www.vheadline.com Posted: Thursday, February 13, 2003 By: Dr. Raymond West

Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003 23:02:37 -0800 (PST) From: Dr. Raymond West go4good2@yahoo.com To: editor@vheadline.com Subject: Another Blind American KNOW IT ALL

Dear Editor: Having been a frequent visitor to Venezuela (our vacation of choice) for many years, and having stayed there as long as several months at a time, I have had opportunity to observe Mr. Chavez, his wife, and his children from a position standing directly next to them.

• I want to stress quite plainly that I was very impressed with all of them!
• I am impressed by their genuine sincerity!
• I am impressed by them as people who are truly doing all they can to bring about needful changes in the country and in our world.

Speaking as a life-long American citizen, who becomes more and more ashamed of letting that fact be known as time progresses, I want to thank you for reporting the facts and the truth, and for giving Mr. Chavez a chance in spite of all the really bad guys who keep writing to slam him with their 'smart alec' comments.

I used to think USA to be a great country, until I began to see how many people here think they are so smart that they can tell other countries how to run their business. Such blindness and conceit is the worst form of irresponsibility.

Nothing is more sickening than several recent letters you have recently published from Americans who insinuate they are smarter than Mr. Chavez.

It just shows how truly blind they really are!

They have NO idea of what he is up against, or the extent of the corrupt propaganda trying to help oust him (so the rich and powerful can become much more wealthy and powerful).

I am sorry to be from a country where the blind are generally the most outspoken, but I want you to know there are many multitudes of us here in the US who are PROUD of VHeadline for standing up against such people.

We would rather they not even be heard from on your site, but understand your reasons.

Keep up the good work!

Dr. Raymond West go4good2@yahoo.com

www.vheadline.com Posted: Thursday, February 13, 2003 By: Patrick J. O'Donoghue

Professors on post-graduate studies abroad are beginning to feel the pinch of the Venezuelan government’s new economic measures. According to a Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV) scholarship officer, there are around 800 professors that haven’t received salaries since January.

The respective universities have told them that they will not be receiving salaries or scholarship money and other benefits until the exchange rate system has been fixed. Professors claim that they have been suffering the effects of a run on Venezuelan currency, which began in November.

One angry professor claims that an average monthly sum of $1,200-2000 consisting of salaries, scholarships and other benefits has been whittled down considerably making it difficult for beneficiaries to meet utility bills, rent payments … in euros, allowances that were once 800 are now just 300. Some universities say that if they don’t get the money, then they will have to ask beneficiaries to come home.

www.vheadline.com Posted: Thursday, February 13, 2003 By: Gustavo Coronel

VHeadline.com commentarist Gustavo Coronel writes: "A government governs...when there is overwhelming consensus ..on the legitimacy of the political system...an effective bureaucracy... a high degree of popular participation in public affairs ... civilian control over the military ...procedures for controlling political conflict" Samuel Huntington; "Political Order in Changing Societies"

A GOVERNMENT THAT DOES NOT GOVERN.

The supreme objective of a government is to govern, not to survive, not to merely exist in a legal and theoretical framework. A government that does not govern has no business in power. The words used by Huntington to define a government can be used to demonstrate that the current Venezuelan government is not governing. Although originally legitimate by virtue of clean elections its dismal and undemocratic performance has rendered it illegitimate. Its bureaucracy is surely the most mediocre and inefficient we have had in the last decades.

Popular participation in public affairs is minimal due to the policy of exclusion entertained by the President. The civilian control over the military is inexistent. Political conflict is not controlled but promoted. According to Huntington's definition this regime is the antithesis of a government.

Let us look at the quality of the bureaucracy, one of the components of government. In Brazil, Lula has just asked his Vice President, Jose Alencar, to put together an Advisory Council to the Presidency and wants to see as members "the most brilliant minds of Brazil". He wants this council to find strategies to make Brazil move forward, to convert a somewhat languid giant into a world class country of full fledged citizens.

• This initiative has been inspired in similar groups formed elsewhere.

In the US President Clinton asked Vice President Gore to put such a group together, to face the technological challenge posed to the US by the Asian countries. In Spain a high level group was formed to promote tourism and make of Spain one of the most visited countries in the planet. In Taiwan Advisers suggested the intensive use of optic fiber to build a technological competitive advantage for the country.

These initiatives have to do with good government. They represent creative ways to make optimum use of national resources, so that quality of life can be increased. They correlate strongly with national self-esteem. Lula is convening a group of the best and the brightest to help him share the burden of government.

Miles to the north, the regime of the world's best baseball utility player ( see one of my previous ed. commentaries) is already into its fourth year and has not yet started to govern. The fundamental problems facing the country four years ago remain unsolved: Poverty, corruption, unemployment, rotten services, deteriorating infrastructure, environmental degradation, street children, uncollected garbage, high crime, ignorance and collective inferiority feelings.

Most of them have, in fact, become much worse. These problems have not been tackled in spite of some $110 billion of income and relatively high prices of  petroleum in the world markets. The President chose to follow, almost exclusively, the political objective of installing in Venezuela a "revolution", vaguely defined along the lines of the Cuban experience, forgetting to address the real economic and social problems of millions of Venezuelans whom could not care less about his "revolutionary" dreams. In order to accomplish his political, and almost exclusive objective, the President did not require the cooperation of the best and the brightest. To assure unconditional loyalty to his plans, he only required the most servile. As a result, his cabinet and other immediate advisers are some of the most mediocre and the most resentful people available.  The best and the brightest are usually of independent thinking, outspoken, even irreverent. They are not sheep but free spirits. In contrast, Chavez' advisers do not even dare to dissent. They attend the interminable speeches of the President, dutifully laughing at his tasteless jokes or clapping after he sings, off key, a Mexican "ranchera" or a Venezuelan "joropo" over national TV. (He has had 27 networked transmissions so far this year).

Who are these people?  Let me mention just a few examples:

1. The original ideological mentor of Chavez is Norberto Ceresole, now in disgrace. He is an Argentinean militarist and anti-Semitic far out rightist, who advised Chavez to base his political power in the military.

2. Adina Bastidas, former Vice President, now member of the Currency Control Commission.  She lived 2 years in Washington without learning English or ever visiting a Museum. She promotes the takeover of PDVSA by the military and the "Tupamaros", a terrorist urban group.

3. Jorge Giordano, former Planning Minister, who dedicated all his efforts to a Orinoco- Apure Development Project, in order to move Venezuelans from north to south. After hundreds of millions of dollars spent in feasibility studies and isolated infrastructure this project was shelved, together with its author.

4. Felipe Perez, current Planning Minister, who said that anyone talking about the devaluation of the Bolivar would be committing "a sin against the Holy Spirit." Months after his warning the Bolivar has suffered a 200% devaluation.

5. Ali Rodriguez, former guerrilla fighter and explosive expert during the Cuban supported Venezuelan insurgency of the 1960`s, who now presides over the destruction of PDVSA and has dismissed 10000 employees and will dismiss 5,000 more if we let him.

6. William Farinas, a coupster with Chavez, leader of the social programs in construction and hand outs, later ambassador to Russia, he has wasted more than one billion dollars in the construction of faulty housing and ineffective food and money distribution schemes, lacking minimum accountability. He and other military officers such as Victor Weffer and Garcia Carneiro have led the most inefficient and corrupt sector of the Chavez regime.

7. General Luis Acosta Carles, recently given the highest decoration in Venezuela, The Order of the Liberator, for his work in illegal break-ins of industrial plants, the military takeover of civilian installations such as the Yagua Gasoline Depot and the rough handling of civilians, preferably women. He is also known as the "Burping General" ... now more famous because of this ability than because of his military accomplishments.

These and others are the Advisers Chavez has chosen. I can assure readers that Venezuela has much better candidates than these to help any President to govern and to help moving our country forward.

But, as the saying goes: You can take the horse to the river but you can not force him to drink...

www.alertnet.org 13 Feb 2003 22:09

(Recasts with Gaviria comments, oil figures) By Phil Stewart

CARACAS, Venezuela, Feb 13 (Reuters) - After three months of tortured talks, the chief mediator in Venezuela warned on Thursday of a long, deadly road ahead if friends and foes of President Hugo Chavez fail to strike a deal quickly.

Organization of American States chief Cesar Gaviria said he would push for a nonviolence pact aimed at defusing the explosive divide in the world's fifth largest oil exporter.

At least seven people have been killed and scores injured in street clashes since December, as negotiations drag on.

"We are working with the wording to see if we can put out a declaration against violence, and the confrontational rhetoric, the hateful (rhetoric) that has prevailed in the country," said Gaviria, at a forum on the country's deep political crisis.

"Venezuela's recovery will be very long, very traumatic and also very difficult to bring to a good ending" without a deal soon, Gaviria said, warning "many more lives" could be lost.

Opponents of Chavez, who charge that his so-called peaceful revolution is a mask for Cuba-style communism, have demanded that he step down and agree to elections.

Chavez has refused and has accused his opponents of supporting a coup that briefly ousted him last year. He has hardened his stance in talks and has slowly eroded a 10-week-old oil strike aimed at forcing him from power by bankrupting the state.

The populist president, whose term ends in 2007, has fired more than 11,000 employees of the state oil firm PDVSA.

Negotiations to end the crisis began in November and are being brokered by Gaviria and backed by the United States, Brazil and four other nations.

OIL FLOW CUT

The flow of oil from Venezuela to the United States, which had been about 13 percent of all U.S. oil imports, has slowed dramatically during the strike. The stoppage has further jolted world oil prices, already reeling from war worries in Iraq.

Chavez said this week production was at about 2 million barrels per day (bpd) compared with pre-strike levels of 3.1 million bpd. The government on Thursday pegged exports at about half normal levels, or 1.3 to 1.5 million bpd.

Rebel oil workers put the output lower, at a modest 1.4 million bpd, and say exports are at about 1 million bpd.

Still, with oil exports limping along, and more than $11 billion in foreign currency reserves, analysts say Chavez can hold on for months even if the standoff deepens.

Chavez introduced sweeping price controls on Wednesday on everything from tomatoes to funeral services to shield the poor majority from spiraling inflation.

Opposition leaders warned that the new controls would further damage shopkeepers, many of whom shuttered their businesses for nearly two months as part of a general strike abandoned earlier in February. Capping wholesale prices will also hurt industry and farmers, already mired in recession.

"Is the desire to make everyone self-destruct? What this could do is shut down the country's productive sector," said Rafael Alfonzo, an opposition negotiator and business leader.

Chavez suspended foreign exchange trading on Jan. 22 before announcing controls to shore up international reserves and the bolivar currency. Trading was still closed on Thursday, leaving businesses starved of the much-needed U.S. currency in a nation that imports more than 60 percent of its goods.

www.heritage.org by Stephen Johnson Backgrounder #1623 February 12, 2003 |  |

Venezuela is the world's fifth largest oil producer and normally provides 13 percent of U.S. petroleum imports, but the United States should not be so eager to open the spigot that it acquiesces to the consolidation of an emerging dictatorship or to prolonged turmoil there. Neither outcome will enhance stability in volatile South America or assure a steady supply of petroleum at a time when the United States is likely to engage in military action in Iraq.

The only way to rescue Venezuela's viability as an energy producer and trade partner is to help restore democracy by bringing sustained pressure on President Hugo Chávez to allow a peaceful, constitutional vote on his mandate and then supervise the resulting campaign and vote to safeguard political and civil liberties until the Venezuelan government is able to do so itself. So far, the Bush Administration has pursued this course.

More Than a Petrol Problem

For more than a year, this South American nation of 23 million has experienced increasing upheaval provoked by the dictatorial ways of its fiery, demagogic president Hugo Chávez. On December 2, 2002, business and labor leaders called a national work stoppage, hoping to pressure him into resigning. Some 35,000 workers walked out of the state oil monopoly PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima), temporarily slowing production to a trickle.

The loss of 1.5 million barrels of imported heavy crude per day from December 2002 to January 2003 made headlines and helped push U.S. gasoline prices up 10 cents at the pump, but that is within the range of normal market fluctuations. Furthermore, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), of which Venezuela is a member, promised to increase output by about 1.5 million barrels per day. And after reportedly firing 5,000 striking oil workers and replacing some of them with loyalists, the government has managed to boost production to one-third of previous levels.

The real issue is what would happen if Venezuela's increasingly unpopular president tried to impose a dictatorship in order to stay in office. This would exacerbate the conflict, possibly even provoking a civil war. Possible scenarios include:

• Financial collapse affecting trade partners Venezuela once had the highest per capita income in South America and was the United States' 25th largest trading partner. Now its economy is beginning to look like Haiti's, having contracted 18 percent since Chávez took office in 1998 and threatening to implode as Argentina's did in 2001. This would harm trade partners already battered by a regional economic downturn and internal problems.1

Historically, the state has intervened in Venezuela's economy to a high degree, but in November 2001, Chávez introduced a package of 49 decrees to tighten control of various local industries and enable the government to confiscate "unused property." Meanwhile, anticipating the creation of a Cuban-style command economy, local and foreign investors began taking their money elsewhere. Since the December 2002 strike, shuttered Venezuelan businesses and industries have become vulnerable to nationalization. In 2002, Colombian exports to Venezuela totaled some $1.2 billion. For the moment, many exports cannot get past the border, and if they do, they may find fewer buyers.2

• Increased terrorist foothold in South America Disorder and dysfunctional government provide a welcome haven for criminals and terrorists. Last March, the Venezuelan army reported that more than 700 combatants of the Marxist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) had established camps in the western border states.3 If Chávez establishes a dictatorship, the FARC and other groups such as Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), with whom he is reportedly friendly, might find Venezuela an even more hospitable environment.4
• Refugee exodus Refugee outflows would impose hardships on neighboring countries and the United States. Colombia already has an internally displaced population of about 3 million, and Ecuadorans are leaving their country at a rate of about 250,000 per year to find work and escape invading Colombians. Anarchy or government crackdowns on civil liberties could provoke a Venezuelan exodus.
• Lagging recovery of oil production Without a satisfactory outcome to Venezuela's political troubles, experienced managers and skilled technicians at PDVSA may not return to work. And without their business expertise and engineering know-how, production and distribution may never return to previous levels. Although the government claims that operations are returning to normal, reports of spills, accidents, and lost capacity in older oil fields suggest disarray.5 For Venezuela to service its foreign debt, production needs to approach pre-strike levels.6

A Ruptured Consensus

Venezuela's crumbling state cannot be patched together overnight. For decades, Venezuelan leaders neglected citizen participation in government and shunned economic liberalization. Instead, they nationalized the country's oil industry to fund extravagant social spending while shielding the established business community behind convoluted regulations and weak rule of law. As the government piled up debt, the poverty rate increased from 27 percent in the 1980s to 60 percent in the 1990s.7

With Venezuela's political parties in disrepute, Chávez--a former coup plotter and cashiered army officer--was elected president in 1998 with a broad mandate to clean house. But instead of weeding out corruption or empowering the poor, he had the constitution rewritten to expand his powers, extend his term in office, and complicate any attempt to remove him from office. He diverted government funds to military cronies to buy loyalty and to organize armed, partisan militias called "Bolivarian Circles"--similar to Cuba's Revolutionary Defense Committees.

On April 11, 2002, spurred by his decrees curbing property rights and hobbling private enterprise, a group of dissident military officers and business leaders rebelled and temporarily removed Chávez from power. Since then, the breech between Chávez and his growing number of opponents has widened. Calling them "fascists" in public appearances, he has polarized society and made it clear that his presidency serves only himself and a declining number of supporters.

Struggle for Control

Since April 2002, Chávez has pursued a two-track strategy to maintain his hold on power. On the domestic front, he discarded initial promises of reconciliation in favor of bullying opponents and manipulating national institutions. In June, he began warning media owners of unspecified consequences if their outlets broadcast stories disrespectful of his government. In October, he appointed Lenín Ramírez Sánchez, brother of convicted terrorist Illich Ramírez Sánchez (Carlos the Jackal), as energy minister.

In November, Chávez ordered the military to seize control of the Caracas police force from Mayor Alfredo Peña, an outspoken opponent. The same month, he asked the National Assembly to modify the election law to remove the existing National Electoral Council, which seemed inclined to approve a petition signed by 2 million Venezuelans calling for a non-binding "consultative" referendum on his rule.8

In January 2003, troops led by National Guard General Luis Felipe Acosta Carles confiscated soft drinks and beer at bottling plants closed by striking workers outside Caracas. Although such beverages are not considered public necessities under Venezuela's "hoarding" law, General Acosta said he was acting on presidential orders to distribute them "because collective rights come above individual rights."9 Finally, having tired of negative publicity in the commercial media, Chávez introduced a new media law on January 23 that would permit the government to close independent TV and radio stations for broadcasting material that promotes "disrespect" for government authorities.10

On the international front, Chávez has tried to complicate outside efforts to promote reconciliation. In April 2002, the Organization of American States (OAS) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights asked the government to create a truth commission to look into killings during the uprising that ousted Chávez. To date, no such group exists. In June, Vice President José Vicente Rangel invited former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to chair talks between the administration and opponents, perhaps thinking that Carter--perceived as an international "boy scout"--would be easy to manipulate. Instead, Carter invited the OAS to join the dialogue and, to his credit, observed that Chávez showed little respect for Venezuela's existing institutions.11

By September, a tripartite negotiating mission had formed consisting of the OAS, the Carter Center, and the United Nations Development Program. In November, OAS Secretary General César Gaviria opened negotiations in Caracas, admonishing both sides to avoid recriminations. But in the collective mind of the opposition, reconciliation competed with the desire to force Chávez from office, no doubt inspired by the president's continued verbal attacks.

On January 21, 2003, Carter laid two options on the table: a constitutional amendment truncating the presidential and legislative terms to four years, which would necessitate new elections in the immediate future, and a binding recall vote in August according to the current charter. In the background, however, the Supreme Justice Tribunal unseated the members of the National Electoral Council, placing decisions on referenda and any constitutional changes in limbo.12

What Washington Should Do

As Venezuela's internal conflict draws on, U.S. policymakers might feel tempted to back a deal with Chávez that pays lip service to democracy in order to make peace--particularly in the interest of boosting oil exports. If that happened, Chávez could either consolidate his regime or lead the country further into anarchy--either way complicating energy and trade problems.13 By the same token, strong measures such as sanctions would focus the rage of both sides on the United States and be equally unproductive.

Instead, the United States and its democratic allies in the hemisphere should bring sustained pressure on Venezuela's president to agree on a peaceful, constitutional, democratic, and electoral solution and then help supervise the resulting campaign and vote through international observers to safeguard political and civil liberties in the absence of official will to do so. A stable, democratic Venezuela would be a more prosperous trade partner, a more reliable energy supplier, and a peaceful, responsible neighbor.

For now, the Bush Administration is on the right track. After a public relations misstep last April in commenting prematurely on Chávez's ouster, the Administration has quietly supported the tripartite mission to bring the Venezuelan government and the country's democratic community to a common understanding. In January 2003, U.S. and Brazilian diplomacy helped organize a "group of friends of Venezuela" that includes foreign ministers from Mexico, Chile, Spain, and Portugal as interested observers in ongoing talks.14 These observers will help to hold Chávez accountable for his promises and give hope to Venezuela's beleaguered democrats.

But more needs to be done. To help restore democratic governance and a viable economy in Venezuela, Washington should:

• Continue to declare the obvious Venezuela's democracy is broken according to the standards of the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter. Opponents charge that Chávez has violated 91 articles of the Bolivarian Constitution and the Democratic Charter 39 times. Although it has been stated in OAS reports and declarations, the United States and the OAS should restate this fact to keep ongoing negotiations in perspective.
• Increase pressure for a lawful, democratic solution President Carter's two proposals were among many considered by Chávez's opponents. Putting them on the table galvanized negotiating parties to act on them. Both proposals have distinct advantages and risks, but once an agreement is reached, facilitators and outside observers should encourage all parties to follow the agreement. The Venezuelan government should not block public choice by trying to stack the National Electoral Council or through other anti-democratic means; nor should opponents sidetrack it with mob action to force the president's resignation.
• Protect civil liberties and democratic processes Negotiators must continue to urge all parties to respect civil liberties and fair campaign practices and allow international observation of the resulting campaign and vote. Specifically, the OAS and the Group of Friends should insist that all government-supported partisan groups such as the Bolivarian Circles be disarmed and dismantled. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights should continue to push for the creation of a truth commission and, along with other observers, monitor the critical phases of any developing solution to help safeguard civil liberties.
• Urge the democratic opposition to develop a national reform plan Venezuela must solve its root problems of weak political institutions, inadequate separation of powers, an over-regulated economy, and dependence on state oil. While Chávez delivers a toxic form of the welfare-state policies Venezuelan leaders have implemented in the past, his democratic opponents have yet to formulate a blueprint to address the problems that led to the current crisis. Even without Chávez, Venezuela will remain unstable unless it makes its political system more representative and accountable and restructures the economy to promote private enterprise and investment.
• Increase intelligence collection The Bush Administration should boost efforts to gather information about Cuban agents working in Chávez's government, the training and strength of all armed bands, and the activities of outside groups such as the FARC that could further destabilize Venezuela or pose a regional terrorist threat.
• Stay engaged The U.S. should work through the Group of Friends and support the OAS facilitators. The U.S. Congress should increase visits with its counterparts in the National Assembly, encouraging them to curb executive branch excesses through proper oversight. International organizations supported by the U.S. National Endowment for Democracy (NED) should continue to advise the full spectrum of Venezuela's political parties, civic groups, and unions.

Conclusion

Compared to Iraq's Saddam Hussein or North Korea's Kim Jong-il, Hugo Chávez may seem like a minor nuisance, but he admires those men and could become more like them as time goes by. Decrying capitalism and freedom of choice as "fascist neoliberalism," his demagogic speeches resonate with growing numbers of poor in Latin America who have lost hope in the slow evolution of democracy and market economies. The chaos he has inspired in Venezuela could further depress commerce in the hemisphere and destabilize neighbors. Because of him, one of the world's most important petroleum producers faces prolonged turmoil and mismanagement under a budding dictator.

To avoid dependence on unstable regimes for critical resources, the U.S. should facilitate exploration elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin and in Alaska and welcome market-developed technologies that are less dependent on finite resources. Meanwhile, by increasing international pressure on Venezuela's president to agree to a constitutional, democratic decision on the future of his country with outside scrutiny to safeguard the process, the United States can help restore stability to this important energy producer and ally. Moreover, it can help the people of Venezuela retake their government, open up their economy, and work for the kind of prosperity that has so far eluded them.

Stephen Johnson is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.

1. Andy Webb-Vidal, "Venezuela Economy `Faces Greatest Collapse,'" Financial Times, January 14, 2003.

2. "Colombia's Usual Exports to Venezuela Still Shut Out," Dow Jones Business News, January 20, 2003.

3. Javier Ignacio Mayorca, "740 de las FARC en Venezuela," Venezuela Ana lít ica, March 11, 2002, at www.analitica.com/va/vpi/5521076.asp (April 1, 2002).

4. Other groups could be welcome as well. Chávez was the first democratically elected leader to visit Saddam Hussein since Iraq invaded Kuwait. Moreover, Chávez's former personal pilot, Major Juan Díaz, charges that after September 11, 2001, Chávez sent funds to Afghanistan's Taliban government and to the terrorist Al-Qaeda group under the guise of aid to Afghan refugees. See Casto Ocando, "Organismo demanda a Chávez en Miami," El Nuevo Herald, January 30, 2003, at www.miami.com/mld/elnuevo/news/world/americas/5060974.htm (January 31, 2003).

5. Francis Robles, "Oil Accidents Mount in Venezuela: Novice Stand-Ins Blamed for Chaos," The Miami Herald, January 21, 2003, at www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/4993381.htm (January 28, 2003).

6. Some Venezuelan business leaders believe that Chávez might consider the "unthinkable," selling off oil company assets, including a major stake in PDVSA, to foreign investors to isolate PDVSA from local politics. Royalties would still go to the government, workers might be less inclined to strike, and oil-consuming nations like the United States might be less concerned with whether Chávez stays or goes.

7. "Venezuela tuvo el mayor aumento de la pobreza en la región," Agence France-Presse, in El Nacional, June 20, 2001, at www.el-nacional.com/eln20062001/pe8sl.htm (June 20, 2001).

8. The Electoral Court in the Supreme Justice Tribunal, dominated by Chávez sympathizers, later ruled that the referendum could not take place because the existing Electoral Council was not named by the current National Assembly. A magistrate in the Constitutional Court in the same Tribunal now says the Electoral Court exceeded its authority. See Irma Alvarez and Juan Francisco Alonso, "Sala Constitucional debe poner orden," El Universal, January 29, 2003, at www.eluniversal.com/2003/01/29/29104AA.shtml (January 29, 2003).

9. Patrick Markey, "Venezuelan Troops Seize Coca-Cola Affiliate Plant," Reuters, January 17, 2003.

10. Penalties include a two-day shutdown of outlets disseminating disrespectful content and an indefinite suspension of the operator's license if more than two infractions occur within a three-year period. See "Proyecto de Ley Sobre La Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión," introduced in the National Assembly, January 23, 2003, Gaceta Oficial, at www.eluniversal.com/especiales/leytvradio/pagina.shtml (January 28, 2003).

11. Everett Bauman, "Nunca vi un país tan dividido," El Universal, July 22, 2002, at www.eluniversal.com/2002/07/22/22108CC.shtml (July 22, 2002).

12. The tripartite negotiating mission maintains that an independent judiciary and a credible elections council are crucial to a democratic solution to Venezuela's political crisis. See Christopher Toothaker, "Delegation Wraps Up Mediation Mission," Associated Press, September 19, 2002.

13. Attending the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil, on January 26, President Chávez declared, "I've saved my rifle, and I don't want to take it out. But I've kept it and if the oligarchies don't accept changes peacefully, like Che Guevara said, sounds of combat and bursts of machinegun fire will thunder." Alberto Garrido, "Tiempo Real," El Universal, January 28, 2003.

14. Chávez wanted to add other countries to the group, including China, Russia, France, and Cuba. On January 15, Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva told him he would not support expansion. On January 28, the French government declared its support for the tripartite mission and freedom of the press. See "Venezuela: Lula no quiere más `amigos,'" BBC Mundo.com, January 18, 2003, at news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_2672000/2672281.stm (January 30, 2003), and "Francia ofrece respaldo a propuestas de Carter," El Universal, January 28, 2003, at www.eluniversal.com/2003/01/28/28107OO.shtml (January 28, 2003).