<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela's Electronic News Posted: Thursday, May 01, 2003 By: Peter Armstrong

Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2003 18:21:48 -0600 From: Peter Armstrong herrqlys@hotmail.com To: Editor@vheadline.com Subject: April 11 coup d'etat linked to Bush 'dirty wars' team

Dear Editor: Firstly, I found your detailing of the affiliations of Otto Reich, Elliot Abrams and John Negroponte very interesting. Despite their nefarious backgrounds, these people have important positions with the current Bush administration, so their malodorous past must be OK with Cheney and the boys.

What a moral cesspool. ¡Preparate, America!

Secondly, the Iran-Contra affair was mentioned twice in this article, but never once hinted at the further Reagan administration perfidy of cocaine trafficking. It was the illegal trafficking in cocaine that provided the CIA with the clandestine funds to buy the weapons to be sold to Iran in the first place (against the US's own embargo on that country).

The Iranian payments for the weapons were essentially laundered (spin cycle and all) drug money for supporting the Contra terrorists against a democratically elected government in Nicaragua. The proceeds from the sale of missiles and spare jet fighter parts to Iran were to be the secret, "clean" funding of the CIA's dirty war in Nicaragua. Col. Oliver North was a Reagan man, with an office in the White House. How obvious does this get?

The Iran-Contra affair expose should have blown the lid off the sleaze that accompanies the American political system. The forgeries and lies invoked to propel the rush to illegal war in Iraq should also have been accompanied by US public outrage. Yet they didn't. The majority of the US public just bleated like sheep, and let it happen.

Compared to these things, explicit US involvement in a Venezuelan coup d'etat is almost pedestrian -- except if you're Venezuelan. At least an outraged Venezuelan public was courageous enough to do something about immoral actions in their country. Public anger and demonstrations forced the coup kidnappers to release President Hugo Chavez Frias within 48 hours.

• Dictator-for-a-Day Pedro Carmona got the bum's rush ... Democratic Venezuelans can be proud of that!

Americans should hang their heads in shame ... Americans should also seriously contemplate the reality of their "democracy."

Peter Armstrong herrqlys@hotmail.com

washingtontimes.com April 30, 2003 Allan Gerson

     With the human-rights file on Sudan closed, with Cuba essentially getting a pass despite its jailing and mistreatment of 74 dissidents, with Zimbabwe escaping from the list of countries requiring special observation, and without any mention of human rights violations in Chechnya, it is little wonder that editorialists argue that the United States should get out of the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

     Thus, The Washington Post on April 18 opined in its lead editorial, "If the Commission [chaired by Libya] is going to continue to act against the interests of the world's weak and persecuted, we ought not to lend it any further credibility." Walking out is offered as the solution.

     The trouble is that, if we pick up our marbles and go away, the commission still continues to function in its nasty way. Countries like Israel that have been subjected to the worst calumny and accused of "Nazilike practices" will have no one — with the valiant exception of Germany at this year's session — to stand up for them. Israel's ambassador, Yaakov Levy, has said that, when he addresses the commission, he tries to look at the delegates as individuals, many of them young people, many of them unaware of the facts, as an opportunity to set the record straight, or at least to present another side of the picture to which they would otherwise not be exposed.

     Participation creates a special dilemma for the United States. Last year, it was booted off in a secret ballot in which the U.S. for the first time in the commission's 55-year history did not gain a seat. Instead the body, which is supposed to be the U.N.'s premier organ for dealing with human-rights violations around the world, granted that seat to Syria. The chairmanship went to Libya. Faced with that unpalatable outcome, the U.S. government decided to withdraw its participation. However, when re-elected this last year, the issue became whether to send a U.S. emissary of relatively low diplomatic stature or to send a big gun. It was decided on the latter, and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick was selected for the task.

     Was it worth the candle? Did we squander a valued national resource by dignifying a body which required only a slap from the back of the hand? To judge what in fact occurred, it is necessary to take into account what is not generally known: the unheralded diplomatic successes scored against the record of what could not be achieved.

     Two days after the start of the Iraq war, when success seemed still distant, a special session was called for under the banner of humanitarian concerns to call for a cease-fire. This would essentially have given a victory to Saddam Hussein, or at the least have made diplomatic life for the United States all the more difficult. Mrs. Kirkpatrick deftly handled the diplomacy with letters to the members of the African Union calling directly for their support, with notification to all the other delegates of the actual strength of those forces supporting the United States, militarily and otherwise, and through a variety of other means.

     Granted, this is not exciting stuff to make the front pages of any newspaper, especially when bullets are flying. But, it can have a critical impact. Keep in mind first what the word "cease-fire" means. Cease-fire is what the omnibus eight-page U.N. Security Council resolution 687 of April 3, 1991, called for, and it bought the Iraqis more than 12 years of time, despite the resolution's repeated call for unconditional and immediate destruction of weapons of mass destruction and chemical weapons.

     Undoubtedly, the Arab League, meeting in Cairo two days after the start of the war, had something along these lines in mind when it voted in favor of a cease-fire resolution. That exercise didn't go anywhere until someone had the clever idea of bringing the show to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. It had already been addressed by various foreign ministers, including those of France and Germany. It seemed like an ideal locale to launch the effort of a cease-fire as, unlike the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. would not be in a position to exercise its veto, and U.N. legitimacy could then be claimed in favor of a cease-fire.

     Syria and Cuba spearheaded the effort, joined by Zimbabwe, South Africa, Malaysia, Libya, Sudan, Burkina Faso and, surprisingly, Russia. On March 26, it introduced its resolution calling for a special emergency session to consider "Human Rights and Humanitarian Consequences of the Military Action Against Iraq." The body of the text made clear, however, that the resolution had nothing to do with humanitarian concerns, as the operative paragraphs condemned the coalition action as "clearly in violation of the principles of international law and the United Nations Charter," and called for "an immediate end to the unilateral military action against Iraq."

     The night before the anticipated vote, the likely tally did not look good. Latin American countries that the U.S. could usually count on for support — Venezuela and Brazil — were now lined up squarely in the opposite corner. Others — like Costa Rica and Mexico — were being pressured to distance themselves. Newer friends — like Croatia and Ukraine — also seemed uncertain in their vote.

     Under Ambassador Kirkpatrick's leadership, the United States not only went to the delegates themselves, but also made demarches in capitals trying to make clear how important the outcome of this vote would be. When the vote on the resolution was called for on March 27, the European Union stood firmly with the United States. Germany, the chairman of WEOG (the Western European and Others Group) exercised a decisive leadership role. In Africa, the Cameroons and Uganda broke ranks with the African Union to vote against the resolution; Senegal, Togo and the Democratic Republic of Congo abstained. Swaziland and Sierra Leone decided to absent themselves from that day's business. Ukraine did likewise. Thailand, despite pressure from the Asian bloc, voted resoundingly No.

     The final tally was 25 against the resolution, 18 in favor, and 7 abstentions. It was a big victory for the United States, although one that went practically unnoticed by the international press. It was too busy covering skirmishes in Iraq to notice what was going on in the posh surroundings of Lake Geneva in the old halls of the League of Nations.            Allan Gerson, an international lawyer and coauthor of "The Price of Terror" (HarperCollins 2001), was a senior adviser on this year's U.S. delegation to the U.N. Human Rights Commission.

<a href=worldnetdaily.com>worldnetdaily.com Posted: April 26, 2003 1:00 a.m. Eastern

Editor's note: By special, exclusive arrangement with Courcy's Intelligence Review, WorldNetDaily publishes excerpts of the latest reports of the world's most prestigious intelligence newsletter.

By Joe deCourcy © 2003 WorldNetDaily.com

There has been surprise in some quarters that the U.S.-led attack on Iraq has not produced a major terrorist response.

The lack of a major terrorist response to the U.S.-led attack on Iraq in fact mirrors the experience of 1991, and the following points are germane:

1. Islamist-inspired terrorism is fuelled by grievances that long pre-date the U.S.-led attack on Iraq and that will long survive the restoration of Iraqi rule in Baghdad. The perpetration of major acts of anti-Western terrorism, therefore, is dependent on the capacity of the terrorists to act rather than the immediate result of any specific policy (such as the invasion of Iraq).

2. The downward trend in international terrorism since 9-11 indicates that the capacity of al-Qaida to strike against Western targets has been significantly diminished – and common-sense suggests this must be so for the following reasons:

• The group's bases in Afghanistan have been destroyed and significant leaders have been killed or captured.
• International intelligence agencies have been collaborating in a far more systematic way since 9-11. The positive effect that this can have was demonstrated at the time of the last Gulf War in 1991 when very few attacks on Western targets were successful. What attacks there were tended to be minor and on the periphery. That has been the case this time as well.
• One major consequence of the Iraq war is that it has demonstrated to anyone who doubted that the current United States administration is not to be fooled with. This has had a salutary effect on all would-be state-sponsors of terrorism, and a severely degraded al-Qaida is now operating in a much less accommodating environment than was previously the case. No state wants to be found with an al-Qaida smoking gun in its hand.
• Saudi Arabia, in particular, will have been frightened by the tone of last year's Rand Corporation report that stigmatized it as the "kernel of evil." The fact that the author of the report was subsequently released by Rand would not have diminished the impact of the report in Riyadh.
• Likewise in Pakistan, President Musharraf is under no illusions as to what would happen if he were to go soft on al-Qaida. It is true that he is maintaining (even increasing) his support for Kashmiri militancy, but worrying though this is it remains a local issue.

3. Although the capacity of al-Qaida has been greatly reduced for the reasons given above, it could still strike at the periphery without too much trouble. But there are problems with this. The Bali bombing (committed by an affiliate organization) achieved little for the cause while producing widespread revulsion among Indonesia's moderate Muslims.

The huge success of the 9-11 attacks adds to the problem for al-Qaida. It would take something extraordinarily spectacular to top the impact of 9-11, whereas a thwarted attack or one that lacked the emotional significance of 9-11 would be seen as a failure.

The danger posed by non-state terrorism has always been the limitation of deterrence. States can be deterred, but groups of fanatics cannot be. However, they can be harried and hounded and spied upon – and their bases can be destroyed. Furthermore, mounting a major terrorist outrage is more difficult than it might at first sight be thought, and without the tacit support of rogue states, al-Qaida's task has become more difficult still.

This is not, for a moment, to say that there is no danger, but it explains the current quiescence and why less has been heard from al-Qaida in the present circumstances than some thought likely.

It goes almost without saying that there remain great dangers ahead, and the negatives include:

• The Islamic world has an inexhaustible supply of grievances and therefore of potential recruits to the terrorist cause.
• There are still many places where terrorist cells and networks can flourish – from the teeming cities of Indonesia, Pakistan, and even Europe to the remote places of South-East Asia, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa. The expatriate Arab communities as far afield as South America (in the tri-border area for instance and in Venezuela's Margarita island) provide funds and places of refuge.
• Fanatics can now acquire the means to kill on an unprecedented scale.

The key to future security will be continuing international cooperation and relentless pressure on any states showing signs of renewed support for al-Qaida or similar groups. All the indications are that the Bush administration will continue to insist on the former and will not shy away from the latter (except possibly – and dangerously – in Pakistan). However, there is no such thing as an impregnable defense.

Readers of WorldNetDaily are eligible in April only for an exclusive promotional deal on new subscriptions to Courcy's Intelligence Review.

25 Apr 2003 21:08:59 GMT

CARACAS, Venezuela, April 25 (Reuters) - A man wanted in Spain for allegedly carrying out a 1979 attack for the Basque separatist group ETA has surrendered to Venezuelan authorities, the government said on Friday.

Luis Maria Olalde, one of six suspected ETA members in Venezuela whose extradition was sought by Madrid, gave himself up to local prosecutors Wednesday. Venezuela's Supreme Court must decide whether the extradition request should be granted.

Olalde, 46, went into exile in the South American nation at the end of the 1980s with other Basque separatists as part of an agreement between the Spanish and Venezuelan presidents at the time, Felipe Gonzalez and Carlos Andres Perez.

Olalde is sought by Spanish police in connection with a 1979 attack against a Civil Guard vehicle.

Following an extradition request last year from Spain to President Hugo Chavez's government, Venezuelan authorities ordered the arrest of Olalde and the five other ETA suspects.

An ETA guerrilla campaign since 1968 to press demands for an independent Basque state in Spain has killed more than 830 people.

4/21/2003 11:43 AM By: <a href=www.capitalnews9.com>Capital News 9 web staff

A man accused of setting fire to a Jewish temple in Syracuse was denied bail Monday and ordered held in jail until his trial.

An Onondaga County judge agreed with prosecutors that 29-year-old Raussi Uthman was a risk to flee the Syracuse area.

Uthman was arrested March 14 in California after being sought by Syracuse police and the FBI for more than two years in connection with the arson at Temple Beth El in October 2000.

His defense attorney denies the allegations that his client was motivated by hate to set fire to the synagogue.

Officials said the fire occurred late at night and the suspect used gasoline to start it. The blaze caused about $700,000 in damage.

Uthman is a naturalized US citizen born in Venezuela of Palestinian parents. Prosecutors said he evaded law enforcement officials by using three different passports, more than two dozen aliases and numerous addresses.