The Miami Herald, Posted on Wed, Jun. 18, 2003 BY ELISA TURNER elisaturn@aol.com

When prizes were handed out at this year's sweltering Venice Biennale, the world's famed showcase for modern and contemporary art, art lovers wilting in unseasonable heat were stunned to learn that one winner was an exhibit from Luxembourg: Air-Conditioned.

Not only was it notable for an unusually apt title, but the show also marked the first time a national exhibit had won a prize while located outside the Giardini, a leafy park at the city's eastern edge and the Biennale's main venue.

But the real heat was provided by Venezuela, which has had a coveted pavilion at the park since 1954, yet wasn't even in the running for an award this year. In May, the Venezuelan government censored the art chosen for its own exhibit, an interactive digital work, CityRooms, by Pedro Morales.

Stirring controversy were the work's caricature images of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez and scenes showing the country degenerating into a ramshackle mass of shanties.

So during the Biennale's gala invitation-only opening on June 12, the pavilion for Venezuela was locked up tight. (Only two Latin American countries, Venezuela and Brazil, are represented among the 26 nations at the Biennale.)

There was no art inside the low-slung, modernist structure designed by renowned Venetian architect Carlo Scarpa. A cart of construction trash blocked the entrance, next to piles of dead leaves. A few days later limp bunting, colored like the Venezuelan flag, also blocked the entrance in protest.

`SEX, HUMOR'

And standing outside the pavilion on opening day, next to the debris and dead leaves, was Morales, the man who had put up the bunting. He watched forlornly as influential flocks of curators, collectors, and critics rushed in and out of the nearby Danish pavilion.

Brushing away rivulets of sweat, he offered to speak about his work -- displayed on a small video camera -- to anyone who would listen.

Two weeks ago, Morales said he received a statement from the Venezuelan government claiming that his art ''was disrespectful of the images in my country. I think the real thing is that they don't understand my proposal,'' he said. ``They say my work has a political view only, but that's not true. There's sex, humor, and violence. It's an extensive work of interactive art.''

''It's unacceptable that a country censors art,'' said Irma Arestizábal, an Argentine curator of Latin American art at the Biennale. ``It's a sin for Venezuela, because every country in the world wants a pavilion [here].''

The cultural attaché for the Venezuelan embassy in Washington, D.C., Carolina Márquez, could not be reached for comment.

In the Giardini, Morales' situation also drew the sympathy of a Venezuelan curator who was touring the Biennale with fellow trustees from New York's Museum of Modern Art. ''No, I am not surprised by what is going on in my country. They should be ashamed,'' she said, asking that her name not be used in order to protect family members in Venezuela.

OTHER CONTROVERSY

Morales is not the first Venezuelan artist to be sucked into controversy swirling around his country's representation in Venice. On March 3, artist Javier Téllez, also chosen to exhibit in the Venezuelan pavilion, circulated an open letter to his country's ministry of culture announcing his decision to withdraw his participation, condemning the government's ``corruption and struggle for power that are choking the country.''

Last Friday, Biennale president Franco Bernabé said his organization was trying to find a way for Morales to exhibit as an individual; the Biennale ends in November. Information about Morales' CityRooms project for Venice can be seen on his website at www.pedromorales.com.

<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela's Electronic News Posted: Monday, June 16, 2003 By: Gustavo Coronel

VHeadline.com commentarist Gustavo Coronel writes: The referendum slated for this year and which, if held, should decide whether our current President stays or goes, is contemplated in Article 72 of the Venezuelan Constitution. This article allows for any elected officer to be subject to a referendum at the midpoint of his/her term in office provided that no less than 20% of the voters request that such a referendum be held. The mandate will be revoked if a number of votes greater than that received originally by the officer are obtained, and the voting includes more than 25% of eligible voters.

If these conditions are met, the mandate of the elected officer will be revoked and the law demands that the replacement of such an absolute absence be replaced at once.

In the case of our President, his term will be at midpoint in August 19, 2003, as determined by a sentence of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ).  To fulfill the number of voters requesting the referendum requires that 20% of ±12.5 million registered voters ask for it ... this is, 2.5 million signatures. To be valid, the referendum must have the participation of at least 25% of eligible voters ... 3,125,000 voters. The mandate will be revoked if more than 3,357,773 voters so decide, this being the amount of votes that the current President received at his election in July 2000.

The percentage of voters abstaining during Presidential elections since 1999 has been very high ... in the order of 49%.  I.e. only 51% of eligible voters have cast their ballots. If this trend is maintained for the referendum, and even if 59% of voters decide against the President staying, his mandate would not be revoked since the absolute number of votes would be less than what he obtained in July 2000. This means the opposition to the President must make sure that abstention is very low, that most voters actually vote.  It explains the emphasis being given, at this point in time, to the organization of civic groups to guarantee that no one fails to go and vote.

The road to the referendum is plagued with obstacles, some legal, some bureaucratic, some of a more dubious nature. Among them:

1. Are the signatures already collected in 'El Firmazo' valid or not? The Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) has not yet said a word. The current Electoral College (CNE) says they are.

2. The Electoral College must be to reappointed. The National Assembly (AN), in charge of selecting its new members, is in shambles. The government block no longer has the majority it once had. From an original 115 members the government block is down to 83, but even then, one or two more of its members are not so sure any more. This has produced a deadlock in the Assembly and the Electoral College members have not been selected. This task will probably have to be made by the TSJ as last instance ... which is highly abnormal.

3. Some high government officers claim that the Electoral College should have 6 months to be "reorganized."  This would delay the referendum considerably.

4. The Minister of Infrastructure (MINFRA), Diosdado Cabello claims without giving much explanation on the basis for his argument, that there will not be a referendum and Vice President Rangel says that the recent agreement signed under the eyes of international observers, has nothing to do with the referendum ... although this was the main reason to sign it.

5. President Chavez has gone on record saying that he does not believe there will be any referendum.

6. Many opposition members feel that the government has no real intention to "allow" a referendum.

Against this background, filled with uncertainty, most Venezuelans are looking to the referendum as the only hope of solving the Venezuelan crisis in a non-violent fashion.

• But the level of frustration increases as they see that the days go by and many organizations procrastinate in tasks they must complete to make it possible.

The President (quite rightly), says: "I am not interested in the referendum ... I will not move a finger to make it possible."  This is logical as one can not expected him to promote a referendum that might result in his removal from the Presidency. But, there is a distinction between not promoting a revocatory referendum and quite another to put obstacles in its way. Not to move a finger to make it happen is understandable, and valid. To move to make it impossible is something else ... which might well be classified as obstruction of the Constitution itself.

This is where we seem to be at this point in time.

The referendum hangs in the balance ... a very delicate balance between Constitutional action and Constitutional violation ... we will need all possible help to make the revocatory referendum happen within the boundaries stipulated in the Venezuelan Law.

Gustavo Coronel is the founder and president of Agrupacion Pro Calidad de Vida (The Pro-Quality of Life Alliance), a Caracas-based organization devoted to fighting corruption and the promotion of civic education in Latin America, primarily Venezuela. A member of the first board of directors (1975-1979) of Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), following nationalization of Venezuela's oil industry, Coronel has worked in the oil industry for 28 years in the United States, Holland, Indonesia, Algiers and in Venezuela. He is a Distinguished alumnus of the University of Tulsa (USA) where he was a Trustee from 1987 to 1999. Coronel led the Hydrocarbons Division of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in Washington DC for 5 years. The author of three books and many articles on Venezuela ("Curbing Corruption in Venezuela." Journal of Democracy, Vol. 7, No. 3, July, 1996, pp. 157-163), he is a fellow of Harvard University and a member of the Harvard faculty from 1981 to 1983.   You may contact Gustavo Coronel at email gustavo@vheadline.com

José Vicente Rangel believes that opposition groups have lost the chance to hold a revoking vote, and that all they have left is to "get ready for the next elections for governors, mayors, deputies and president in 2006"

He denied that the administration is afraid of a vote to terminate the mandate of President Hugo Chávez

ALFREDO ROJAS EL UNIVERSAL

Even though he has occupied three positions in the current administration of President Hugo Chávez, Venezuelan Vice President, José Vicente Rangel, prefers to talk about the groups opposed to the government. As if he was a mentor of dissidents, he even dares to give Chávez' foes some advices, "which I should not disclose, because if they take these suggestions into account this may be harmful for the government. But I do believe that it is fundamental to have a democratic opposition in a democratic government."

Question: Is the government more comfortable now with the country's internal situation?

Answer: I do believe that we all should be more comfortable, specially our foes. Our opponents are the ones who need democratic and institutional normalcy the most. They have to accept that they are not going to overthrow Chávez. During this conspiracy, opposition groups have won nothing but the strengthening of Chávez.

Q: Don't you believe that accusing Chávez' foes of plotting to conduct a coup d'etat is a little overrated?

A: As long as there are plans to conduct coups and people who do not believe in a recall referendum -as some leaders in the so-called Democratic Block have said, and as some retired military officers have admitted- this is a valid allegation. We talk about coup-mongers because we have detected coup-plotting activities. Let us think for a moment what would have happened if the opposition sectors were democratically wiser and used the vast resources they have at hand, such as our Bolivarian Constitution. I am sure that they would be in a completely different situation.

Q: In what position would the government be then?

A: The administration's situation would be harder perhaps. The government would be under siege, because nothing is more harassing than a democratic opposition -this generally puts any government between the devil and the deep blue sea. Coup plotting does not.

Q: A revoking referendum may put the government under siege?

A: Not necessarily. That is another thing. Opposition groups currently operating in Venezuela have not laid the grounds for a recall referendum adequately. They have wasted time. They are lost in senseless disputes. At first, they have a 38 percent support -this was a fast track for them-, but since they lack the will to serve, such a force could not be channeled through a democratic way, and instead it was focused on coup-plotting -with the help of television networks.

Q: Do you believe that Chávez' foes could have forced early elections?

A: I cannot say what they could have achieved, but in any case they could be in a better position for holding a recall referendum.

Q: And what would be the administration's situation?

A: Perhaps the government would be in a precarious position. It is hard to forecast the future when confrontation is really democratic, when citizens decide what is their best choice.

Q: How is the government facing a likely recall referendum?

A: Very calmly, with no fears. But what are Chávez opponents going to do if they do not gather the number of signatures necessary to hold this vote?

Q: There will be a revoking referendum or not?

A: I have serious doubts on the opposition's capabilities to collect the necessary signatures. This is a valid doubt, because if they do not gather signatures, there is no recall vote. I know that many people in the ranks of the opposition have this doubt. That is the reason why they have taken the way of coup-plotting and accusing Chávez of fraud.

Q: The government plans to regulate the right to demonstration, the freedom of speech and the freedom of press, why?

A: In Venezuela, people now exert their rights to demonstrate and their freedom of speech as never before. We have a hyper democracy in our country. The problem is not the exercise of the citizen's rights, but the fact that some sectors refuse to respect the Constitution, and they use the right to demonstrate or the freedom of speech with coup-plotting intentions. But we have guarantees for the political, social, business, and unionist sector to work.

We intend a regulation in the framework of the development of constitutional rights, because our Constitution establishes the regulation of general rules. We do not want to eliminate the right to demonstrate, but we do want to put an end to demonstrations having a purpose other than the exercise of a civic right. Some steps will have to be taken. If a demonstration jeopardizes lives and properties, a regulation must be adopted, either in Venezuela or in the United States.

<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela's Electronic News Posted: Monday, June 16, 2003 By: Hector Dauphin-Gloire

Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2003 22:32:09 -0400 From: Hector Dauphin-Gloire montonero22@hotmail.com To: Editor@VHeadline.com Subject: the Bolivarian Revolution

Dear Editor:  In his recent letter Mr. Elio Cequea, presumably a Venezuelan and a supporter of the Bolivarian Revolution, presents an eloquent defense of the Revolution.  I agree with him for the most part, and it is clear that he is a man who loves social justice. I have only two points to quibble with him. The one is minor; but the other leads into questions of deep importance for the future of the revolutionary process ... questions of great concern both for the supporters of Chavez and for his opponents.

I would argue, first of all, with Mr. Cequea's description of the Bolivarian Revolution as the first non-violent, democratic revolution in history.

Mr. Cequea is CLOSE to being correct, in that many of the revolutions that are often supposed to be non-violent, actually include a dose of actual or threatened force.

The liberation of India, for example, would probably not have come about as soon as it did without the Second World War. The end of apartheid in South Africa was at least partially due to the military defeats of the South African army in Angola.

The much-heralded democratization of Costa Rica was carried out by a Social Democratic clique that seized power in a military insurrection, following a disputed election, that at least in its initial stages repressed its political opponents including both the Christian Democrats and the Communists.

The end of the Salazar tyranny in Portugal was brought about when a group of socialist military officers overthrew the government ... it was a military overthrow, even though fairly bloodless.

There have been some non-violent democratic revolutions (in Poland 1989, or in Tanzania 1964, or in Chile under Allende) but they have been very rare ... and often, as in Chile, quickly reversed.

In all these cases, force played a role: either the ruling regime was reasonable or humane enough to step down before further force was required, or force was an ever present threat (implicit force, even if not explicit), or external force (such as a foreign war) weakened the existing regime enough that it could no longer step down.

The Portuguese revolution of 1974 was heralded as a peaceful revolution, a "Carnation Revolution," but let it be remembered that the rose grows with the thorns, and that that peaceful democratization was carried out through a military coup, by Socialists who, though certainly democrats by their lights, were often not liberal democrats in the Western sense.

Truly, hidden within most peaceful revolutions is some violence, somewhere along the line; nine times out of ten, within the rose-scented glove is the curled fist.

I mention this, not to defend either the Bolshevik perspective that all revolutionary violence is justified, nor the Conservative view that no revolutionary violence is justified; surely we can have a more humane, yet realistic outlook which acknowledges that most revolutions involve some force and repression, but seeks to minimize it and refrain as much am possible from harm to non-combatants.

I mention it, rather, in defense of Mr. Cequea's argument: that few governments have ever carried out social change on the order that the Chavez regime hopes for (and that Venezuela needs) without any repression or bloodshed, and that therefore the Chavez government, truly, is to be commended for its moderation and its tolerance.

By the guideline that I mentioned, that force and harm to non-combatants are to be minimized, surely the Chavez revolution deserves the plaudits of the world for the lack of repression, the preservation of liberal freedoms, the relative lack of bloodshed.

Do not point out isolated instances of repression or bloodshed, but simply compare Venezuela's record to, say, that of Costa Rica after its democratic revolution of 1948 (when two major newspapers had been shut down) and then observe the relative tolerance that exists in Venezuela.

My second criticism of Mr. Cequea's argument is more substantive. He argues that revolutions accomplish changes once and for all, and establish a line in history across there shall be no regress. In defense of his point he argues that "France never returned to a monarchy" after its Revolution.

Would that it were so, but it isn't. France returned to a monarchy after the fall of Napoleon in 1815, and had a reactionary monarchy until the 1830 revolution, and then a liberal monarchy until the 1848 revolution.

This may seem like irrelevant history, but it isn't ... it shows, among other things, that History, as some have said of God, "grinds fine but exceedingly slow."

Christianity was the first major creed in the West to proclaim that all men were equal and that slavery was incompatible with God's will for mankind; and truly, as Christianity spread across the Roman Empire, slavery began to break down. But history grinds slow; slavery returned several times, in different forms, as a scourge of Western civilization, and it took twenty full centuries from the birth of Christ for the last remnants of the slave culture of Greece and Rome to be extirpated from Europe.

Progress comes about in the aftermath of revolutions, but it comes about slowly, and in the immediate aftermath of revolutions there is as much frustration of hope as there is ground for exaltation. The French and the Cuban revolutions were both undertaken in the name of justice for the poor and suffering; and indeed, in the long run, the French and Cuban regimes managed to greatly improve the health, education, nutrition, and social solidarity of their poorest citizens.

But in the short run, the French poor were actually hungrier after the Revolution (because the Revolution had expropriated the Church, until that time the only provider of food to the destitute, and had not set up secular charities to take their place).

In the short run, the Cuban poor actually had a lower life expectancy for the years immediately following the 1959 Revolution (because most Cuban doctors, fearing a loss of income and status, left for Miami between 1959 and 1961, hemorrhaging the island's medical infrastructure).

In the short run, things got worse, even though in the long run, Republicanism in France and socialism in Cuba accomplished much good for the poorest citizens of each country.

(And please, for purposes of this discussion, let's leave the Russian Revolution out of it ... the Russian Revolution, in retrospect, was a tragedy, that became hijacked first by the Bolsheviks and then by Stalin. Cuba never had a Stalin, or a Mao, thank God- although there was certainly repression and political execution in Cuba, it never approached nearly the scale that it did in either Russia or China, either in kind or in degree).

This has a cautionary importance for both the opponents of Chavez and for his supporters.

To his opponents, I say this; Remember that revolutions always cause some hardship and sacrifice in the short run, and do not assume that because standards of living for many poor Venezuelans may have dropped in the last four years, they will continue to drop in the future.

Maybe, as the redistributed farms begin being cultivated, as the new industrial cooperatives begin producing, as foreign capital learns to live with Chavez, as the government learns from experience, and as the industries that went on strike realize that further strikes are futile and only hurt the country further, the recession will turn around; and maybe, once the government gains the political strength to carry out real economic redistribution (land reform, food distribution, higher taxes on the wealthy and middle class) the poor will see an even bigger rise in their share of the national income relative to the current property-holding classes.

To those in Venezuela who support Chavez (and I consider myself a strong supporter of Chavez in spirit, even though I'm only a foreign onlooker), I say: Remember that revolutions naturally bring hardship and sacrifice in the short run- our task is to make that short run as short as possible!

Chavez has already had four years, and time is running out before the poor, in whose name Chavez revolted in 1992 and was elected in 1998, lose faith in him. The Chavistas need to carry out responsible and effective economic reform SOON that will do the job and improve conditions for the poor and working classes of Venezuela.

This is my fervent hope; that those who currently hold a privileged economic position will realize that justice and social stability demand that they lose some of their advantages in property, position and privilege, and that the government begins to take more effective and responsible measures to create jobs and improve the well-being of Venezuela's currently impoverished majority.

I pray for this every day, that through some collaboration between the government and its opposition, a solution can be attained, that will bring peace, but more importantly, peace only with JUSTICE.

The lesson of every revolution throughout history is that peace can't stably last without justice, as Pope Paul VI once said. But the lesson of many, many revolutions is just as much that justice doesn't automatically come about once you've overthrown an unjust system; in fact, that's exactly when the hard part really starts.

It's at that point that one's virtues are really called upon; it is after the Tyrant has been overthrown that one needs most to have hope that things will turn out better in the long run, wisdom to think deeply and plan the best methods, mercy towards one's opponents so as to not waste time, effort or worse, human life itself in pointless factional squabbles; and most of all the spirit of love, that one always remembers the ideal towards which we strive, the achievement of material sufficiency and spiritual fulfillment for all citizens.

Sincerely, Hector Dauphin-Gloire montonero22@hotmail.com Environmental Technician

<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela's Electronic News Posted: Friday, June 13, 2003 By: Jose Gregorio Pineda & Jose Gabriel Angarita

VenAmCham's Jose Gregorio Pineda (chief economist) and Jose Gabriel Angarita (economist) write:  On Thursday June 12 the National Assembly's Finance Committee authorized the 4.8 trillion bolivar public borrowing for which Finance Minister Tobias Nobrega asked for authorization on May 26. But before the Assembly took action the government made use of Article 80 of the Organic Financial Administration Act, according to which borrowing authorization requests are automatically approved due to "administrative silence" if no decision has been made within 10 days of submission.

The public borrowing policy pursued in the last several months comes as no surprise; it had been expected since the beginning of the year that the National Treasury would need to make major fiscal adjustments to meet its obligations in 2003, especially in view of the economic contraction's effects on non-oil revenue collections.

The rapid growth of Venezuelan public debt in recent years, the high cost at which money has been borrowed, and the debt's high concentration, can all undermine the maintenance of long-term financial solvency. The most important fiscal problem at this time is an issue of liquidity or flow of funds, but the way this liquidity problem has been addressed may lead to a solvency problem in the future, given the large and rapid growth of government debt's share of GDP. Consequently, the main risk facing public finance is that the only viable way to resolve a future solvency problem is to liquidate those liabilities through high inflation.

The Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) board has expressed its deep concern that the rapid growth of national debt could have an impact on fiscal sustainability and the absorption capacity of the domestic market ... and especially that of the banks ... because the recession forecast in the months to come will result in an even smaller demand for credit, leaving the banks with no other profitable option than purchase of high-yielding public securities.

All this could generate a situation of high risk in which the financial system's health would be tied to the evolution of internal public debt.