Friday, May 23, 2003
Both Church and Civil Society Are Persecuted in Venezuela--Says President of Episcopal Conference
TENERIFE, Canary Islands, MAY 14, 2003 (<a href=www.zenit.org>Zenit.org).- The Catholic Church under attack in Venezuela is not alone, the president of the Venezuelan episcopal conference says "there is a persecution of the whole of Venezuelan society."
In the following interview with ZENIT, Archbishop Baltazar E. Porras of Merida spoke about the ways President Hugo Chavez's government exerts pressure on the Church and trims democracy in the country.
Chavez, who staged an unsuccessful military coup in 1992, came to power in 1999. Among other things, he is noted for his harsh attacks against the country's bishops, and for reducing the public funds allocated to the Church's evangelizing and humanitarian work in the country.
Q: Perhaps the most acute moment of tension was lived a year ago, with the unsuccessful attempt to remove Chavez in April of 2002. You were with Chavez at that time.
Archbishop Porras: At that moment there was an explicit recognition of the role of the Church. Cardinal Ignacio A. Velasco, archbishop of Caracas, and I were among those being attacked the most.
However, when he was about to go under, the president of the Republic himself called me to see if I was prepared to defend his life and to help him leave the country. I told him: "Of course. Let me see what I can do." As a priest, it is one of my first obligations. With the guarantee of my person, Chavez was prepared to confirm his resignation. But the military then did not accept this condition; they obliged him to stay in the country and then, as we know, he was able to return to his post.
What is interesting is that now, a year after the event, the president has tried to change the version. He has said: there were a few "little bishops" who were with the coup participants. He knows very well, as I told him on one occasion, that "I appeared on the scene because you called me." I think all this has to be seen in the context that any institution which can cast a shadow on him has to be erased, impaired, or divided.
Q: Has he succeeded?
Archbishop Porras: The government has always tried to divide. As with other institutions, Chavez has said: the leaders are at the top, and the top is divorced from the base.
I think that given the characteristics of the Church in Venezuela, its configuration and presence, his plan has failed. This does not mean that there are not a few elements, priests and a few groups calling themselves Christians, who hope to relive in Venezuela the history of Guatemala's Sandinismo. If there was to be in Venezuela a division between religious and the diocesan clergy, or between their presence in popular and other areas, it would have been different, but this situation does not exist.
Q: What is the situation in Venezuela?
Archbishop Porras: There is a populist, authoritarian, militarist government; it is no accident that a military coup leader is at the head. It is not accidental that the models proposed are Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba, Colonel Muammar Gadhafi's in Libya, and Saddam Hussein's in Iraq, although we don't know where he is now.
Q: Aren't you afraid to speak with such clarity?
Archbishop Porras: The best way to maintain the people's hope in face of this situation is to keep the truth before them.
Q: Have their been bomb attacks against the Churches?
Archbishop Porras: Of course there are limits to situations that some of us Bishops have to live in a particular way. But there is a characteristic of this process that is being seen in Venezuela: the people are not afraid. It is very interesting, because it also denotes a series of values.
In my diocese of Merida, in the two weeks preceding Holy Week, there were 12 robberies. But they weren't real robberies, because their objective was to destroy. Tabernacles were destroyed. If there had been sacred golden vessels, one might think it was robberies. But they were ordinary chalices of no value. In recent months, the Cathedral has been the object of robbery. They have stolen the chairs from the Presbytery and also pictures. The Cathedral always had normal police protection -- that of the Square. It was removed, because the authorities said it was a privilege that the Catholic Church should not enjoy. The houses of some priests have been looted, but the delinquents are never identified, no one ever knows what happened.
This creates an atmosphere of fear, which is not exclusive to the Church. I want to highlight this. It would not be right to say that there is a persecution against the Church. There is a persecution against the whole of Venezuelan society. Efforts are being made to create fear so that people will get paralyzed. One should hear some of the speeches which state that no one will stop this Revolution, and that if it cannot be carried out by fair means it will be carried out by foul means, with violence.
Q: Has the government not promised you greater well-being if you give in to its demands?
Archbishop Porras: Yes, there have been cases. When this government was newly elected, in one of the first meetings that President Chavez had with the presidency of the Episcopal Conference, he said: I propose that you give me the name of two or three priests, of two or three Bishops, so that they can be ministers. And tell me what ministry you want them to have. It was up to me to answer him and I explained that we are not seeking any posts; that it is not our role. "Think about it," he said. "We don't have to think about it," we replied.
Then he said: "as I am convoking a Constituent Assembly, I can create a Constituent Assembly with 60 military men and 40 priests. Give me the names of 40 priests and we will create the Constituent Assembly."
I answered: "President, you think that with the 60 best military men, luminaries in all orders, and with 40 of the best priests, a Constitution can be drawn up? Whose representatives are the military men and the priests? With what right can we represent journalists, homemakers, businessmen, workers?"
It is somewhat indicative of the totalitarian mentality.
Q: What effect does the crisis in Venezuela have on the American continent and on the world?
Archbishop Porras: It is important to realize that it is not just a problem of Venezuela. A plan is underway in Venezuela for which Venezuela is too small. It is a plan that in the first instance has continental projections and then world ones.
Indeed, what OPEP has done in recent years follows along that line, or the contacts with the "Bloc of the 72." The fact that it is called a Bolivarian Revolutionary Plan, is not just simply to exalt Simon Bolivar, but because this allows for an enclave with the Colombian guerrilla groups, who also call themselves Bolivarian, with certain native groups of Ecuador, of Bolivia ... It is a plan designed as an alternative to the imperialism of the First World, of the United States and Europe.
It is a curious and explosive mixture, which includes populism, militarism, totalitarianism, outdated Marxism, and others "isms." This is why it is important, from the point of view of our faith and of our religious role, that we believers have very clearly in mind the values we work for and serve, so as not to fall prey through naivete.
Dissident Venezuela general set to face trial
14 May 2003 22:13:51 GMT
(Adds general's comments, background)
CARACAS, Venezuela, May 14 (Reuters) - Venezuela's Supreme Court on Wednesday cleared the way for the trial of a dissident general charged with rebellion for taking part in a protest against President Hugo Chavez, his attorney said.
National Guard Gen. Carlos Alfonzo would be the first dissident officer to go on trial following the April 2002 coup that toppled left-winger Chavez for 48 hours and triggered months of political turmoil over his rule.
"It's a political decision bent on sending an innocent man to a prearranged trial," his lawyer Alberto Arteaga said.
Alfonzo, who was sacked as Inspector General of the National Guard for his alleged role in the coup in the world's No. 5 oil exporter, told reporters he did not accept the Supreme Court ruling and would appeal.
"I am innocent of the charges they are trying to pin on me," he told reporters.
The court ruled the attorney general had presented enough evidence for Alfonzo to be tried for rebellion and incitement for participating in an anti-Chavez protest in December 2002.
The general has been under house arrest since security police detained him at the Caracas rally.
Alfonzo had also joined scores of other officers who camped out for months in a Caracas plaza after launching a civil disobedience campaign against the president in October.
"I don't believe in the revolutionary project President Chavez is trying to implant," Alfonzo said Wednesday.
Since last year's coup, former paratrooper Chavez has purged from their posts more than 150 senior officers, including Alfonzo, who were allegedly involved in the short-lived uprising against him.
Chavez's opponents accuse him of trying to introduce Cuba-style communism in Venezuela.
"I am a democratically-minded officer. I am not, have never been, nor ever will be, a coup monger," Alfonzo said.
Last year, radical Chavez supporters rioted in Caracas when four other senior officers were allowed to walk free after the court ruled they could not be tried for rebellion for their alleged leadership of the April coup.
In April six lower-ranking dissident military officers asked for asylum in Peru, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic, saying they feared persecution and death threats.
Chavez, who led a failed uprising himself six years before his 1998 election, has threatened to jail foes who organized a general strike in December and January meant to pressure him out of office. No trial date has been set for Alfonzo. (Additional reporting by Silene Ramirez)
An open letter about PDVSA to President Hugo Chavez Frias
<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela's Electronic News
Posted: Wednesday, May 14, 2003
By: Gustavo Coronel
VHeadline.com commentarist Gustavo Coronel writes: Mr. President: I just heard you saying that the 18,000 rebel PDVSA managers and workers who were fired by you, in an undignified fashion through newspaper listings, "will never go back to work at PDVSA."
You added that "they are criminals who deserve 30 years in jail."
In answer to these utterances, I would like to say to you that, yes, these people will go back to work at PDVSA ... not while you are President, of course, but almost the instant you go out of the Presidency by means of a popular referendum ... much before the normal end of your Presidential term.
This will happen, as sure as the sun goes up every morning...
It will happen because what you have installed in PDVSA is not a group of true and professional managers and technicians ... some of whom know about petroleum what you know about running a country ... i.e. very little.
Let me tell you why the real PDVSA professional managers and technicians decided to rebel. I am sure that many of the things I will tell you will be new to you, since you have a praetorian, authoritarian perspective of the Presidency, certainly not a democratic and civic outlook:
1.-- PDVSA, Mr. President, does not belong to the State, much less to the government and, of course, much less to you, Hugo Chavez ... a public servant and not a feudal ruler. PDVSA belongs to the Venezuelan nation ... this is all of us, you included, together with 23.4 million others.
2.-- The nation is not at the service of the State and the government, but these must be at the service of the nation. You, as a servant of the State, are clearly at the service of the nation and should be accountable to the nation ... but you are not.
3.-- From 1. and 2. above, it clearly follows that PDVSA is not your personal playground. It is one of the most important institutions of the nation and, as such, it has to be protected at all costs by the servants of the nation, of which you are one.
4.-- As a national institution, PDVSA belongs to all Venezuelans, not only to your followers. We are all shareholders of PDVSA. The State is not the only shareholder, much less the government or you as a person. All shareholders have the right and the duty to protect PDVSA from destruction, contamination, prostitution of its mission and corruption of its activities.
5.--The rebel staff that you fired had been trained in a tradition of meritocracy, apoliticism and professional management. These values formed the backbone of the corporation and their practice explained its sterling operational and financial performance for 25 years, until you came into action. These values had been accepted by the nation as the guiding principles for the Institution. You came, as gracefully as an elephant in a china shop, and proceeded to demolish all these principles. You named a madman, a Marxist enemy of professional management and a terrorist as successive presidents of the institution. You placed as members of the board people who lacked the credentials to be there. You promoted the use of PDVSA's facilities and equipment for political events. You became enemy number one of the institution which provides most of the financial resources for the nation, resources that the State and the government have consistently tried to misuse for their selfish purposes.
6.-- The managers and technicians of PDVSA acted on their triple duties as trustees of the institution, as shareholders of the institution and as citizens of the nation, Venezuela, to protect the institution from this gross attempt at destruction and prostitution of its values, norms and procedures. They acted against you, the person who has tried and is still trying to destroy PDVSA. Do you think, for a moment, that these managers and technicians want to go back to work under a Presidency which represents the exact opposite of the values they cherish? They are selling cakes in the streets today but, every morning, they see themselves in the mirror and they see people with dignity and self-esteem. They do not see lackeys...
Do I go on or you got it clear?
I doubt that you did, or that you would, no matter how much in detail I explained it to you. Because for ten years, by your own admission, you plotted a coup against the democratic governments of Venezuela.
Whoever discredits his own institution in this manner can not understand what institutional loyalty means.
And ... after ten years of plotting, you finally came up empty.
On the other hand, the managers of PDVSA did not plot ... they met in a public assembly and decided to act immediately, on the basis of their conscience, putting everything on the line: jobs, financial stability, family and career. They are not asking for your mercy and they would not accept it. They know they will be back to PDVSA after the national nightmare is over, after you are gone. Some of them will find that there is life after PDVSA and will not go back to the institution ... but the majority will get their jobs back and, more importantly, they will put right most of the wrongs.
And there will be no more fish markets in front of PDVSA's headquarters, there will be no more political commissars, there will be no more international embarrassments.
As you are still young, I hope that the example of civic responsibility given by the PDVSA rebels will make you reflect on your own ethical posture and will help to improve it.
Moral force is always stronger than brute force, you can be certain of that...
You have some personal qualities which, if properly blended with true democratic manners and a more humble disposition, would allow for a reasonably good political career.
But, right now, you are making a mess of it.
Gustavo Coronel is the founder and president of Agrupacion Pro Calidad de Vida (The Pro-Quality of Life Alliance), a Caracas-based organization devoted to fighting corruption and the promotion of civic education in Latin America, primarily Venezuela. A member of the first board of directors (1975-1979) of Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), following nationalization of Venezuela's oil industry, Coronel has worked in the oil industry for 28 years in the United States, Holland, Indonesia, Algiers and in Venezuela. He is a Distinguished alumnus of the University of Tulsa (USA) where he was a Trustee from 1987 to 1999. Coronel led the Hydrocarbons Division of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in Washington DC for 5 years. The author of three books and many articles on Venezuela ("Curbing Corruption in Venezuela." Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, July, 1996, pp. 157-163), he is a fellow of Harvard University and a member of the Harvard faculty from 1981 to 1983. In 1998, he was presidential election campaign manager for Henrique Salas Romer and now lives in retirement on the Caribbean island of Margarita where he runs a leading Hotel-Resort. You may contact Gustavo Coronel at email gustavo@vheadline.com
Venezuelan tourism, a Cinderella who can not find a Prince...
<a href=www.vheadline.com>venezuela's Electronic News
Posted: Wednesday, May 14, 2003
By: Gustavo Coronel
VHeadline.com commentarist Gustavo Coronel writes: Caracas' most famous landmark and an obligatory tourist stop for many years was the main square, Plaza Bolivar, originally called Plaza Mayor. It dates back to 1567, when Diego de Lozada, founder of the city personally marked it out. Today no tourists go there for two main reasons: 1. There are no tourists to speak of, and, 2. the square has been taken over by vandals, (allegedly) paid by Chavista Mayor Bernal, to assail any passer by who looks prosperous.
For the last 20 years now, Venezuelan tourism has been a Cinderella unsuccessfully looking for a Prince. Dozens of tourist hotels have been repossessed by the government or simply gone broke on their own.
As we go back those 20 years we can remember hearing then the same phrases, almost the same words, we now hear. No tourism "Czar" has ever spoken of what he, she is doing but of what they will do....
Venezuelan tourism has no present, only a future...
At times it seemed as if tourism would finally take off ... from 1988 to 1991 the volume of tourists coming into Venezuela went from 380,000 to almost 600,000 ... everybody was dancing a jig. But then, in 1992, Chavez and his comrades staged two bloody coups which produced almost 200 deaths, one in February, the other in November.
Not surprisingly, in 1993 the amount of tourists went down to 300,000 (data from Business Venezuela, December 1994). In 1994 a new tourist "Czar" came in and given cabinet rank ... this man, Herman Luis Soriano, listed ten main obstacles to the development of tourism in the country, as follows:
- Insufficient promotion abroad;
- Low priority assigned by the government to the sector;
- Insufficient financial resources allotted;
- Lack of a service mentality among Venezuelans;
- Insecurity;
- Poor airline connections to main tourist destinations;
- Confusing government regulations;
- Bureaucratic red tape and exchange controls;
- Slow privatization programs and political turmoil...
He went on to say that this would now change...
Ten years later, the obstacles identified by Soriano are still there, and no less than ten other Czars have come after him ... to say the same things. Some of these "Czars," like Maria Eugenia Loriente, have been extremely incompetent, and none have received much support from the rest of the government.
Four years ago, President Chavez unveiled his Strategic Plan for the development of tourism. In this plan he predicted that, by 2002, Venezuela would be receiving 1.5 million visitors. Only 150,000, 10% of the predicted visitors, accepted the invitation ... this was an amount four times lower than 20 years before!
- During these four years tourist hotel occupation has dropped about 60%, from a yearly average of 55% in 1999 to a dismal 22% by 2002.
Why this failure?
Although Venezuela is, in theory, a far superior destination than many others in the region ... due to its natural beauty and diversity of attractions, from waterfalls to jungle, from exotic fauna to spectacular beaches, from great restaurants to snow-capped mountains ... it is in practice perceived by potential visitors as of difficult access, dangerous and unfriendly.
Many of these perceptions are too harsh, but they nevertheless dominate the decision making of many tourists ... and many of those who come to us, frankly, do so because they have no other alternative. However, when they finally make it here, they are almost always favorably impressed.
This was my personal experience for the almost three years I spent as top executive of a company owning a big Venezuelan tourist resort. Inside our doors everything was clean and in good working order. Our staff was polite and smiling. The word "no" had been eliminated from their vocabulary ... they were "aggressively friendly," a motto which I concocted.
- However, outside our doors we could not control the filth on the sidewalks, the potholes in the road, the attacks of petty thieves, the harassment of buhoneros...
There are plenty of good, hard-working people in the private sector trying to make Venezuela a better tourist destination. The government, as always, is very indifferent, very inept, frequently corrupt...
The hard-working private sector has to swim in a tank of sharks...
And so ... year in and year out ... while sharks and humans wearily swim together, tourists hesitate to come to us and Cinderella keeps waiting for her Prince ... a bit more wrinkled now (she, not the Prince)...
Gustavo Coronel is the founder and president of Agrupacion Pro Calidad de Vida (The Pro-Quality of Life Alliance), a Caracas-based organization devoted to fighting corruption and the promotion of civic education in Latin America, primarily Venezuela. A member of the first board of directors (1975-1979) of Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), following nationalization of Venezuela's oil industry, Coronel has worked in the oil industry for 28 years in the United States, Holland, Indonesia, Algiers and in Venezuela. He is a Distinguished alumnus of the University of Tulsa (USA) where he was a Trustee from 1987 to 1999. Coronel led the Hydrocarbons Division of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in Washington DC for 5 years. The author of three books and many articles on Venezuela ("Curbing Corruption in Venezuela." Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, July, 1996, pp. 157-163), he is a fellow of Harvard University and a member of the Harvard faculty from 1981 to 1983. In 1998, he was presidential election campaign manager for Henrique Salas Romer and now lives in retirement on the Caribbean island of Margarita where he runs a leading Hotel-Resort. You may contact Gustavo Coronel at email gustavo@vheadline.com
Venezuela's foreign reserves and foreign exchange restrictions
<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela's Electronic News
Posted: Wednesday, May 14, 2003
By: Jose Gregorio Pineda & Jose Gabriel Angarita
VenAmCham's Jose Gregorio Pineda (chief economist) and Jose Gabriel Angarita (economist) write: Venezuelan government spokesmen have recently said the duration of the exchange control system inaugurated on January 21 is directly related to the volume of foreign reserves held by the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV). They have specifically indicated that a reserve level in the US$18-20 billion range would be considered adequate, and the government expects that level to be reached by December of this year."
This volume of foreign reserves held by the Central Bank would seem to reflect a goal of having reserves equivalent to one year's imports, but that target is unquestionably satisfied and then some by the current stock of reserves. So there must be another reason for wanting to accumulate the aforementioned amount, which was last held in 1997 following the maxi-devaluation that following the elimination of the previous exchange control system.
Going to the figures, we find that Venezuela's foreign reserves grew by $3.593 billion between January 21 and May 12, and that growth has apparently led the authorities to believe the target level will be reached or exceeded by December.
What the government does not seem to understand is that there are pressing un-met needs for foreign exchange to import and pay private debt service costs, not to mention covering the cost of the government's food import plan.
Hence, the authorities' foreign reserve build-up target is practically impossible to achieve without an indefinite continuation of the current dearth of dollars ... but that would provoke a total paralysis of productive activity that would make a foreign reserve accumulation that much harder to achieve.
So far this year there has been intense conflict surrounding CADIVI, in view of its operating problems and refusal to authorize foreign exchange distributions to sectors "not considered top priority" even though they have repeatedly asserted that companies meeting the requirements would have access to dollars.
For all these reasons, we cannot expect major changes in the control system to occur, and every day's marginal contribution of foreign exchange restriction further weakens national industry, drives up unemployment and forces more companies to close their doors.
In a nutshell, the likelihood of accumulating the amount of foreign reserves the authorities believe will allow them to lift the controls becomes more and more remote with every day the current policy remains in force.