Adamant: Hardest metal

Libre comercio: ¿Quién se beneficia?

Carlos Ball
2001.com.ve

A menudo oímos decir que en la apertura comercial de las Américas, los principales beneficiarios serían las grandes empresas multinacionales. La realidad es otra: Los más beneficiados serían los latinoamericanos pobres, quienes hoy pagan precios altos por sus alimentos, bienes y servicios básicos, gracias a la frecuente alianza de políticos, productores y sindicatos locales en mantener trabas a las inversiones extranjeras, a la vez que altos aranceles, cuotas y prohibiciones de importación. Los latinoamericanos ricos siempre podrán viajar a Estados Unidos y comprar barato.

Los países asiáticos, que eran mucho más pobres, y una decena de naciones del este de Europa, que apenas emergen del comunismo, gozan ya de niveles de vida muy superiores a los de América Latina.

Era lógico pensar que una vez que los mexicanos se quitaran de encima 71 años de gobiernos corrompidos del PRI, todo cambiaría. Pero continúan las trágicas muertes de mexicanos indocumentados tratando de cruzar la frontera y seguimos oyendo tonterías como la reciente del presidente Vicente Fox sobre que "Pemex no sólo es parte de nuestra economía, sino parte de nuestra historia".

La petrolera estatal Pemex es blasón de la corrupción gubernamental y sindical mexicana, a la vez que modelo de ineficiencia. En 1938, con la excusa de querer mejores salarios para los obreros petroleros, el presidente Lázaro Cárdenas nacionalizó las concesiones. Estados Unidos no protestó mucho, porque la mayoría de las concesiones estaban en manos de la Royal Dutch Shell. Las autoridades mexicanas declararon que las empresas petroleras habían ya explotado el 90% de las reservas mexicanas, debiéndoseles compensación por apenas el 10% restante. El entonces secretario de Estado, Cordell Hull, advirtió a las petroleras que no esperaran ayuda del gobierno de Estados Unidos, por lo cual estas procedieron a aceptar la compensación ofrecida de apenas 30 millones de dólares para las empresas norteamericanas y 130 millones para Mexican Eagle (Shell).

Es decir, esa historia gloriosa a la que se refiere Vicente Fox comenzó con un fraude. Y no sólo por violar contratos y derechos de propiedad, sino porque lejos de aumentar los salarios a los trabajadores mexicanos, Pemex procedió a reducirlos. Igual que los venezolanos 38 años más tarde, los mexicanos entonces gritaban "ahora el petróleo es nuestro". ¿Nuestro o de los políticos como Fox y Chávez?

Se trata de una historia emblemática de la tragedia y de la pobreza latinoamericana. Pero la culpa no es sólo de los políticos, sino también de los pueblos que se dejan engañar. Y mis colegas periodistas a menudo aplauden que, en este o aquel importante acuerdo de apertura, el ministro logró posponer por 15 años la inclusión de la fábrica de vidrio y a los productores de maíz, asegurando el empleo de tantos miles de ciudadanos. Lo que entonces ocultan es el mucho mayor número de compatriotas que pasará hambre porque los alimentos seguirán caros y las viviendas pobres seguirán sin vidrios en las ventanas. Ese ministro o su partido político, de alguna u otra forma, pasará la factura a los empresarios locales que salen beneficiados al no tener que competir por 15 años más.

Del lado de Estados Unidos, lo que sucede no es mucho más feliz. Por una parte está el representante de Comercio, el embajador Robert Zoellick, miembro del Gabinete, quien ha formulado la excelente propuesta de eliminar todos los aranceles industriales para el año 2015. Eso realmente beneficiaría a los pobres de todo el mundo. Aún mejor sería incluir la eliminación de los aranceles a los alimentos, lo cual salvaría más vidas que todos los programas de ayuda internacional y de las Naciones Unidas juntos.

Pero el problema en Estados Unidos es que el organismo encargado de vender al mundo los beneficios del capitalismo y de la economía libre, el Departamento de Estado, tiene una burocracia tan enemiga de tales principios como las que encontramos en la ONU y en los gobiernos de México, Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina, etc. Siendo así, no podemos esperar un ALCA vigoroso, difundiendo libertad de elección entre todos los consumidores de las Américas. Los burócratas socialistas afincados en el Departamento de Estado desde tiempos de Franklin Roosevelt siguen empeñados en complicar los tratados, incluyendo cláusulas ambientales y sindicales que hubieran logrado impedir el desarrollo económico de Estados Unidos en los siglos XIX y XX.

(*) Director de la agencia AIPE y académico asociado del Cato Institute.

(www.aipenet.com)

Primero Justicia's Borges says government import policy jeopardizes 200,000 jobs

<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela's Electronic News Posted: Monday, May 12, 2003 By: Patrick J. O'Donoghue

Primero Justicia (PJ) has presented an economic balance of Venezuela, complaining that the government's import policy to alleviate food shortages in certain sectors has left around 200,000 persons out of work.

PJ leader, Julio Borges says the policy's main defect is that it is affecting jobs and points to the case of rice imports from Thailand.

"The government aims to import finished rice through Cuban Alimpor placing 21,300 jobs in jeopardy." The same, he claims, is true in the case of wheat imported from Italy ... "Italy doesn't grow wheat, it imports from Canada and the USA."

Borges estimates losses at $800 million and suggests that if the government used the money to subsidize the basic food basket for 300,000 families for 6 months, it could easily do so ... "if it used the money for an emergency job plan, employing 800,000 persons for 6 months, it would be better than spending the money on Cuban companies."

Venezuela's exchange control headaches

By Brian Ellsworth <a href=www.upi.com>UPI Business Correspondent From the Business & Economics Desk Published 5/12/2003 1:07 PM

CARACAS, Venezuela, May 12 (UPI) -- In the midst of the shacks and slums of southern Caracas, bakery owner Daniel de Sosa says he may have to shutter his business. Like everyone else in Venezuela, de Sosa has been hit hard by the economic crisis, but he has a much more immediate problem: The price of flour has doubled. "The government isn't handing over the dollars, so the flour mills aren't running," says de Sosa. "Now I have to buy imported Colombian flour that costs me twice as much. I'm barely keeping the business running."

De Sosa's case represents a prime example of how Venezuela's currency controls are affecting average citizens across the country. Since over 60 percent of products consumed in Venezuela are imported, exchange controls decreed in January have led to supply chain bottlenecks, creating shortages of basic goods such as flour, chicken, and eggs, as well as many imported medicines. The government is trying to make up for shortages by importing products, enraging local producers and increasing costs. Many merchants have maintained their usual inventories, and widespread product shortage is unlikely. But the exchange controls continue to cause headaches for many.

President Hugo Chavez ordered a halt of all dollar sales early this year at the height of a strike by Venezuela's oil industry meant to remove the president from office. The Finance Ministry locked the Venezuelan bolivar at Bs. 1,600 to the dollar to prevent continued hemorrhaging of the government's dollar reserves, 80 percent of which come from hydrocarbon exports. Reserves have climbed considerably after four months of controlled exchange, but the government shows no sign of lifting exchange controls.

Private sector leaders insist that the exchange controls represent a government plan to destroy businesses that joined last December's national strike. Julio Brazon, president of the Venezuelan Trade and Services Council, has openly accused the firebrand left-wing populist Chavez of trying to shut down private industry and have the government assume the role of the private sector. "I don't believe this situation can be maintained much longer," Brazon told local media.

Since the start of currency controls in February, the government has approved $104 million in dollar sales, when it previously auctioned an average of $45 million per day. In addition, many products are subject to price controls that business leaders say are below production costs, which makes it impossible to sell them. The combination of the two measures has forced some businesses to shut down.

To buy dollars, a business must file an official request with the government currency exchange board, but can only receive them if they have paid all their taxes. Since Venezuelans are known for ignoring tax obligations, few businesses in the country are likely to qualify.

"We are simply asking that businesses be up to date on their tax payments if they are going to buy dollars," says pro Chavez legislator Ricardo Sanguino. "It's the same thing that any other government would do." In addition, the government accuses industries of hoarding goods to be able to sell at higher prices, and claims to have found 100,000 kilos of chicken at one domestic producer.

The exchange control has also exacerbated the tensions between Chavez and the private sector, which in the last two years has joined the opposition in demanding the president's resignation. When Chavez was briefly removed from power in a brief coup on April 11, 2002, business leader Pedro Carmona was briefly installed as president until Chavez was restored, increasing government anger at private enterprises.

Since then, the government has been openly antagonistic towards the business sector, at times indicating that the government will take over the functions of private enterprise. Many say the government's plan of importing products and selling them to the poor at subsidized prices threatens to close off markets to private businesses. Chavez has created a program of massive imports of basic products chicken and eggs from Brazil and wheat flour from Italy. Opposition leaders say Venezuelan businesses could just as easily provide these products, and that the president's import plan will cost the country over 140,000 jobs.

Venezuela's exchange controls have also caused friction with the Andean Community of Nations, which has been highly critical of the measure. Without access to foreign exchange, Venezuelan businesses have developed mounting debts with suppliers from neighboring nations such as Peru and Colombia. Colombia and Venezuela recently developed an agreement have central banks pay off hard currency debts, but Peru has announced that it will levy a 5 percent tax on all Venezuelan products to protest the exchange measure.

The current exchange control plan is the fourth in Venezuela's history, the most recent of which was created in the mid 1990s after a banking crisis rocked the nation's economy.

Opposition leaders have done their best to exaggerate claims that widespread starvation will ensue if the government doesn't end the restriction. The government, for its part, continues to insist that there are in fact no shortages of any products, only mild inconveniences in the supply chain as a result of recalcitrant business leaders not following government orders.

While it would be unwise to take either one at face value, local merchants like Caracas bakery owner de Sosa will have to struggle, literally, for their daily bread.

France's Alstom signs Venezuela hydro power deal

Reuters, 05.11.03, 2:13 PM ET

CARACAS, Venezuela, May 11 (Reuters) - French engineering group Alstom <ALSO.PA> and Venezuela's government Sunday signed a contract to complete a $160 million hydro power project in the southwest of the oil-rich South American country.

The agreement to finish the third stage of the 514 MW La Vueltosa hydroelectric plant in Venezuela's Tachira state was signed by senior executives of Alstom Power Hydro and Nervis Villalobos, president of the Venezuelan state electricity company Cadafe.

Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez witnessed the signing of the contract, which was broadcast live on his weekly "Hello President" radio and television show.

"The construction of the La Vueltosa hydroelectric plant is starting up," Chavez said. He added the total investment would be $160 million and that financing would be provided by European and Brazilian banks.

Chavez said the plant, which would come online in mid-2006, would supply power to the southwest of Venezuela.

( BW)(NY-FITCH-RATINGS/HOVENSA) Fitch Removes HOVENSA's 'BBB-' Rtg From Neg Watch Status

BW5425 MAY 09,2003 14:14 PACIFIC 17:14 EASTERN     Business Editors

    CHICAGO--(<a href=www.businesswire.com>BUSINESS WIRE)--May 9, 2003--Fitch Ratings has affirmed the 'BBB-' senior secured debt rating of HOVENSA LLC (HOVENSA), and has removed the rating from Rating Watch Negative. The rating applies to HOVENSA's $272 million senior secured term loan due 2008, $150 million senior secured reducing bank revolver due 2007 and $126.8 million senior secured tax-exempt bonds due 2021. HOVENSA is a limited liability company which owns and operates a crude oil refinery in the U.S. Virgin Islands. The refinery, which has the capacity to process up to 495,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil, is indirectly owned 50% by Amerada Hess Corporation (Hess) and 50% by Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA).

    As detailed in the Dec. 20, 2002 Fitch press release 'Fitch Places HOVENSA's Senior Secured Debt on Rating Watch Negative', the Rating Watch Negative status reflected the suspension of crude oil and feedstock supply from PDVSA and related entities as a result of the national strike in Venezuela, which lasted two months, from early December 2002 until early February 2003. PDVSA is contractually obligated to supply approximately 60% of HOVENSA's crude feedstock requirement under two crude oil supply agreements (155,000 bpd of Mesa and 115,000 bpd of Merey). While the ability of PDVSA to honor its crude supply obligations is a key determinant of HOVENSA's credit quality, the refinery does have the operating flexibility to process a wide variety of crude oils. Throughout the strike, HOVENSA was successful in acquiring substitute crude oils from a wide variety of sources at volumes sufficient to maintain relatively high operating rates. HOVENSA began receiving a portion of its contractual volumes from PDVSA in late January 2003 and has been receiving 100% of contractual volumes since the beginning of March 2003.

    HOVENSA's liquidity position has improved substantially over the past few months primarily as a result of the solid operating performance and favorable refining margins, resulting in record EBITDA of $132 million for the first quarter of 2003. In addition to the revolver being untapped, and a fully funded debt service reserve, HOVENSA currently has approximately $200 million of cash on hand. Last week, HOVENSA prepaid $78 million of its senior secured term loan, representing scheduled principal payments due in December 2003 and June 2004. Fitch believes the debt prepayment reflects conservative financial management, a credit positive given the cyclical nature of the oil refining industry.

    While HOVENSA's present liquidity position is strong, the refinery's planned capital expenditure program (Clean Fuels Program) needed to comply with recently enacted low sulfur gasoline and diesel regulations requires a significant financial commitment over the intermediate term. As such, Fitch is concerned with the significant estimated cost of the Clean Fuels Program (approximately $450 million planned to be spent over the next four years) and the potential strain on liquidity. While HOVENSA has some flexibility related to the timing of the program, Fitch is also concerned that a significant delay of the Clean Fuels Program could hinder the refinery's ability to sell into the U.S. market. The new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards go fully into effect in January 2007.

    HOVENSA's debt is currently supported by completion guarantees from the sponsors, which will remain in place until financial completion of the delayed coker project is achieved, which is expected in the coming months. While HOVENSA is a joint venture, Fitch believes the refinery is a strategically important asset to Hess and as such, Fitch continues to view Hess's committed sponsorship as a key factor in HOVENSA's debt rating. Fitch currently rates the senior unsecured debt of Hess 'BBB-'.

--30--EB/sf*

CONTACT: Fitch Ratings
         John W. Kunkle, CFA +1-312-606-2329
         Caren Y. Chang, +1-312-368-3151
         Bryan Caviness, +1-312-368-2056, Chicago
         Alejandro Bertuol, +1-212-908-0393, New York
         James Jockle, +1-212-908-0547, New York, Media Relations

KEYWORD: NEW YORK
INDUSTRY KEYWORD: BANKING BOND/STOCK RATINGS
SOURCE: Fitch Ratings
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