www.upi.com By Owain Johnson UPI Business Correspondent From the Business & Economics Desk Published 3/11/2003 4:20 PM

CARACAS, Venezuela, March 11 (UPI) -- There is a Venezuelan joke that begins by noting that the best business in the world is a well-managed oil company. And the second best business in the world? A badly managed oil company of course.

Oil is Venezuela's economic lifeblood and whatever the standard of management has been at state-owned energy producer PDVSA, the country's huge reserves have generally provided Venezuelans with a higher standard of living than their regional neighbors.

PDVSA's activities typically account for around 80 percent of Venezuela's gross domestic product and for around 50 percent of government income, giving the company a strategic significance far beyond that of a normal commercial enterprise.

Recognizing the company's power, President Hugo Chavez has repeatedly tried to tie PDVSA more closely to his government and in the wake of the recent disastrous general strike he has finally got his way.

The majority of PDVSA's managerial and administrative staff joined the opposition-led general strike against the government in early December, and by mid-month the energy industry was paralyzed and PDVSA was forced to declare force majeure.

But predictions that Chavez could not survive a long-term oil strike proved unfounded. The former paratrooper refused to reach a compromise deal, and ordered PDVSA President Ali Rodriguez to import gasoline to keep the nation running.

Rodriguez used a mixture of loyal workers, contract workers and new hires to restart operations, and by late December PDVSA was starting to produce and export crude once again.

The payback began immediately. Rodriguez, a former leftist guerrilla and OPEC secretary-general, summarily dismissed 16,000 of PDVSA's 33,000 employees for 'deserting their posts' in order to participate in the strike.

The dismissed employees, who included virtually all the company's top executives, had an estimated average of 17 years' experience in the industry each, and their leaders were confident PDVSA could not operate without them and would soon recall them.

Earlier this month, though, PDVSA lifted force majeure on all its exports, apart from unleaded gasoline, lubricants and asphalt, and Chavez was able to announce that the company's crude production had reached 2.6 million barrels per day (bpd).

Sacked oil managers immediately poured scorn on the president's figures and placed production at 1.6 million bpd. But, as analysts noted, if PDVSA risked lifting force majeure, Rodriguez must be confident the company can reach its pre-strike production levels of 2.8 million bpd within the next few months.

The dramatic restoration of production at PDVSA has taken the wind out of the sails of the strikers, who now see little chance of returning to their posts until the fall of the Chavez government, an event that looks increasingly remote.

Rodriguez attributes his success at restoring production with vastly fewer employees to a combination of factors. PDVSA was overstaffed with middle managers before the strike, he believes, while loyal employees were determined to disprove allegations that they lacked the necessary skills to restore production.

Critics allege, however, that the restoration of production has come at the cost of lower safety standards. They also note that PDVSA has focused on easier wells, and has cut key maintenance, research and exploration divisions, harming its long-term prospects.

The Gente de Petroleo association of dissident oil workers believes PDVSA will inevitably be unable to maintain its current level of production since the current staff lack the know-how to tackle older and more technically challenging wells.

But for all their public confidence, many former company managers privately admit their surprise at how well the industry is performing without them.

They are also quick to express their anger at Venezuela's political opposition, which called off the damaging strike after failing to force Chavez from power, leaving the dismissed oil workers to carry the can.

"Are we disappointed? I think that's somewhat of an understatement," one former senior PDVSA manager said. "Everyone else has gone back to work, and we are the only ones still fighting for our industry and our country. We feel we are in danger of being forgotten."

Rodriguez has repeatedly ruled out an amnesty for the strikers and he has even thanked them for giving him the possibility of carrying out reforms that would otherwise have been impossible.

Meanwhile, the oil workers who struck in April to protest government intervention in PDVSA have, by striking again in December, effectively handed total control of their industry to Chavez loyalists.

With their opponents locked out, Chavez and Rodriguez are now free to carry out whatever actions they wish to PDVSA and the president has already spelled out his aim of setting the company at the service of his social reform project.

"The new PDVSA must never again be a nest to shelter the privileged elite. This company must be now and always the property of the Republic," he said at the recent inauguration of the company's new board.

"There will be no amnesty, selective or otherwise, there will be no forgiveness for anyone, for traitors. They are traitors and they cannot return nor will they," he added.

www.scoop.co.nz Wednesday, 12 March 2003, 9:38 am Press Release: Council on Hemispheric Affairs March 11, 2003 For Immediate Release Memorandum to the Press 03.10 Revised Memoranda, First Issued Yesterday

Scant Prospects Emerge From High-level Meeting on Venezuela

· "Group of Friends" gather to strive for a solution to long-lasting Venezuela dispute

· United States energy and security interests in the region spark Washington to play a bigger hand in Venezuela's political crisis

· But the United States must emphasize supporting the development of Venezuela's democratic institutions

· Bilious relationship between the Chavez administration and the middle class opposition poses a block to constructive resolution of old enmities

· Human rights violations, and the mismanagement of the judiciary and unprofessional media in Venezuela render any electoral solution a remote possibility.

· The opposition-controlled media must substitute professionalism for manipulation of public opinion.

· The executive undermines Venezuela's democracy as it strikes back at the media through control over the judiciary's decisions.

Acting Assistant Secretary of State Curtis Struble met with diplomats from Brazil Mexico, Chile, Portugal and Spain, in Brasilia on Monday to discuss the prospects for an electoral solution to Venezuela's simmering political crisis. A complex mediation task is at hand for Venezuela's self-appointed Group of Friends, who heard starkly different accounts of the crisis from government and opposition representatives.

Two Self Serving Positions

Venezuelan Ambassador to the OAS, Jorge Valero, who spoke on behalf of the Chavez administration, presented a report on the normalization of political and economic life in the country, including the stabilization of oil production. The government obviously was trying to present an image that Venezuela is back to its old politically stable and oil-reliable self, in order to negate support for an opposition-backed constitutional amendment, that calls for immediate elections, and which would reduce the terms of all elected officials, including President Chavez, to four years.

Timoteo Zambrano, a congressman and delegate for the opposition at the negotiations table, urged delegates to pressure the government to accept elections as he painted a stark picture of Venezuelan political realities. Prior to the meeting he informed the press that the government is staging a "political persecution" against the leaders of the Coordinadora Democratica (CD), which heads up the opposition group. His report strongly suggested that the government is blocking efforts to reach an electoral agreement by heightening political tensions surrounding the negotiations. Zambrano cited the law on media contents, drafted by Chavez supporters in the national assembly, and the arrest of several opposition leaders for their participation in the general strike, as acts that have sabotaged prospects for an electoral solution.

The opposition also demanded that the Group of Friends send permanent representatives to the negotiations, who would be in a position to pressure the government to accelerate the negotiations, and could possibly press for the opposition's constitutional amendment. Furthermore, they asked that Secretary General of the O.A.S. Cesar Gaviria, convert his role as a facilitator into that of being a mediator, in which he could influence which items must be resolved on the agenda.

The government camp would most likely consider such action as an intrusion into Venezuela's sovereign rights, mindful of the fact that President Chavez already has lashed out at such countries as Spain for criticizing the Fernandez arrest. But despite the Chavez administration's concerns with foreign intrusion, its delegates pushed once again for the Group of Friends to include countries such as Cuba, France and China, that maintain close political and economic ties with Caracas.

It appears that Venezuelan government and opposition delegates traveled to Brasilia to push for concessions that would facilitate their political agenda, rather than to present proposals that could strengthen Venezuela'sdemocratic institutions, such as reformation of its biased media or its flawed judicial system. As negotiations towards an electoral solution resume in Caracas today, the Group of Friends will be left with few pragmatic points to build upon, while the Chavez government as well as its embattled opposition are single-mindedly hindering prospects for an electoral solution, by seeking to influence the judiciary and manipulate free speech and the press in order to blast each other out of the country's political arena.

Oil Appears to Change the Tide

Washington is showing signs that it might accede to the opposition's requests of becoming more involved in the negotiations process. On Thursday March 6th, seven members of the U.S. House of Representatives sent a letter to Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez, expressing their concern regarding the arrest and criminal charges brought against several leaders of the Venezuelan opposition who helped plan the two-month general strike. In a few words, they meant to remind Chavez that they would not remain indifferent towards any shortcuts in Venezuela's democratic process which does not fully respect the opposition's rights. Overall, the tide seems to be turning in U.S. -Venezuela relations as Washington's officials show signs that they may take a proactive stance towards Venezuela's political crisis.

But does this invigorated stance come solely out of empathy for Venezuela's embattled opposition? After an ill advised and embarrassing demand for immediate elections in the early days of the strike, the White House has avoided any high profile role in Venezuela's conflict by throwingits support behind the OAS' lengthy mediation efforts.

However, it is probable that the Bush Administration might increase its involvement in Venezuela's political strife as White House officials grow concerned that the decay and politicization of PDVSA, Venezuela's national oil company, may threaten U.S. energy interests in the region.

Renewal of a High Profile U.S. role

Washington's professed unrest isn't necessarily a cover to blast Chavez for his leftist and nationalistic ideologies, or defend the interests of the local elite. Oil has been the glue that has held Venezuela and the U.S. together in the past 50 years. For decades, U.S. administrations have tolerated various nationalistic measures taken by Venezuelan governments, even those appearing to be anti-American, such as nationalizing oil production or imposing tariffs on U.S. imports. Venezuela gained Washington's trust by maintaining a reliable oil supply in times of both prosperity and crisis.

The Chavez administration was given similar treatment in its early days in office. Washington officials were prepared to discount the new president's fiery rhetoric and praise for the Fidel Castro regime, as they rushed to assure the American public that his actions didn't match his words and that there appeared to be no evidence that the Bolivarian revolution would threaten United States' energy concerns in the region.

But PDVSA's turmoil could give the U.S. good reason to become more actively involved in negotiations towards resolving the country's political crisis. During the strike, PDVSA became increasingly politicized as mid-level as well as senior managers carried out an oil stoppage in consort with opposition leaders. It is no secret that this alliance decimated PDVSA's production levels and cut exports to the United States. As oil prices rise and a likely war in Iraq approaches, U.S. policy-makers are asking if Chavez's embattled government will be able to supervise this fractured company and deliver oil in a reliable fashion.

Mixing Oil and Politics

Venezuelan officials are eager to convince Washington that PDVSA will soon recover its full production and its reputation as a reliable supplier. However, the State Department is not altogether buying this optimistic projection. At a meeting on February 26th with Venezuelan Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez, State Department officials told that country's officials that Venezuela cannot be considered a reliable oil supplier to the United States at the present time. This sentiment is also shared by some members of the Bush cabinet. Despite assurances from Ramirez that his country was now producing 2.4 million barrels of crude daily in the last week of February, U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham told a Senate hearing it might be two to three months before Venezuelan oil production reaches its normal levels. Prior to the strike Venezuela produced 2.8million barrels of crude daily.

Chavez's efforts to manage PDVSA efficiently are further complicated by the opposition's negotiation strategy. Its representatives in the negotiations, have demanded that Chavez reinstate thousands of PDVSA beaurocrats, technicians and managers who were fired for joining in the general strike, or no electoral solution will be permitted to come about. Such a demand could be an incentive for the United States to influence negotiations, as it would offer Washington an opportunity to play a hand in the restructuring of PDVSA, its main interest in Venezuela's current strife.

Drugs Invigorate America's Response

Political instability in Venezuela also appears to be undermining Washington's war on drugs. One of the main pillars of the Bush administration's northern South American strategy is to widen Washington's role in combatting Colombia's drug trafficking rebel groups. Recent reports suggesting that important leaders of the FARC, including Manuel Marulanda, are hiding out in Venezuela, have damaged the standing of the Chavez administration in Washington. At the very least, they have led some U.S. officials to ponder whether an embattled government hobbled by protests, unpopularity and constant challenges to its legitimacy is a worthy partner, willing and able to tackle the drug traffic issue with resolve. On February 27th , Drug Czar John Walter's expressed this concern at a House Committee on International Relations hearing, stating that "Venezuela's political problems have created a haven for narco terrorists to operate with impunity."

Oil policy and anti-narcotics interests may be powerful reasons for the United States to claim a bigger stake in the resolution of Venezuela's political tensions. Furthermore, some of Bush's officials are growing suspicious about Chavez's commitment to an electoral solution. Following the arrest of opposition leader Carlos Fernandez, U.S. Ambassador Roger Noriega, who appears to be the administration's choice to succeed Otto Reich as the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, urged his fellow OAS ambassadors to reflect upon the U.S. belief that "there is little doubt that Chavez's rhetoric has contributed to a climate of violence that does not contribute to the search of a peaceful solution."

Venezuela's Hard Nosed Negotiations

As negotiations resume today in Caracas, the framework for holding elections will top an agenda that also included the disarming of civilians and establishing a truth commission to investigate the controversial eventssurrounding last April's coup aimed at ousting Chavez. In late January of this year, President Jimmy Carter had visited Caracas and proposed that a constitutional and electoral solution could be achieved via a constitutional amendment or a revocatory referendum on President Chavez' rule. Very little progress has occurred on either track.

The middle class led opposition is demanding new elections to be based on a constitutional amendment which it tabled on January 29th. This provision would be subject to a popular vote and, if passed would shorten the president's and congress' terms from six to four years. Once approved, presidential and congressional terms would immediately end and elections for both levels of governance would take place within 30 days. This bold, if self-serving initiative would challenge the government's grip on all elective offices. It also calls for other concessions, including an amnesty for oil workers who participated in the general strike. It is unlikely to find many supporters on the government side, which has repeatedly insisted that constitutional amendments lie outside the scope of the current round of negotiations.

The government's proposal basically buys into the status quo. A mid-term referendum authorized by the Chavez-inspired Bolivarian constitution, would take place in August if the electorate qualifies for it by gathering sufficient signatures. The referendum would only challenge the president's tenure; the national assembly and the constitution would remain intact. Both sides agree that a new national electoral board should be selected. This could also delay either game plan, as the new body becomes institutionalized.

Human Rights: A Condition for an Electoral solution

Human right's violations would endanger the environment in which either electoral proposal would take place. On February 18th, government and opposition negotiators issued a declaration in favor of peace and democracy, with the blessings of Cesar Gaviria, the secretary general of the OAS, the Carter Center and the United Nations Development Programme. One of its most telling points calls for freedom of the press and acknowledges that as a democratic institution, the media must play a constructive role in "promoting peace, tolerance and peaceful coexistence."

But in real life, the media's problems are increasingly reflecting the degree of Venezuela's social and political polarization and its drift away from any prospect for a near-term electoral solution. On the 26th of February, a delegation of journalists from Venezuela's private media visited the Inter American Commission on Human Rights in Washington, to denounce the government's restraints on free speech. In a forum held the previous day at the Heritage Foundation, its members presented evidence that their physical safety was now under threat and that the government is an accomplice to this dangerous situation. According to Sergio Dabar, associate editor of the Caracas daily "El Nacional," there were 200 cases of harassment against Venezuelan journalists in 2002. Most of these have gone unpunished due to the indifference of the courts and the bureaucracy.

In several cases, evidence points directly towards the government's complicity in the intimidation of the press. The opposition claims that during the general strike, civic groups affiliated with the government systematically targeted the media. For example, on the night of December 9th, 26 media facilities were simultaneously attacked by government supporters while the police and national guard made themselves blatantly unavailable. Some government backers went as far as to physically destroy some of their targets, including Globovision news network's Maracaibo studio.

Scenes of journalists in bulletproof vests being beaten back by national guardsmen as well as being hectored by pro-Chavez supporters have become everyday occurrences over Venezuelan TV. At the very least, it appears that state prosecutors appointed to office by the Chavez administration, are taking a convenient siesta when it comes time to defend the safety of journalists working for private television stations and newspapers.

A Darker Picture

Some journalists go further and paint a darker picture of the realities they are facing. They are concerned that the government is wielding its judicial muscle against them, and making them "a war target", as stated by Levy Benshinol, the president of the National Journalist's Association. Unfortunately, President Chavez gives his opponents little reason to believe that he is particularly interested in the status of a free press. An indication of Mr Chavez's personal contempt for the media is his labeling the four major private television stations as " the four horsemen of the apocalypse." The opposition argues that by failing to guarantee freedom of the press, the government threatens any future prospects for fair and free elections. Elections where media coverage is reined in by violence or appears to be intimidated by the manifestation of state power, will inevitably give off an air of illegitimacy.

The Media's Bias Hampers Possibilities

But the media situation is far more complex, and the Venezuelan press is far less peaceful and fair minded than appearances would have it be. The local media is a closely held monopoly where conservative press owners like Gustavo Cisneros, of Cuban refugee descent, decide which issues will be discussed and which will be ignored by the nation's closely held television and radio stations. Coverage of the events surrounding the coup in April 2002, provide a case in point. After reporters valiantly risked their lives and producers defied the government to maintain coverage of Chavez' ouster from power on April 11th 2002, the private media was notoriously absent when Chavez returned to office. Simply put, whatever the issue Chavez was always wrong. Looking back over the past 12 months, the charge can be made that, for the most part, the bulk of Venezuela's media acted in a blatantly unprofessional manner with little accountability and saw itself more as an adversary to Chavez, than a neutral, responsible operation.

Most of the privately owned media has not used its freedom to prudently encourage an electoral solution that is acceptable to both sides in Venezuela's current crisis. This is because most of the nation's newspapers and television stations have been serving as a loud speaker for radical, rightist elements in the opposition. Throughout the general strike, private TV stations sacrificed paid commercial time in order to make way for spots calling for the president's resignation. In some ads, children have been used to play on the audience's emotions. One witty commercial featured a news clip in which a young girl tells the president that she wants a suitcase for Christmas. Chavez cheerfully asks "why a suitcase?" and a black screen with white letters intercepts the clip, replying "para que te vayas" (so that you will leave).

Throughout the two-month general strike, the media's unrelenting antagonism against the government went even further by provoking a sense of derision towards the country's constitutional order. As the strike entered its second month, television stations repeatedly broadcasted statements in which opposition leaders, Carlos Ortega and Carlos Fernandez, incited viewers to undercut the government by boycotting tax payments.

The opposition's de facto merger with the media gives the government grounds to believe that the period running up to the proposed elections will serve as the occasion for a major anti-Chavez defamation campaign which is being scripted right now. This is a serious consideration because in Venezuela, private television stations account for at least 80% of the public audience. Chavez is no fool and for good reason will be reluctant to take part in an electoral event where the media will go to any length to paint him as a villain, with little opportunity for his being able to respond to these charges. Inflexible ground rules must be agreed to.

The Media Under New Threat

Many analysts fear that in response to the opposition's aggressive media tactics, the administration may be taking steps to limit freedom of speech. Currently, Chavistas are wielding their power in the national assembly to draft a radical law on media content. This measure proposes restrictions on the hours in which TV stations may show programming that is not apt for children, which could lead to the banning of the opposition's political shows and their often strident morning news programs. Furthermore, the law bans content which "alarms the audience," "incites violence," or "threatens national identity," which could be used to cancel coverage of opposition rallies as well as unpopular government activities.

Foreign monetary exchange controls dictated by the chief executive could also be put to work against the media's interests, as they will arm the authorities with the ability to prevent opposition newspapers and television stations with access to the foreign currency that is needed to import vital newsprint and other materials required for media organizations to operate.

Freedom of Speech: An Impasse

Venezuelan government officials argue that legitimate elections cannot occur if the media is not conducting itself by professional norms, distorts coverage of Chavez at every turn, while lauding the virtues of the opposition. However, such actions could be equally flawed if the opposition can be silenced by legal or economic schemes.

In order to break with this latest chapter of polarizing confrontation, people of good will are beginning to argue that it would be wise for Chavez and the opposition to open negotiations on the issue of media content right now, where concrete issues such as the number of anti-government commercials or the number of obligatory presidential television appearances could be up for discussion.

The Struggle over the Judiciary

But the struggle over freedom of speech is not the only obstacle towards fair and free elections. The executive's power to appoint judges gives Chavez sway over the judiciary. Lately, some judges have complicated the prospects for an electoral solution by seeming to be part of a campaign to behead the opposition's leadership. The conditions surrounding Carlos Fernandez's detention last month, give the impression that a personal vendetta is being carried out in the name of justice. Fernandez, who heads the country's major business association, Fedecamaras, clearly had been compromised by his likely illegal involvement in the April 2002 coup. Strangely, however, the government only decided to come up with its charges against him the week after it signed a non-aggression pact with the opposition, and then used undercover agents to arrest him. In addition, Mikel Moreno, the judge who ordered the arrest, is himself a person with a suspect background. He has been previously accused of murder and his personal biography fails to fulfill criteria, such as possessing a post graduate degree which the Venezuelan constitution requires in order to be appointed to the bench.

Opposition leaders are not likely to be in a mood to carry out good faith negotiations after what they see as a politically motivated arrest having taken place. Instead, they are fighting back by leveraging their control over the media. Frequent press conferences sympathetic to Fernandez are now the norm, while local TV and newspapers make little effort to remind the public that the business leader was involved in a junta that had illegally overthrown a constitutional government and that he had been fully prepared to abolish civil liberties in the process.

The judiciary has now upped the ante by calling for the detention of 7 executives of the national oil company who participated in the general strike against Chavez. Rather than inappropriately focusing on neutralizingthe opposition, the courts might consider helping to prepare the legal framework for the elections to occur under the terms of the existing constitution.

Back to the Basics

The collection of 4 million signatures calling for a referendum on February 2nd demonstrates that Venezuelan society is aching for healthy debate, and both sides must be heard in a fair and transparent dialogue. But if an electoral solution to the political crisis is to come about, both the government and opposition must be guaranteed fair play by the ground rules. The government must be accorded balanced coverage in the media, while the opposition must receive guarantees against antagonistic laws and judicial prejudice.

As of now, both sides wield their control over their domain as if their mission is to expel each other from the political arena. If the Group of Friends decide to take a stand in favor of free and fair elections, it would be wise to press for the reform of this country's media and its fledging democratic institutions.

This analysis was prepared by Manuel Rueda, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Washington, D.C.

The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, founded in 1975, is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, tax-exempt research and information organization. It has been described on the Senate floor as being "one of the nation's most respected bodies of scholars and policy makers." For more information, please see our web page at www.coha.org; or contact our Washington offices by phone (202) 216-9261, fax (202) 223-6035, or email coha@coha.org.

mapage.noos.fr Luis DE LION Domingo, 23 de Febrero 2003      

En su edición de éste fin de semana 22 de Febrero 2003 Le Monde (no circula los Domingos), publicó en la muy leída sección Horizons, un amplio reportaje titulado "En Venezuela, la vida bajo Chávez", donde la veterana periodista Sylvie Kauffmann cuenta como el presidente Chávez, "en cuatro años de torpezas, partió el país en dos facciones enemigas. De un lado los de las clases alta y media, asustados, y que luchan con el apoyo de los medios; del otro lado las clases populares excesivamente marginalizadas como para constituir una verdadera fuerza política."

Sin duda, el periódico de mayor influencia sobre la opinión publica francesa es Le Monde; y la sección Horizons es una buena herramienta para tomarle el pulso a los grandes temas que preocupan a dicha opinión. El hecho que Horizons de éste fin de semana esté consagrado a Venezuela, implica que una buena parte de la opinión "influyente" de Francia, va a leerlo; y en las llamadas "dîners en ville", cuando se hable sobre Venezuela, se hará a partir de lo señalado en Horizons.

En ese sentido, el reportaje en cuestión obedece a las reglas clásicas que la materia exige; contar una situación a partir de cosas vistas y escuchadas, en un tono de relato. Kauffmann, corresponsal de Le Monde, durante muchos años, en New York y Washington, busca hacerle vivir a los lectores algunas de las situaciones que ella misma vivió durante su reciente estadía en Caracas. Relatando como un banal evento social, como lo fue la boda de la hija de Gustavo Pérez Issa, padece su respectivo cacerolazo; al tiempo que Kauffmann con un tono más personal señala que "el estado de gracia que vivió el chavismo, ya es historia"  "...el discurso del presidente no ha cambiado ni en lo más mínimo, siempre polarizado sobre los elementos los mas extremistas e ignorando la decepción real, no solamente de la oligarquía, que nunca lo quiso, sino de la clase media, que en el 98 y en el 2000 había depositado en él sus esperanzas de cambio"

Las declaraciones de Luis Miquilena, Alberto Müller Rojas y Alberto Garrido, que Kauffman recopiló, son de un aporte pedagógico muy importante para el lector galo, que de ahora en adelante tendrá las herramientas para hacerle un buen seguimiento a la crisis venezolana.

Sin embargo, cuando Kaufmann señala que " de un lado los cuatro canales comerciales, clones latinoamericanos de Fox News... del otro lado, el canal del Estado, venezolana de Televisión, bajo el formato soviético..." está sin querer metiendo el dedo en la llaga, del espinoso tema del apoyo y participación de los medios en la terrible crisis que padece Venezuela. El propio, Le Monde no escapa ni de las criticas, ni de los señalamientos que colocaban sus editoriales extremadamente favorables al gobierno de Chávez, por la frecuencia de dichos escritos llegamos a preguntamos si Le Monde no estaba al borde de la propaganda, ¿donde quedaba? la exigencia particular y la disciplina colectiva que tanto pregona su directiva.

El grupo Le Monde S.A., detenta - entre otras propiedades - el 51% de las acciones del tristemente célebre, Le Monde Diplomatique, éste ultimo mensual con sus propagandistas editoriales en favor de la naciente dictadura que se instaura en Venezuela, corre el riesgo de sumar un dolor de cabeza mas a su accionista principal, el cual espera para los próximos días, la aparición del libro " El rostro oculto de Le Monde" a través del cual sus autores; Pierre Péan et Philippe Cohen, concluyen varios años de investigación sobre dicho periódico, y donde en una suerte de arreglo de cuentas pondrían al desnudo a Le Monde, últimamente criticado en Francia, porque se considera que lo que le interesa es vender. ¿será que habrán perdido la pureza revolucionaria?

mapage.noos.fr by  Heinz Sonntag(*)

  Paradox: "A statement or sentiment that is seemingly contradictory or opposed to common sense and yet perhaps true in fact." WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

What is it that makes the situation in Venezuela during the last 18 months -- with accusations against president Hugo Chávez as non-democratic and even tyrannical, the subsequent massive protests, strikes (the most recent lasting more than six weeks), and partial stoppages of the country’s decisive oil-industry -- seemingly contradictory, given the origins of a regime democratically elected by a broad margin? This question goes to the heart of the current crisis and embraces several elements barely recognized or perceived by international public opinion, knowingly hidden or silenced both by journalists and other writers of the "left" in the region, in European and North-American countries, and by Latin American and Caribbean political leaders, as well as by politicians of the developed countries.

The first element is the most obvious and reiterated: Chávez is not the first and will certainly not be the last political leader to use democratic procedures to seize power for non-democratic purposes, supposedly to "renew democracy" or to "establish a real democracy." Intending no analogies, some prominent examples might be remembered: King Victor Emmanuel III had to appoint Mussolini prime minister of Italy in 1922 because a majority of the voters had given his party the strongest fraction in the parliament. Hitler became chancellor of the Weimar Republic in January 1933 because the voters, through their representatives in different parties, made possible a coalition, which obliged the president of the German Reich to nominate him. Vargas in Brazil and Perón in Argentina became presidents in 1934 and 1946, respectively, because they won the masses’ votes through their mobilization and organization.

Hugo Rafael Chávez, a former Lieutenant Colonel who had tried twice to topple the Venezuelan democratic government in 1992: once in February as the leader of an attempted coup; the second time in November as an inspiring actor, based his campaign, like those preceding him, on the promise to solve all of society’s existing problems, first of course those that worried the majorities: from poverty, unemployment, the lack of adequate health care, educational services, housing, and their own marginality, to the shortcomings, failures and corruption of the socio-economic order and the political system. As his overall instrument he invoked a new Constitution for a "really participatory and protagonist democracy." As a result of the deterioration of the socio-economic, political and socio-cultural climate during the previous – say – 15 years, and very much as in the cases mentioned above, this push toward change was well received by broad social sectors, including the working classes of the modern economy (particularly the oil industry), the middle sectors, segments of the bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia. Chávez’s popularity rose quickly to about 80 %.

The evening the result of the elections was announced (December 6, 1998), the majority of Venezuelans celebrated in the streets and plazas of the cities, towns and villages. Chávez’s speech had a moderate tone, reiterating that he would fight poverty, promote a "true" democracy through a new Constitution, be "the president of all Venezuelans, also of those who did not vote for me." He would eliminate corruption within one year, live a modest life, renouncing to "all the paraphernalia that surrounded the previous presidents’ lifestyles," and even transform some of the presidential residences into schools. The mass media praised the speech and the elected president’s promises the following day.

A second element is more intricate: not only did Chávez win the presidential election by a landslide, he also won the following three referenda on the constitutional process during 1999 and, finally, his own "re-legitimizing" election in July 2000 "with overwhelming majorities." This is regularly presented as a proof of the unquestionable legitimacy of the regime. The results, however, had a systematically muffled flaw: all of them reflected a high rate of abstention of registered voters: 38 % in Chávez’s presidential election; 62 % in the referendum on the appropriateness of a Constituent Assembly in April; 54 % in the election of its members in July; 56 % in the vote on the new Constitution in December; and 54 % in the re-legitimation vote of July 2000. High voter abstention does not necessarily destroy the legitimacy of a democratic regime. It does, however, certainly weaken it, generating a curious mixture of rational and charismatic legitimacy (M. Weber), by focusing on the "popularity of the leader." This is particularly certain and problematic in democracies that, like the Venezuelan, do not have a tradition of civic culture and of strong cohesive and consensus-stimulating institutions. About half of Venezuela’s citizens, thus, showed little interest in, and actually did not vote for, Chávez’s Bolivarian Revolution (though they would later express some sympathy in the opinion polls, especially in the first 18 months or so).

A third factor is structural and has several dimensions. The exercise of political power by Chávez had, from the very beginning, some features which, both in the short and long run, tended to put his popularity in question and, consequently, to further threaten even more the democratic elements of his legitimacy, though not affecting his charismatic appeal. He polarizes the people into "friends" and "enemies" in an extremely aggressive manner, roughly along the divisions between the social classes, as he (erroneously) understands them. Enemies are dubbed the squalid ones or the oligarchy, independently of their real socio-economic and political status; friends are the dignified ones. This pattern, evident from the very beginning of his political career, even during his campaign, has been steadily reiterated in the Sunday allocutions that came after his victory (136 to date, with an overall duration of more than 1.000 hours).

Chávez militarized the public administration by appointing active and recently retired military officers to practically all important positions, from ministers (few), vice-ministers (many) to officials (a lot) in charge of "essential" programs, such as the Plan Bolivar, a financially megalomaniac social plan, and a no less gigantic house building plan. He assumed control over nearly all institutions of political society: the Supreme Court, the National Electoral Council, the Offices of the General Attorney and the Ombudsman, the state organizations for social policies, the Central Bank, filling them with his allies. He also tried to impose his will on the civil society, with reasonable success in cultural institutions like museums, the national library, the two state-owned publishing houses (Monte Avila Editores and Biblioteca Ayacucho), one TV and several radio-stations, the arts schools, and theaters, but with little or no success in the trade unions, the major part of the Catholic Church, the autonomous public and private universities, the entrepreneurial organizations and most of the mass media: they resisted this bringing into line by the process (as Chávez’s followers call the Bolivarian Revolution).

In addition, Chávez presented himself as "the candidate (and later president) of the poor." The economic and social policies of his government, however, were and are basically those of previous governments, subject to structural adjustments and neo-liberal reforms, even as his ideological and political discourse condemns them (and capitalism in general) as savage, anti-humanist and exploitative. This contradiction between discourse and praxis was, and is, accompanied and mirrored by a slowdown of economic growth and an increase in unemployment and poverty, the first from about 12 % to roughly 20 % in three years; the latter, from about 48 to 70 %, in spite of high windfall profits in the oil industry during 2000 and part of 2001. Indeed, the availability of funds from this sector surpassed anticipated state revenues for the 2000 budget by 47 %.

In spite of this favorable financial situation, the economy experienced growing deterioration. The number of companies that went bankrupt, particularly of medium and small size, increased from year to year. There were no policies for the re-activation of the internal economy. The inflation is among the highest of the region (around 30 %.) The real per capita income declined more than 11 % in three years. During 2002, the economy contracted by 7 %. The savings rate, and with it the capital formation, is currently one of the lowest of all Latin American and Caribbean countries. The national currency has been devaluated by more than 100 % since October 2001, mainly due to Chávez’s disastrous policies, and the resulting lack of confidence of the investors who prefer to transfer a considerable part of their assessments and incomes abroad.

Chávez’s regime has been described as one of the most inept, chaotic, and ineffective administrations in the history of the country since the achievement of its political independence more than 170 years ago. Since there is no internal coordination between the different governmental agencies and no external accord between these and the different collective actors, the ship of the state drifts in an eternal zig-zag without any clear course, subject to the arbitrariness of Chávez’s decisions and, secondarily, those of his closest "collaborators" (who often do not respect the Constitution of 1999). This anarchy, at least partially a consequence of the militarization of the state apparatus referred to earlier, engenders a growing corruption, compared to which that of the "really existing democracy" in place up to 1998 appears relatively benign. It is focused of course mainly in the high and middle rank military officers with bureaucratic jobs. Scandals like the disappearance of about $ 3.7 billion, legally destined to a macroeconomic stabilization fund, or the illegal use of currency exchange profits of the Central Bank, were neither explained, investigated, nor punished. Since the comptroller and the chief of the Central Bank are followers of Chávez, there is no real control of the state’s expenditures. These are but a few examples that throw light on the nature of this peculiar "government."

Chávez’s foreign policy would deserve an article of its own. Be it sufficient to highlight his early friendship with Fidel Castro, whose "paradise" he would like to import to Venezuela (his own words!), and specially his messianic belief that his destiny, his teleological mission consists of fighting and negotiating for the "second independence" of Latin America and the Caribbean.

National, regional and international defenders of the regime blame the hostility of the mass media for the broad resistance against the president. But, as is so often the case with this regime, this is only a part of the truth. Chávez’s triumph in the elections of 1998 was actively and until the end of 1999 enthusiastically celebrated by the mass media, both by their owners and their journalists, as by a majority of the population; as a matter of fact, Chávez owed his landslide victory largely to the media. The president and his entourage had ample accessto tv- and radio talk shows and dominated the headlines of the tabloid press. He was seen and thus presented as the incarnation of a much desired political and socio-economic change. During practically the entire constitutional process, from February 1999 to the re-legitimation elections of July 2000, the mass media were in favor of the government and its measures, mainly the reform of the political system and its constitutional framework, though they occasionally made criticisms against abuses, some policies and isolated scandals (which is, after all, one important function of the fourth estate).

The way in which these criticisms were received brought the first disappointments with the regime. Instead of giving coherent explanations or accepting responsibility for their wrongdoings, Chávez and his followers attacked the media, committing the additional error of personalizing these attacks by focusing on certain journalists and media owners. Since the scandals became more and more frequent, the investigative journalism of the press and the audiovisual media, highly developed in Venezuela, insisted on trying to uncover other scandals, irritating the government, particularly the president, and provoking him to make increasingly aggressive attacks, such as his condemnation of the anti-social mass media. So a spiral was born, which escalated very quickly as journalists published growing proofs of governmental gaffes, errors, misdeeds, and corruption. In addition, the promises of Chávez’s inaugural speech the night of his victory were quickly forgotten. The president discovered the pleasure of elegant suits of Saville Row, when he doesn’t rig out (illegally) with his military uniform, and Cartier watches. Seldom had a previous president surrounded himself with such impressive military and civilian security. He and his entourage indulged in a luxury lifestyle. The repair of the swimming pool of the presidential residence in Caracas cost more than $ 1 million. The government also bought a new airplane for the president for $ 65 million, plus $ 6 million for "extras" of the design and equipment of the interior cabins. These facts irritated the media even more.

It became progressively evident that the freedom of information and opinion had become formal, that is to say, had no real influence on the regime’s measures and policies. It was the first time since 1958 and the (re)establishment of democracy after the dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez that the media would see themselves deprived of any real influence on governmental policies and the dynamics of the political system, experiencing only their own impotence. In short, the freedom of the press existing in Venezuela is today nothing more than a chimera, a sort of farce, which implements the wishes of the government in its desperate attempts to demonstrate its "democratic" nature. The state owned channel and radio station were converted into, and continue to serve, as a kind of "propaganda machine" à la Goebbels.

During the years of the worst deterioration of democracy, between approximately 1980 and 1990, with the riots of the Caracazo of February 27, 1989 as its most emblematic expression, the dissolution of the internal cohesion of Venezuelan society had reached its peak. With Chávez’s victory in 1998 there was widespread hope that this state of anomie (normlessness) could be overcome by the changes he proposed. His aggressive political style and his tendency to conceive political and social dynamics only within the limits of a friend-enemy framework (in which the enemy is the other and has to be destroyed), very much in accordance with the 1920s theories of the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt, have made nearly impossible the reconstruction of a set of rules that facilitate an orderly society, respect for "the other" as a fellow citizen yet particularly as a human being, even under conditions of (inevitable) controversy about the goals and characteristics of this order between the different collective actors. His polarization of political (and civil) society has resulted in polarizing the opposition, so that in the end no negotiation is feasible. Even the attempts of international organizations (OAS, UNDP, CARTER CENTER) to foster a climate of negotiation have failed, primarily because Chávez and his government deny any concession to the opposition, even a non-binding advisory referendum about the acceptance or rejection of his permanence in the presidency.

As if this were not enough, Chávez, in addition, began to found Bolivarian Circles across the country, neighborhood and shanty-town (barrio) groups for both the local organization of his allies and the defense of the Bolivarian Revolution. Though a few of these circles develop significant community work, most are dedicated full-time to attacks on the political enemy. Investigative journalists have noted that the members of these latter circles are paid and armed by the government and it is obvious that they attempt to intervene and fight the opposition’s demonstrations, especially in the last months.

In brief, the political polarization nurtured by Chávez, the incapability and inefficiency of his government, the tremendous corruption, the failure to accomplish his campaign promises, the contradiction between his policies and his discourse, his tendency to monopolize political and even social power, have ultimately undermined his popularity and have been producing an unexpected result: those who say they will not abstain in the next election or referendum have decreased to less than 12 %. Since mid-2001, the resistance against the president grows steadily, among practically all sectors of the population. The first to express resistance were the bourgeoisie and the middle sectors, in whose social circles Chávez had had a favored place. When he tried to suppress the traditional trade unions, he lost the support of the working classes of the modern economy (including the oil industry), particularly when he attempted, once more via referendum at the beginning of 2001, to eliminate the unions and create a workers’ organization within the framework of his political party (remember Mussolini and Hitler?). In more recent times, he is even losing the support of the poor, the nourishing soil of his "revolutionary" project. This explains the fall of his popularity from 80 to 27 %, among all social strata, maintaining figures of about 30 % only among the most marginalized (more than 60 %, of these same people, nonetheless, doubt, that Chávez will solve their problems or that their future will be any better under his leadership).

This also explains the quantitative and qualitative growth of the opposition. It is a peaceful opposition, its demonstrations big, frequent and powerful. Even Chavez’s temporary ouster in April 2002 during a massive demonstration is no proof of the opposition’s "violence," since it is an episode in which the details and particulars still remain opaque and unclear. In the nation’s capital of about 4.5 million inhabitants alone, the demonstrations have grown from some 100.000 in December 2001 to 1.2 million people during the current strike. Though at its beginning on December 2, 2002, the opposition still asked only for a consulting referendum (foreseen in his custom-made Constitution) on whether Chávez ought to remain in the presidency or not, there are now more and more calls for immediate new elections.

The opposition movement is composed by members of all social classes, of all ages, of all regions, with a specially notable number of women participating. Although there is a coordinating group of entrepreneurial, workers’ union, and political, civil, and NGO leaders, the movement is highly spontaneous. For Latin America and the Caribbean, where mass movements are often manipulated, this one has more of a grass-roots character, mostly independent of formal leadership, and with a considerable degree of autonomy.

The reason for this special growing movement is the perception that Chávez is destroying the economic, social, and cultural bases of the society. Relatively independent analysts (i.e. committed to neither of the contending parties) have been making calculations about the time it would take to reconstruct Venezuela’s material and socio-institutional structures. Their most optimistic estimate is about 15 years.

The most recent demonstrations were violently disturbed by members of the Bolivarian Circles, producing casualties and numerous injured. Chávez threatens with the declaration of a state of exception. For now, he appears to be in control of the armed forces, despite rumors about the growth of their institutional sector, hostile to being used in Chávez’s personal project. So he has still the money (but, with the oil strike, until when?) and the arms (with the institutional officers, again, until when?) to maintain himself in power.

Venezuela is not (yet?) a dictatorship or a tyranny. But there is a notable and growing discrepancy between the formal character of the regime and its real content in terms of political practices and policies. In parliamentary democracies, this discrepancy also occurs, but then new elections are being called. In a presidential-authoritarian democracy, the Constitution becomes a strait jacket, which eliminates the sovereignty of the citizenry, particularly if it contains many nearly totalitarian elements.

Like for any other paradox, there is no solution to the Venezuelan predicament, save the eventual overcoming of the contradictions by the triumph of one contender or the other (since there is by now no possibility of any compromise). But what seems clear is that the contradictory aspects will continue to go unrecognized or unperceived by regional and international public opinion, for basically two reasons. First, many members of the regional, North-American and European "left" with influence in some mass media support and defend Chávez’s regime: either because of their absolute ignorance about what is going on in Venezuela; or as a result of their incapacity for thinking beyond the limits of their obsolete ideological framework; or maybe even because it can be profitable to write and speak as they do; or for all these reasons together. The second reason is that many Latin American and Caribbean leaders, as well as politicians of developed countries, have vested interests in hiding the true character of the situation. They recognize that the possibility of questioning the discrepancy between the formal character of a regime and its real content in terms of political practices and policies in a specific case could very well open the eyes of their own peoples. And collectively open eyes are dangerous to any pretension to maintain their dominion. In the meantime, they delegate the mediation to the OAS, whose Secretary General is currently moderating a "Round-Table of Negotiations" of government and opposition, which for more than five weeks has produced no results.

Still, even a round-table without results can prove convenient to our political leaders and heads of state, by hiding their inactivity behind the veil of a seemingly collective defense of "constitutional regimes." The "Group of Friends of Venezuela," just constituted by Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, and the USA during President Gutierrez’s inauguration in Ecuador (1/15/03)--despite Chávez’s attempts to deny membership to the United States--has to be seen in the same light.

Amherst, MA, January 2003

(*) The author is a retired Professor of Sociology at the Central University of Venezuela and former director of its Center for Development Studies – CENDES, where he is still a research fellow. His next book is on social exclusion in a comparative perspective.

edition.cnn.com Friday, March 7, 2003 Posted: 1830 GMT ( 2:30 AM HKT)

CARACAS, Venezuela (AP) -- A legislator who belongs to President Hugo Chavez's political party was kidnapped, robbed and freed Friday, police said.

Two armed men in a Chevy Corsa intercepted Jose Gregorio Castro's taxi Friday morning while he was on his way to the Simon Bolivar International airport, just outside Caracas, said commissioner Carlos Medina, a federal police investigator.

The kidnappers forced Castro and a businessman into the Corsa and drove off. The taxi driver was allowed to go and alerted the police, Medina told Globovision television. Medina said Castro and the businessman, Renzo Basso, were robbed and freed in Catia la Mar, a town in the northern state of Vargas.

There were no immediate arrests or suspects, Medina said.

Castro is a substitute for legislator Calixto Ortega in the National Assembly. Both belong to Chavez's Fifth Republic Movement party.

Crime has risen sharply in Venezuela, which is mired in a deep economic recession and political turmoil. In 2002, there were more than 9,000 homicides in this country of 24 million people, up from almost 8,000 in 2001, according to federal police figures.