ran the Geneva branch of the Lebanese bank, Mebco, which was shut down by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission in 1989, due to liquidity and lax accounting.

Another Geneva-based business owned by the Chalabis, Socofi, ran into financial difficulty, allegedly ruining thousands of investors and leaving a SFr140 million ($101 million) hole.

Two of Ahmad's brothers were found guilty of falsifying documents at Socofi.

Ahmad himself has been sentenced to 22 years imprisonment in Jordan for his involvement in the downfall of Petra bank, which has connections with both Mebco and Socofi.

Socofi is also believed to have paid SFr88 million of non-guaranteed funds over a five-year period into companies owned by the family.

On Wednesday, Saddam Hussein's government lost control of Baghdad, after the Iraqi capital fell to United States-led forces. Chalabi ran the Geneva branch of the Lebanese bank, Mebco, which was shut down by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission in 1989.

Mebco is part of the Middle East Banking Corporation of Beirut, which is owned by the Chalabi family.

It was one of only three financial establishments in Switzerland authorised to issue Visa credit cards.

Although there is no record of illegal dealings by the bank, the commission said Mebco was badly run, with liquidity problems and lax accounting procedures. The company is also suspected of handing out unsecured credit.  

Suspect dealings   Several months after Mebco was shut down, another Geneva-based business owned by the Chalabis ran into financial difficulties.

Wednesday’s edition of “Le Temps” newspaper said that Socofi’s downfall is estimated to have ruined thousands of investors and left a SFr140 million ($101 million) hole.

The Chalabi family blamed the first Gulf War as the reason for Socofi’s financial difficulties.

But in September 2000, two of Ahmad Chalabi’s brothers were sentenced to six months in prison in Switzerland for falsifying documents in relation to dealings at Socofi.

Ahmad himself has been sentenced to 22 years in prison in Jordan for his involvement in the downfall of Petra bank, which has connections with both Mebco and Socofi.  

Family affair   The Chalabi family has also come under fire for allegedly using their financial establishments to lend money to their own companies.

Le Temps said Socofi is believed to have paid SFr88 million of non-guaranteed funds over a five-year period into companies owned by the family.

According to the Chalabi family, all the problems encountered by their companies were due to pressure from Saddam Hussein’s regime. swissinfo, Ian Hamel (translation: Joanne Shields)

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Lula quiebra todos los pronósticos apocalípticos sobre su gestión económica en Brasil. El presidente muestra su optimismo al reiterar que pretende "construir un país de crecimiento económico, de empleo y distribución de la renta"

<a href=www.estrelladigital.es>Estrella Digital Omar Lugo Río de Janeiro     
El presidente de Brasil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, cumple hoy sus primeros cien días de gestión con logros que han contrariado los pronósticos apocalípticos sobre el curso de la economía del país bajo su mandato. Lula asumió el poder el 1 de enero, tras ganar abrumadoramente las elecciones con promesas de mejorar la distribución de la renta y reducir las abismales brechas sociales.

Optimista, ahora ha reiterado que su propósito es "construir un Brasil de crecimiento económico, generación de empleo y distribución de la renta". Estos son los principales enunciados de la fuerza política que lidera, el Partido de los Trabajadores (PT), que según los analistas se ha movido al centro. El mayor temor era que el país sufriera un colapso económico y se transformara en una Argentina o en una Venezuela. "Brasil no se transformó en esos países y aunque el gobierno fuera el peor posible, Brasil jamás llegaría a ser una Argentina", afirmó Lula. Los pronósticos de adversarios políticos y financieros eran tan sombríos que la sola estabilización de los grandes indicadores económicos ya es todo un logro para un gobierno que se ha basado en la continuidad, según especialistas. "El Gobierno está siendo comparado con la oveja Dolly: clonó al de (el ex presidente) Fernando Henrique Cardoso y con apenas 100 días ya da señales de envejecimiento precoz", según el columnista político Expedito Filho. Saliendo al paso a las críticas, el ministro de la Casa Civil, José Dirceu, recordó que el plan oficial es de largo plazo. "Hicimos lo que debíamos y no tenemos vergüenza de haberlo hecho", dijo Dirceu, un articulador del gobierno de Lula. En el fragor de los últimos días de campaña electoral se agravó la crisis económica en Brasil y el indicador que mide el riesgo de invertir en el país alcanzó los 2.400 puntos. Este índice de desconfianza internacional era uno de los más altos del mundo. Se traducía en cobros para Brasil de tasas de interés del 24 por ciento por encima de lo que pagan los papeles del Tesoro estadounidense. Cuando asumió el Gobierno, cerca de 20.000 millones de dólares en líneas de crédito para el país estaban cerrados y la depreciación del real acumuló un 52 por ciento, hasta casi cuatro reales por dólar. "El Gobierno no sólo evitó la profundización de la crisis, sino que revirtió la tendencia negativa de los indicadores económicos", señaló el presidente del PT, José Genoino. Esta opinión ha sido compartida por el Fondo Monetario Internacional y por agencias calificadoras de riesgo. El real se revaloriza En estos 100 días, el real se ha revalorizado en cerca del 10 por ciento y la cotización se mantiene en torno a 3,20 reales por dólar. El riesgo país cayó a menos de 1.000 puntos y se reabrieron los créditos. Para el economista Edward Amadeo, "la economía ha ido entrando en una situación de normalidad" y las anclas fiscales y monetarias "han sido mucho más sólidas de lo que se esperaba". "Estas políticas han sido conducidas con prudencia y han apartado las visiones más pesimistas", dijo a EFE Amadeo, que fue ministro del Trabajo y director de Hacienda del pasado gobierno de Cardoso. Lula logró un apoyo abrumador en el Congreso para una reforma constitucional clave del sistema financiero. Este pragmatismo político elevó la confianza en la capacidad de un gobierno que se ha entendido con la derecha y el centro. Pero el ministro de Hacienda, Antonio Palocci, advirtió que esto es sólo el comienzo. "Es necesario tener claro que no estamos con las cosas arregladas, estamos en curso de arreglarlas", dijo. Según expertos, la economía sigue siendo frágil y sujeta a vaivenes internacionales. Por delante quedan las más trascendentales reformas de los sistemas de previsión social, tributario y laboral. Hasta ahora el mayor costo de la estabilidad ha sido posponer la promesa electoral de Lula de reducir las tasas de interés para estimular la inversión y el crecimiento económico. Hoy la tasa mínima es del 26,5 por ciento anual, la más alta en años. En su "remedio amargo", como lo llamó Lula, también apretó la tuerca fiscal para ampliar el ahorro destinado a pagar deuda. A cambio de la relativa estabilidad y de haber sedado al demonio de la inflación que, según el propio Gobierno, sigue amenazante, el país tendrá este año un magro crecimiento de menos del 2,0 por ciento del PIB, similar al de los ultimos años.

<a href=www.estrelladigital.es>Estrella Digital Primo González

La cruda realidad de la economía, tal y como están revelando los informes de los numerosos organismos internacionales que esta semana se han volcado en presentaciones y anticipos del inmediato futuro, parece no tener contentos a los expertos ni a los inversores ni en general a los agentes económicos. La guerra está, por lo que parece, vista para sentencia en Iraq y los gobiernos de los países más importantes, en especial los que tienen presencia activa, con y sin veto, en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU se aprestan para organizar el futuro de Iraq sin Sadam.

De momento, lo único que parece estar claro en el plano de las realidades es el proyecto americano de poner de nuevo en marcha la máquina de extracción de crudo en Iraq y hacerlo con la mayor brevedad posible. Las estimaciones que se hacen estos días señalan que el daño causado a las instalaciones petroleras por los saboteadores y por el estado de abandono en el que se encontraban a causa de la prohibición de exportar una buena parte de la producción es más que aceptable. Tanto que ya hay en perspectiva un programa de recuperación de las exportaciones petroleras del orden de los 800.000 barriles diarios a través del golfo Pérsico, es decir, de los yacimientos de la zona sur del país.

Una producción muy estimable que se tendría que complementar con la entrada en producción de los ricos yacimientos del norte, en donde el desenlace final de la batalla presenta todavía algunas incógnitas. No tanto porque el régimen de Sadam Husein vaya a mantenerse en esta zona sino porque el crudo de los yacimientos del norte del país entra en otro tipo de dinámica debido a la particular situación del pueblo kurdo y sus relaciones con Turquía y la salida al mar del crudo a través de territorio de terceros países. Pero, problemas y obstáculos políticos al margen, si la situación se normaliza, esta zona del país debería poner sobre el mercado un flujo de petróleo no inferior al millón de barriles diarios en un plazo razonable, quizás no superior a un mes.

Si estas condiciones se cumplen, y entra dentro de los planes de los aliados que se cumplan en términos bastante parecidos a los comentados, Iraq aparecerá en breve como un importante agente del mercado petrolero, en unos momentos en los que la oferta de crudo supera con cierta amplitud la demanda del mercado y en el que algunos países importantes, en especial Estados Unidos, están embarcados en una operación de reconstitución de sus reservas estratégicas. No resulta extraño, por todo ello, las prisas que les han entrado a los dirigentes de la OPEP a la hora de convocar reuniones de urgencia para adoptar medidas de control de las exportaciones.

La preferencia que en la situación actual va a tener Iraq, a la que la comunidad internacional, los aliados sobre todo y la ONU si llega a tener papel en ello, concederá todo tipo de ayudas para que el flujo de petróleo permita financiar una rápida reconstrucción del país, puede condicionar la armonía y la cohesión interna de la organización de exportadores. No hay que olvidar tampoco el hecho de que Venezuela, tras la crisis política de estos últimos meses, está volviendo de forma gradual a sus niveles de producción y exportación de crudo anteriores a las revueltas que colapsaron su producción hasta hace apenas un mes.

El precio del petróleo ha bajado escalones importantes en las últimas semanas. Se ha situado en el precio ideal que los analistas económicos siempre han considerado como neutral a la hora de influir en la evolución de las economías occidentales, es decir, entre los 24 y los 25 dólares por barril. Convencer a los países exportadores a que recorten sus cuotas de producción para hacerle un hueco al recién llegado y para permitir al mismo tiempo que el nivel de precios no se desplome es ahora la ardua tarea a la que se enfrenta la organización de exportadores. Dicho de otra forma, no parece improbable que el coste de la guerra de Iraq y de la reconstrucción del país vaya a estar muy lejos de la capacidad de sacrificio y entendimiento del mundo árabe exportador de petróleo. La guerra no va a salirle gratis a casi nadie, pero desde luego mucho menos a los productores del Golfo.

<a href=www.southamericadaily.com>South America daily AI Index: AMR 53/006/2003 (Public) News Service No: 087 10 April 2003

A year on from the failed Coup d'Etat of 11 - 14 April 2002, when more than 50 people lost their lives and scores of others were wounded, Venezuela's government and opposition have failed to face up to their part in the tragedy and ensure that those responsible are brought to justice, Amnesty International said today.

"It is time that both the government and opposition stop attempting to use the events of April 11 to serve their political agendas and instead create the climate in which the facts can be established, justice can be secured and the victims can receive reparations."

"The recent dismissal of murder charges against those accused of shooting from the Puente Llaguno, and the failure to charge Metropolitan Police implicated in the deaths and injuries suffered on 11 April, demonstrate the weakness of the official investigation. It also raises serious concerns about the capacity of the state to effectively prosecute all those responsible," the organization continued.

Alixis Gustavo Bornones Soteldo and César Mattías Ochoa were two of the victims who were shot and killed in Avenida Beralt on 11 April. Their families, and many others, are still waiting for justice. Important investigations in order to identify those responsible have already been carried out, but Amnesty International remains concerned that establishing individual criminal responsibility for the crimes remains a long way off. Furthermore, while there has been a degree of progress in the investigations regarding events of April 11, the organization fears that the violations committed on 12, 13, and 14 April have received less attention and risk being ignored by investigators and public alike.

"The investigation and judicial process must lead to justice for the victims and their relatives, in order to avoid the pattern of impunity of other notorious cases of serious human rights violations which haunt Venezuela's recent history," said Amnesty International.

"Impunity for human rights violations leaves the victims and their families without redress and encourages further violations. This can only fuel the climate of violence undermining the rule of law and human rights in Venezuela."

To ensure the success of the investigations, Amnesty International urges the authorities to guarantee that all agencies, including all police forces and the National Guard, cooperate fully with the investigation and ensure there is transparent and effective coordination between the Attorney General's Office (Fiscalía General de la República) and the Scientific and Criminal Investigation Force Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y Criminalisticas (CICPC).

"It is vital that both these agencies receive the support and resources necessary to make their work timely and effective. The judiciary must also play a fundamental role by ensuring its timely, impartial and effective handling of these highly politicised cases; the executive and the legislature must ensure support for the investigation while avoiding any implication of undue influence on the results, " said Amnesty International.

"If the responsibility, both criminal and moral, for violence of April 2002 is to be established it is vital that the opposition, including the media, contribute to the clarification of the facts, even if these do not coincide with their immediate political interests."

A proposed commission of enquiry, to establish the truth surrounding the human rights violations committed in April 2002, has not been set up due to the failure of the opposition and government to guarantee its independence, impartiality and effectiveness. Amnesty International believes that another possible means of ensuring an impartial and credible enquiry could involve the participation of independent international experts, under the auspices of the international community, to visit Venezuela to evaluate the investigation and make binding recommendations. These mechanisms would be a step toward creating space and credibility for the facts of April to emerge from the political polarization affecting the country. "One of the challenges to any such investigation is to clarify what led to the violence and the responsibility for it. Since April 2002, the political crisis destabilising Venezuela has repeatedly led to violence, with the police and National Guard employing excessive force against pro and anti-government demonstrators."

" An outcome of these investigations must be the urgent reform to policing practices and structures to ensure impartial law enforcement and prevent excessive or indiscriminate use of force in police operations with strict adherence to international human rights standards."

"Impartial and effective investigations into human rights violations committed in April 2002 and subsequent incidents are the only means of rebuilding confidence in the police and criminal justice system and ending the climate of impunity," Amnesty International concluded.

Background Economic, social and political tensions led to an indefinite strike on 9 April by supporters of the opposition, an alliance built around the business sector, the principal trade union and private media interests, who demanded the immediate resignation of President Chávez. On 11 April, a mass opposition demonstration met pro-government protesters in the vicinity of the presidential palace. As demonstrators, Metropolitan Police, National Guard clashed, 20 people died as a result of gunshot wounds, and over 60 others were injured. In the ensuing crisis, senior military officials forced President Chávez from power and placed him in detention. Following the Coup d'Etat, a de facto joint civilian-military administration was established under the opposition leader Pedro Carmona, head of the Employers Association, FEDECAMARAS. The de facto government issued draconian decrees, inclusing the closure of the National Assembly, and the summary dismissal of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General and the Human Rights Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo). Police carried out raids on a number of homes of supporters of President Chávez. Amongst those arbitrarily detained were a Minister and a National Assembly deputy. There was widespread condemnation of the unconstitutional and summary removal of President Chávez, the illegal detention of his supporters, and the arbitrary powers assumed by the de facto government. This, coupled with the increasingly determined efforts of President Chávez's followers to secure his release and return to power, led to the resignation of the new government and reinstatement of President Chávez on 14 April. The civil disturbance during these four days left at least 50 people dead and many more wounded. The government and opposition have continually accused each other of masterminding the violence for political advantage over the last year.

Political violence has also continued throughout the last year, resulting in the deaths of a number of pro and anti-government demonstrators and has repeatedly threatened further disintegration in the rule of law and human rights protection. In December 2002 the opposition called a second indefinite national stoppage which continued to February 2003. Social tension and political violence escalated in the context of the strike, which had a dramatic impact on the economy. Negotiations between government and opposition have continued throughout the year under the stewardship of the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, César Gaviria. A group of "friendly counties" was also established to facilitate this process and help find a negotiated solution to the political crisis.

To refer to other materials produced by Amnesty International on Venezuela, including a "Human Rights Agenda for the Current Crisis" published in January 2003, visit our website at

Public Document

For more information please call Amnesty International's press office in London, UK, on +44 20 7413 5566 Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WC1X 0DW. web:

For latest human rights news view

AI INDEX: AMR 53/006/2003     10 April 2003

<a href=web.amnesty.org>AI INDEX: AMR 53/001/2003     21 January 2003

The seriousness of the situation currently faced by Venezuela requires a concerted response from all sectors of society. They will have to decide whether to continue along the path of confrontation, perpetuating the cycle of violence, harassment and polarization, or whether to commit themselves to seeking peaceful negotiated solutions within the constitutional framework and in accordance with international human rights standards.

Faced with the imminent danger of a breakdown in the constitutional order and the violation of fundamental human rights, it is essential that the international community takes concrete measures to avoid such a breakdown and help find a negotiated solution, based on the full protection of human rights.

Since the beginning of the current crisis, Amnesty International has alerted the Venezuelan government and the international community of the need to take immediate measures to avoid a breakdown in the rule of law. The most serious symptoms of this situation include the events that led to the break with constitutional order in April, serious violations of the right to life, the partiality of the judicial system and the engagement of the security forces in the political life of the country.

Amnesty International has urged the government to speed up the investigation into the events of April, avoid the excessive use of force by state agents and ensure a halt to attacks against and harassment of the press and human rights defenders. It has also directed its appeals to opposition sectors, urging them not to use protest measures and "civil disobedience" that are not in keeping with fundamental constitutional provisions. It has also encouraged the media to be impartial and assume co-responsibility for guaranteeing the right to information.

Considering that disrespect for human rights is one of the roots of the crisis, the national and international standards that enshrine these rights offer a framework to promote the resolution of the crisis, as affirmed by non-governmental human rights organizations in Venezuela. However, the parties to the conflict have only referred to the issue of human rights to attack and discredit each other. The government, the opposition and the media have appropriated, manipulated and distorted the issue of human rights, converting it into one more weapon for polarization and confrontation.

So far, the negotiations facilitated by the General Secretary of the Organization of American States (OAS), César Gaviria, have been undermined by the intransigence of both parties, and the agenda seems to have been limited to the electoral issue. A sustainable and lasting solution to the crisis requires all parties to pay attention to human rights issues, which are key to solving the problem.

At this crucial moment for the future of the country, Amnesty International appeals to all sectors of Venezuelan society to avoid using human rights issues to polarize the situation and to use them as a basis for building peace and restoring the rule of law.

In a press release issued on 19 December (AMR 53/018/2002 ) Amnesty International proposed a series of basic and immediate measures to avoid a deterioration in the extremely polarized climate and to prevent a breakdown in the constitutional order.

Below, we propose a more long term human rights agenda, aimed at restoring full respect for Human Rights. Although the government has the main responsibility in this, all political and social actors must accept responsibility for contributing to the achievement of these objectives.

At the same time, the international community, and especially the regional and international human rights organizations, must redouble their efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and to provide adequate mechanisms and resources to monitor the human rights situation in the country and stop the situation from deteriorating.

HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA FOR THE CRISIS

Strengthen justice and eradicate impunity

The Venezuelan judicial system's failure to prosecute and sentence those responsible for human rights violations and compensate the victims has been a feature of the country's history and continues to be the fundamental factor that weakens the Rule of Law and denies credibility to the institution. The lack of independence and capacity of key institutions such as the Judiciary, the Public Prosecutor, the Police and Ombudsperson poses an urgent need to build the credibility of the judicial system.

• Society and its representatives must identify and agree on a process that will end uncertainty and strengthen the legitimacy, credibility, independence, capacity and autonomy of the powers and institutions that guarantee the Rule of Law, in accordance with the rules set out in the Constitution and international standards on the independence of judges and prosecutors(1). The credibility of these institutions also depends on society's commitment to recognizing their authority and respecting their decisions.

• Clarify, in an impartial, speedy and exhaustive way, the human rights violations committed during the events of April 2002 and since then, and ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. To this end, Amnesty International recommends that an international delegation of experts analyses and evaluates the steps already taken by the authorities and makes recommendations for the more effective conduct of the investigations, in accordance with the appropriate international standards(2). This commission should make its conclusions public.

• Investigate and punish the police officers who are responsible for the many executions that are being committed in various states of the country under the guise of "clashes with criminals resisting the police". This is not a new kind of human rights violations, but the total impunity that police officers have enjoyed for years weakens the rule of law and increases the cycle of violence.

• Comply with the human rights measures and recommendations issued by mechanisms of the United Nations, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

Depoliticise the armed and security forces

• To ensure that the armed forces and the security forces do not play a political role, remain subordinated to the civilian authorities and act impartially; and it is essential to avoid the armed forces being used to maintain public order, so as to restore their credibility and guarantee citizens' rights.

• The security forces should act with scrupulous regard for the standards that regulate the use of force against demonstrations and mobilizations. Since the tragic events of April 2002, Amnesty International has, on many occasions, denounced the excessive use of force by the police and the National Guard, which has resulted in many deaths and injuries. Any action ignoring these standards should be rigorously investigated and punished.

Guarantee freedom of expression and the right to information

• Attacks on journalists and other press workers should cease immediately. Likewise, the indispensable work carried out by human rights defenders should not be restricted and they should be able to count on the impartial protection of the law. The State must comply with the precautionary and provisional measures issued by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Any threat or attack against journalists or human rights defenders must be rigorously investigated and those responsible punished;

• When exercising their legitimate right to the freedom of assembly, association and expression, opposition sectors should take responsibility for choosing protest methods and tactics that do not undermine constitutional guarantees. Without these guarantees, the rights of all are prejudiced.

Comply with international obligations regarding economic, social and cultural rights

• Considering that social exclusion is one of the basic structural problems that have contributed to the extreme political polarization of the country, we remind the government of its obligation to comply with the recommendations of the United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee. In its 2001 report on the state of these rights in Venezuela, the Committee recommended the government to take advice from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and adopt concrete measures to further economic, social and cultural rights as part of the 1997 National Human Rights Action Plan. A sustainable and lasting solution to the crisis requires the implementation of concrete and effective policies to combat the extreme poverty and inequality prevailing in the country. It also requires all political actors to be more sensitive to the socio-economic roots of the crisis and the consequences that a prolongation of the crisis could have on these rights.

(1) Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary

(Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Milan between 26 August and 6 September 1985, and confirmed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985).

Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors

(Approved by the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, held in Havana (Cuba) between 27 August and 7 September 1990).

(2) Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (Recommended by Economic and Social Council Resolution 1989/65 of 24 May 1989).

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