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Can A Post-war Iraq End Opec Manipulations?

<a href=www.financialexpress.com>Read Source. Shebonti Ray Dadwal

Will securing Iraq’s 112 billion barrels of oil reserves resolve the industrialised world’s and the US’ energy problem? Can a pro-west, perhaps even a democratic Iraq provide Washington with the alternative it has been seeking to replace Saudi Arabia as the linchpin of its Gulf and energy policy and, more importantly, lead to the end of an increasingly troublesome OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries)?

Whether George W Bush’s leitmotif for a second Gulf War is oil or not, or whether his objectives are more ambitious vis-a-vis the entire Gulf region, there are many who are ready to believe they are. The elaborate plans that were made to ensure that Iraq’s precious oil fields were secured, both during the war and after, for the US oil companies, add grist to the rumour mill. In fact, it is even said that a certain American oil company has already been given a post-war reconstruction contract. And, after all, wasn’t the first Gulf War all about not allowing the Iraqi dictator wresting control over Kuwait’s oil and gaining access to the world’s largest reserves?

But that was a different era, when Riyadh was Washington’s most trusted ally and could be depended on to use its ability as a swing producer to keep oil prices at acceptable levels — not too high as to increase inflationary trends and impact on the global economy, yet not too low as to affect the profit margins of the producers, including the American companies.

Of course, the relationship worked both ways. The Saudis always knew that with their incredibly low cost of production and reserves close to 262 billion barrels, they could capture market share by jacking up production over and above their OPEC quota levels and flood the market with crude at prices which would render the high cost non-OPEC producers — which included the American producers — unviable. Besides, it suited Saudi Arabia, whose main source of revenue continues to remain rooted in its energy sector, to keep the world hooked on a diet of oil.

Then 9/11 happened and Washington’s greatest fears regarding Saudi reliability were confirmed. Signs of anti-Americanism that had begun to take root soon after the first Gulf war, were by and large, ignored as long as the regime was seen as loyal and Riyadh controlled and manipulated the spigots to keep renegade OPEC members, who were advocating production drawbacks to keep prices high, in line. But with evidence of some linkages between the Saudi regime and Islamic terrorist funding, Washington was ready to look for alternative allies.

Besides, Riyadh’s ability — and interest — to halt rising oil prices were also being questioned. When prices increased by 40% in a little under a year to reach $36 a barrel in January this year, a Saudi-engineered Opec production hike was instituted. But with rampant quota busting already ensuring that most cartel members were already producing to capacity, a ceiling hike only legitimised clandestine output. And with a strike in Venezuela all but wiping out that country’s 2.5 mbd exports, and tight US inventories, even a Saudi production hike could not bring about a price drop.

For a while, Moscow presented itself as a possible partner, as it not only had large energy reserves but was also a useful ally in facilitating Central Asian energy exports to the world market. With American investments pouring into the Russian oil sector, production was revved up to more than 7.5 mbd from an earlier below 6 mbd. However, Russia’s oil reserves, at 48 billion barrels, constitute only a small portion of global reserves; also, its cost of production is high and it is already pumping oil to capacity.

That leaves Iraq. With its vast oil wealth and twice as much potential reserves, plus its incredibly low cost of production, it could, if brought out of Opec, allow the world to be delivered from its price manipulations, perhaps even render the cartel ineffective. However, for this to happen, Iraq’s oil wells, already crippled by more than a decade of UN-imposed sanctions, and now perhaps by Saddam Hussein’s retreating troops, will first have to be brought back on line if a prospective oil shock is to be staved off. With US oil inventories at an all-time low, political problems in Nigeria affecting exports, and Venezuela yet to regain pre-strike production levels, the world may well have to see the International Energy Agency forced to release strategic stocks to prevent another crippling oil price hike.

Gulf War II And Its Aftermath

<a href=www.financialexpress.com>Read more.. Saumitra Chaudhuri

Estimating the cost of war has become a bit superfluous. Till some days back, the defining limits were thus: A short war of six to eight weeks, without adverse repercussions after the US occupation. Or a more drawn-out affair lasting many months, combined by terrorist strikes and simmering local discontent to the eventual occupation. Obviously, the first had much less of an associated bill of cost, than had the latter.

Three days into the war, and the Iraqi army seems to be melting on contact. Unless, that is, the Iraqi supreme command has taken a leaf out of Russian tactics in the Napoleonic wars. Like the Russians, Saddam is perhaps drawing US troops deep into Iraq, after which he will wait for winter. The empty bluster and singular intransigence of the Iraqi regime is matched only by its plain idiocy. The one route Iraq had to force a stalemate, was the ability to inflict pain to the invading force beyond its threshold to accept politically. Which always seemed to be a remote possibility, but the absurdity of even considering such an outcome is now evident. The 2003 Iraqi expedition might yet turn out swifter than that of Lt. Gen. Maude in February-March 1917.

So let us check out the three instruments by which adverse effects from this war could possibly bear on the Indian economy. First, West Asia accounts for 12% of our merchandise exports and this year it rose by 37%. The largest market is the UAE, followed at some distance by Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey. The fear was that if the conflict spilled over to other countries in the Persian Gulf, and if the dislocation were to last, our exports to this region could fall precipitately. We can safely rule this one out now. Our exports to Iraq of about Rs 1,000 crore are in jeopardy, but we will return to this later.

Second, there are the millions of our citizens who work in the region and who remitted a large part of Rs 64,000 crore over the last four quarters. In 1991 a big chunk of Indian workers were in Iraq and Kuwait and they had to be evacuated. This time round, there are none in Iraq and there is no cause for anyone to flee Kuwait. Of course, if sarkari flights are available, some in Kuwait will surely fly. And the powers that be in the civil aviation ministry must be looking forward to all those photo-ops. No, not much loss in remittances or re-location costs should be on the table.

Third, oil prices. Producers have reaped a bonanza ever since the Axis of Evil speech raised the possibility of conflict in Iraq. Oil prices defied the laws of gravity, that is, the cold logic of soggy economies across the developed world. By rights it should be in the low-20s, but they stayed in the band of $25 to $30 per barrel ever since mid-March 2002. The strike in Venezuela in December 2002, of course, worsened matters.

To understand why oil prices fell $10 per barrel since last week, reflect on the nature of the market. What we call spot prices are really contracts for delivery after one month. And contracts are written for 2,3,4 months and so on for over a year into the future. As the war became more imminent, forward contracts come under pressure, since everyone knows that the regime of gravity defying prices will end, once the war is over. Thus, with a date set for the beginning of war future prices collapsed with immediate consequences on spot. Also bear in mind that the nervousness in the oil market related not only to loss of Iraqi supplies, but to dislocation to Persian Gulf supplies in general. This nervousness has, of course, been fully diffused. Hence, we look at 2003-04 through a prism of oil prices that will be actually significantly lower than that which ruled in 2002-03. So scratch that item of cost, and substitute it with a benefit.

Thus, the costs of war in Iraq are minimal, and are likely to be outweighed by the benefits. Given the quality of Iraqi resistance, it is best if we turn to the aftermath. What are the things that can go wrong and how might they affect Indian economic interests. Restive Iraqi populations, making for the occupation to be a bloody business? Unlikely. The majority Shias will find political space in the new set-up. Knives will be out against the minority who ruled the roost with Saddam and they will have their hands more than full just to survive. Will the Turks try slaughtering the Kurds, or at least their present autonomy? The Turks would perhaps like to do just that, but it is unlikely that they will cross the Americans excessively, especially after Baghdad falls. But there is some potential for a mess. Will the jehadis strike, and with what success, for given the anger amongst Arab and other Muslim populations, it is an opportune moment? That remains a big unknown, as also what manner of tremors it will set off against the many unpopular regimes in West Asia and North Africa and the not so stable ones in our part of Asia.

Will we be able to sell our sub-standard (everyone else think so) wheat stocks to Iraq after the dust has settled? American and Australian producers expect to be given the opportunity to provide the liberated people of Iraq better quality wheat. And whoever can argue against that? Will Indian companies get back pre-1991 Iraqi debts? Maybe. Will they get a slice of the Rebuilding Iraq project? Sub-contracts from American companies are possible, for all these are reasonable people and the bottom line matters. How about the contracts that ONGC (and the Russians and the French and the Chinese) had with the deposed regime? Best to forget it.

Is Iraq the last pre-emptive strike? More likely not, and it would serve us well to work out what the next act in this play might be.

The writer is economic advisor, ICRA

Simmons says U.S. justified to attack

Weapons of mass destruction, not oil. Sunday, March 23, 2003 By JENNIFER HICKS Norwich Bulletin

MYSTIC -- The war in Iraq is about weapons of mass destruction, not about oil, according to U.S. Rep. Rob Simmons, R-2nd District.

Simmons, a Vietnam veteran and former CIA agent, talked about the war Saturday at his office in Mystic. He said America gets most of its oil from Venezuela and Saudi Arabia and not from Iraq.

Simmons said he understands U.S. forces trying to end the war quickly by conducting operations such as Friday's "shock and awe" bombing campaign.

"That kind of attack to the heart of their leadership has a lot of impact," he said.

He also said he doesn't believe the U.S. strikes will increase the risk of terrorist attacks here in retaliation.

"We're at the risk of terrorist attacks in this country to a greater or lesser degree, regardless of these attacks," Simmons said.

He said he believes the United States is sending a clear signal to countries that support terrorism to show it's not going to tolerate it.

Simmons said the Iraqi government failed to comply with 17 U.N. resolutions to disarm, particularly resolution 1441. He said satellite photos taken by the CIA showed suspicious buildings and vehicles.

"In situations like this, you have to be prepared to use force. War is an extension of politics by other means," he said. "I'm against war, but I believe it can be used as a last resort."

He said this war is a last resort to quash the goal of the Iraqi regime -- which is to kill Americans.

He said the Iraqi regime resents the influence that Western culture is having in the Middle East.

"They have fundamental differences and values than us," he said. "They feel our culture is taking over in other parts of the world."

Simmons also doesn't believe America's loss of allied support for the war will be long-term He said U.S. allies have disagreed with us in the past and then resolved the issues. He believes that will be the case again.

He said Congress' move to change the name of French fries to "freedom" fries because of France's reluctance to support the war was just for humor.

He said France, China, Russia and Germany have lucrative oil negotiations with Iraq, which is probably their reason for keeping out of the war.

He predicted Americans would continue to order Chinese take-out and White Russians even though the names come from countries standing on the sidelines of the war.

Simmons said the anti-war protests make this war different from other wars, such as Vietnam. Anti-war movements during Vietnam started several years after the war began.

"Here, we have a movement that preceded the war," he said of today's protests.

Simmons said protesters have the right to voice their opinions. Some might not have gathered all of the facts about the war, while others are pacifists, he said.

"I have great respect for pacifists," he said.

But, he said, Saddam Hussein is not a pacifist and eventually will go after the American people.

jehicks@norwichbulletin.com

Will war mean disaster?

www.sundayherald.com A short war could stall recovery but, say Ian Fraser and Mike Woodcock, a longer one could bring the economy to its knees

AS THE first few Tomahawk cruise missiles rained down around Baghdad last Thursday morning there was a distinct sense of d?jˆ vu among seasoned economic observers.

After all, there's a George Bush in the White House, Saddam Hussein clinging onto power in Baghdad and uncertainty about the conflict's duration and long-term economic repercussions clouding the global economic picture, fear of terrorist reprisals under mining the tourism and aviation sectors, and financial markets in limbo after an astonishing 'war rally' that started when the diplomatic wrangling ended 10 days ago.

Economic commentator Anatole Kaletsky was last week unremittingly gloomy about the conflict's possible impact on all our economic futures.

Writing in the Times, Kaletsky said: 'It may seem callous to suggest this when people are about to die, but the worst consequences of the Iraq crisis may be economic.'

If the current war is short and successful, the consensus is there will be a strong economic rebound worldwide.

But should the war drag on for longer than markets are expecting -- as George W Bush warned in his eve of hostilities address -- commentators are united in feeling the outlook would be distinctly more hairy.

Kaletsky said a 'bad' war would not only be catastrophic for Bush and Blair, but would also provoke a doomsday scenario for the global economy.

'[In the UK] tumbling financial markets would hit London property prices and the contagion would quickly spread to regional housing markets, causing a collapse in consumer spending, recession and a dramatic deterioration in fiscal policy. Gordon Brown would be forced to choose between cutting public spending, raising taxes or accepting huge deficits. Britain could find itself sucked through a time warp back to the days of Denis Healey.

'[In the US] the stock market and the economy would plunge, almost certainly triggering a double-dip recession. Fiscal policy would be unable to compensate. The dollar would fall sharply. Trade policy would lurch towards protectionism in response to recession and Europe's perceived betrayal of the US. Export industries would be devastated around the world. Unemployment in continental Europe would rise to a level last seen in the 1930s. And who knows what Rough Beast might arise again?'

Not a particularly happy scenario for our future economic well-being.

And, even if the war is short and successful, the diplomatic schism between 'old Europe' and the USA may take years to heal, with disturbing consequences for economies and financial markets in France and Germany. Their aerospace industries, for example, could be grounded as they find themselves frozen out from US-related joint ventures and technology transfer.

This would accelerate the current weakening of the European economy, with repercussions for UK and Scottish exporters which on average distribute 50% of their exports to other EU member states.

The Ernst & Young Item club is also warning that even a short war could knock the stuffing out of UK growth during 2003 and beyond.

Adrian Cooper, managing director of Oxford Economic Forecasting and an adviser to E&Y's Item club said: 'Businesses are being unsettled by the continuing uncertainty. Many are delaying decisions to invest or take on new staff until they have a clearer picture of how the war will pan out. The recovery from the bursting of the new economy investment bubble has so far been very subdued. The Item club is now forecasting a pause in growth through this year rather than the continued acceleration one would previously have expected.

'If the war is protracted, if oil supplies are interrupted and if there are significant terrorist reprisals then it is going to be very, very costly -- and would certainly lead to recession across Europe.'

The most obvious and immediate lightning rod from the conflict in Iraq to the global economy is through the oil price. After all, it is the channel through which most damage to global growth could be done.

So far, the omens are good. Even with seven oil wells alight around Basra in southern Iraq, the price was still coming down after the impressive 26% falls last week, with Brent crude selling for around $25 per barrel on Friday.

Traders seemed confident this war would be short, decisive and would leave Gulf producers unscathed.

However if the war proves does turn out to be prolonged and the oil price starts to rise frighteningly towards the $40 per barrel mark, central banks around the world will almost certainly take concerted action to reduce interest rates further.

The conflict's effect on the oil market would be easier to fathom were the precedent set by the previous Gulf war anything to go by. However, this is an altogether different conflict and, for example, the support from the Arab world has been much more muted than last time around.

The Boston Consulting Group (BCG), a management consultancy, believes Iraq will sharply increase oil production once the war is over as a means of restoring its battered economy as swiftly as possible, and that Opec countries will follow its lead.

Whilst accepting that other scenarios are possible, BCG believes this would probably lead to a break-up of Opec and cause the oil price to crash to $10-$12 per barrel. BCG's Stephan Dertnig said: 'It's already difficult for Opec member states to restrain production because of population growth and increase in governmental subsidies.'

One reason that oil prices fell so soon after hostilities broke out in 1991 was because it soon became apparent that nearby Saudi oil fields would remain unscathed. This time it is what happens to the fields in Iraq that is more critical, according to Professor Alex Kemp, a petroleum economics expert at Aberdeen University.

He said: 'This time the uncertainty is over the question: will the Iraqi fields be damaged?' he said.

Bruce Dingwall, president of the UK Offshore Operators' Association (UKOOA), who spent nearly 10 years working in the Middle East, points out that the already crumbling oil infrastructure in Iraq is now 12 years older than in the previous conflict and that -- given interruption to production in Venezuela -- the supply side of the equation is harder to forecast.

'The days of simply being able to turn on an oil field are gone. If they are already full on, and only really Saudi Arabia can do that, the oil price might not go down as much as we think.'

A key issue is whether Iraq remains a member of Opec, the Saudi-led cartel of oil-producing states. If it does, Iraq's output quotas could be no more than Iran's three million barrels per day. That would make wholesale development of its huge reserves unviable in the short to medium-term.

An Iraq outside Opec would produce much more oil and invite significantly greater Western investment. But such a turn of events might also send oil prices tumbling. Even the US, with its dislike of high oil prices, would not necessarily want a collapse in the market.

But what about reconstructing and rehabilitating the Iraqi oil industry once peace returns? The prospect of a $1.5 billion rehabilitation programme in a post- sanctions world is already getting oil companies salivating.

As one senior oil executive said: 'There is no reserves constraint in Iraq. It is the second biggest holder of oil in the world next to Saudi and it is not difficult oil. There isn't 3000ft of water, and it isn't jungle. This is desert. It is easy oil.' The US Agency for International Development (USAID) has, reportedly, established a shortlist of five companies to bid for a $900 million contract to rebuild Iraq, with the likes of Kellogg Brown & Root, part of Halliburton, which helped bring 320 oil wells under control in the last Gulf war, believed to be in the frame.

According to Deutsche Bank's global oil analyst JJ Traynor, Halliburton, of which US vice president Dick Cheney was chairman and chief executive from 1995 to 2000, and Schlumberger Oilfield Services, are 'almost certain to play an early role in upgrading the technical facilities of Iraq's oil fields'.

However, the level of participation and the types of contracts that could be offered will not be clear until a new government takes office.

Martin Purvis, Middle East energy consultant at Edinburgh-based energy consultants Wood Mackenzie, said the potential for foreign oil firms will depend on the types of contracts on offer. He said Saddam's government set up several Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) following the previous Gulf War, notably with France's TotalFinaElf and Russia's Lukoil, but that new contracts called Development and Production Contracts (DPCs) have since become more fashionable in neigh bouring countries such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

Under DPCs, foreign investors are paid a fee for participating in the development of a prospective oilfield, after which the field reverts to state control. 'What is certain is that Iraq has only exploited a few of its large discoveries,' said Purvis.

While US companies jostle for position in an unseemly fashion, British and European companies are being more circumspect. Speculation has been rife that the US will seek carve up oil contracts between itself and its principal allies, including Britain. That would infuriate the Russians and the French, some of whose oil companies already have PSCs in Iraq.

It is entirely possible however that the successor regime in Iraq will prove reluctant to open its doors wide to international production partners.

Middle Eastern nations such as Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia nationalised their oil industries in the 1970s, and while they have pledged to invite foreign producers to bid for contracts, the oil majors have in fact made very slow progress in establishing themselves in these countries.

This is partly because the countries concerned have such a strong desire to retain control over their own black gold. 'If they get a new government why should they think any differently?' said one well-placed source. 'Iraq has been denied capital investment for many years, so they may insist that they can do it themselves.'

Oil giant BP, led by CEO Lord Browne of Madingley, is one major that is keen to become involved in any post-war deals in Iraq. But despite reported meetings with the UK government on the opportunities, the company was reluctant to comment while a post-war settlement remains some way off. A spokesman said: 'If sanctions are lifted and if the Iraqi government wants foreign investment in the oil sector, then we would could consider any opportunities there as we would anywhere else in the world.'

Last week, the chairman of Royal/Dutch Shell, Philip Watts, said he hoped there would be 'a level playing field' for the international energy industry in a post-war Iraq if Saddam Hussein is removed from power.

The most direct opportunities are likely to be available to oil services firms (in Scotland these would include Weir and Wood Group), especially those with experience of rebuilding crumbling infrastructure. Aberdeen-based Wood Group was, for example, involved in the rebuilding process in the Kuwaiti oil fields following the last Gulf War.

Kemp said: 'I have no doubt that a number of North Sea companies could participate in either rehabilitation, if that were necessary, or in redeveloping the fields. If there is no damage to the fields because the American troops get there and protect them, the question would be if they still want to expand the sector.

'It currently produces about two million barrels a day but it could become much larger. This would create opportunities for the oil companies themselves and the contractors.'

Overall, however, many North Sea firms seem to prefer to keep their powder dry until the conflict is resolved.

But Dingwall sounds a note of caution. He suggests that any turn round in production could take up to five years as new legal and fiscal frameworks are put in place by the still unknowable post-war regime.

'There will be no grab and steal,' he added. 'I think it will be done in an incredibly orderly and sensible fashion. The Iraqis are a very intelligent bunch and they understand the oil business intimately. There will be no bonanza, but they will take a year or two to see what the new fiscal and legal regime will look like.'

Lessons to be learned from the first gulf war... IN the six months between Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the beginning of the Gulf war in January 1991, the build up to war had a worse effect on global stock prices than the actual war itself.

The over-reaction of equity markets was linked to talk of another 'Vietnam'. The US Standard & Poor's 500 Index declined by 19.2% and the FTSE-100 by 16.2%.

The only market areas almost immune from the jitters were defensive stocks such as utilities, telecoms, consumer staples, energy and healthcare.

After the Gulf war concluded there was a 20% leap in the US equity markets, however this jump has to be seen in the context of a US and global economy which was entering a recession. The post-conflict rally could also be linked to a more stable economic and political environment, where the dollar was stronger and the US had an 18% excess capacity for oil.

The movement of oil prices in 1990/1991 was erratic, with crude prices increasing by 160.1% during the conflict. At its highest level the price of a barrel reached... but once the land war commenced, prices had already started to decline, and by the end, had come down to around 53% from the peak to levels reached prior to the invasion. Tourism revenues have not declined for a single year since the second world war, but the Gulf war was a benchmark of gloom, with growth in global revenues from 21.5% in 1990 to just 3.2% in 1991. However, the sector's resilience combined with aggressive pricing and marketing to achieve a growth figure of 13.5% in 1992. In Scotland, the value of tourism expenditure in Scotland during 1991 increased by 8% to £1.7bn -- despite the Gulf war.

The international airline sector reported that transatlantic bookings suffered the most in 1991. After the Gulf war, three US airlines folded as fuel prices soared amid fears about supplies from the Middle East. These were Eastern, Midway and Pan American. British Airways saw profits plunge from £156m to just £9m before tax in the aftermath of the war.

The financial difficulties were exacerbated by airlines over-ordering aircraft in the boom years of the late 1980s, leading to significant excess capacity in the market. International Air Transport Association member airlines suffered cumulative net losses of $20.4bn in the years from 1990 to 1994.

The construction sector in the US hit a low point in 1991. The US economy had been in recession since July 1990, with contractions in real estate and commercial property. In the UK the sector, which contributes around 10% to GDP, struggled through the early 1990s as investment levels dropped as a result of generally poor economic conditions.

By 1991 the US economy was so big and the scale of fighting so small that extra military spending did little to boost the economy. Global sector consolidation began, R&D levels rose and defence spending increased.

War sends oil, gas prices plunging

www.nydailynews.com By NANCY DILLON DAILY NEWS BUSINESS WRITER

Oil and gasoline prices took another high-octane ride yesterday, plunging and zigzagging on reports pouring out of Iraq.

After falling as much as $1.82 per barrel on rumors Saddam Hussein had been killed and U.S. forces had seized the Kirkuk oil hub in northern Iraq, crude closed down $1.21 at $26.91 per barrel.

Crude prices inched back up in afternoon trading after U.S. officials said they didn't know Hussein's whereabouts and that forces had taken control of oil fields in southern Iraq but not the north.

Crude prices have dropped sharply since reaching a 12-year peak of $39.99 three weeks ago.

Gasoline,meanwhile, plunged 6.3% to a two and a half month low. This capped the market's largest weekly decline since the last Gulf War.

"The market has almost completely lost its head. Any [news] that comes out moves prices. It's raw emotion," said Martin King, a commodities analyst with FirstEnergy Capital.

"There was a huge change from the morning to the afternoon," said Peter Zeihan, senior energy analyst at Stratfor in Austin. "The markets loved hearing that Kirkuk had been secured, but the reports were patently false."

Even so, Kirkuk is not as strategic as the Rumaila oil field in southern Iraq, he said.

Rumaila, whose fields, pipeline and loading platforms were captured by American and British forces, pumps about 1.25 million barrels of oil per day, more than half Iraq's total production. Kirkuk, by comparison, produces about 600,000 barrels a day.

Zeihan said Rumaila has stopped pumping oil for the moment since the pipeline passes through Basrah, which has not yet been secured by U.S. forces. Kirkuk is still pumping oil through Turkey.

Nauman Barakat, oil trader at Fimat International Bank, said with Rumaila now in U.S. hands, American forces "should be able to minimize the ability of the Iraqis to set more oil wells on fire. That upward pressure on prices has almost totally disappeared."

Indeed, fear that dozens of wells had been set ablaze drove crude prices higher overnight on Thursday. Later reports pegged the number of fires at fewer than a dozen.

During the Gulf War of 1991, Iraqi forces torched more than 600 wells as they withdrew from Kuwait.

Experts said oil prices are so volatile right now because worldwide supplies are extremely tight thanks to production problems in Venezuela and Nigeria and a bitter cold winter. Originally published on March 22, 2003

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