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Caracas — The Venezuelan government has fired 828 more employees from the state oil monopoly for participating in a two-month illegal strike aimed at ousting President Hugo Chavez, the company said Thursday.

The latest dismissals brought the total number dismissed to 17,871 — almost half the 38,000-member workforce at Petroleos de Venezuela S.A., a PDVSA spokesman said.

Most PDVSA workers, including management, joined the national strike to demand Chavez's resignation or early elections.

The stoppage paralyzed the world's fifth largest oil industry and cost Venezuela some $6-billion US. But the strike fizzled last month without achieving its goal.

Despite the reduced personnel, the government says it has restored crude oil production to prestrike levels of more than three million barrels a day. Fired executives say output is 2.4 million barrels a day.

Mr. Chavez has rejected pressure from the opposition and foreign governments to reincorporate the fired workers, saying they cannot be trusted to avoid illegal strikes in future. Many also participated in an April, 2002, walkout that helped trigger a short-lived coup.

The government also says it is taking advantage of the strike to reorganize PDVSA, reduce excess bureaucracy and increase government control over the company.

The strike was supported by the country's economic elite and many in the middle class who fear plans by Mr. Chavez to distribute more of Venezuela's wealth among its poor majority.

Miami Today News By Paola Iuspa

   While some financial institutions have stopped financing Argentine-bound exports, others are being creative to provide financing for Venezuelan-bound products.    Making loans to US exporters doing business with Argentina and Venezuela is being considered too risky because of those countries' continued economic and political turmoil during the past two years.    Argentina fell out of grace more than a year ago when it defaulted its foreign debt amidst a fiscal crisis that sent more than half of its population to below-poverty levels and government instability. Governed by a populist president, Venezuela's economy has been a victim of a series of national strikes, government opposition and new currency regulations limiting the access of US dollars to the country.    Carlos Milian, president and CEO of ImportCard Financial, a subsidiary of Hemisphere National Bank in Miami, said his firm three months ago stopped export-loan programs for Venezuelan customers.    "We were lucky," he said. "All of our Venezuelan customers paid us. We did not incur any loss."    His company was not so lucky in Argentina, he said, where at least three clients defaulted on loans.    "The climate there became worse," said Mr. Milian. "We had to pull out in 2001."    With about 95 exporters as customers, ImportCard provides 60-day credit lines to assist small- and mid-size companies.    Mr. Milian said the Export-Import Bank of the United States, or Ex-Im Bank, guarantees many of the loan programs available for other Latin American countries. But the Ex-Im bank is no longer operating in Argentina and Venezuela, reeling from double-digit negative growth, according to the bank.    "We are monitoring the situation in Argentina and Venezuela," said Jeffrey Miller, senior vice president for Ex-Im Bank's Export Finance division. "As soon as we see some changes, we will restart our programs."    While the Ex-Im Bank is closed for routine trade finance transactions, it will consider structured finance arrangements such as Ex-Im Bank's project finance program, asset-based aircraft leases and other financing that offers a reasonable assurance of repayment, including reliable access to adequate foreign exchange, Mr. Miller told a group of Miami entrepreneurs this year.    Ex-Im Bank's job is to finance exports, even in difficult times and difficult markets, to enable creditworthy national governments, municipalities and private-sector borrowers in emerging markets to buy goods and services from US exporters, according to the bank. Ex-Im Bank last year authorized more than $3 billion in financing for Latin America and the Caribbean last year.    Mr. Miller said last year Mexico was his bank's No. 1 market in the world, with $1.6 billion in authorizations. The federal agency guaranties private banks' export loans reducing the risk factor for the lending institutions.    Despite Ex-Im Bank's ceasing commercial-export loans to two South American nations, some banks are still providing financing for export transactions to Venezuela, but only when the loans are backed with private insurance. Those banks are lending money without government guarantees.    Alberto Valdes, heading The International Bank of Miami, said his firm still does business with Venezuela but analyzes each export transaction carefully before approving any export loans. He said customers with a long-standing relationship with his bank and able to provide private guarantees often get credits.    On the other hand, his bank has temporarily discontinued lending programs to Argentina-bound exports, said Mr. Valdes, also president of the Florida International Bankers Association, an industry advocate.    "Many banks are facing the same challenge," he said.    David Konfino, president of Union Planters Bank International, said his bank has open lines of credit for Argentina-bound exports, but only when exporters provide cash collateral or private insurance.    "In countries like Argentina and Venezuela we need to be more creative," he said. "We work with structured transactions. We look at each transaction and find a financing solution unique to each situation."    Mr. Miller said the outlook for the rest of Latin America is brighter.    Despite last year's depreciation of Brazil's currency, the economy grew by about 1% in 2002, a sharp contrast to the 13% and 10% declines for Argentina and Venezuela.    And in Central America, economists expect Mexico's gross domestic product to grow about 3.5%.    The Dominican Republic's economic growth is also expected to pick up after last year's global slowdown. Ex-Im Bank has supported efforts by the Mejia government to improve infrastructure, including housing, according to the federal bank.    "I hear many financial institutions are moving away from the international trade finance world," said John Zdanowicz, a professor of finance at Florida International University's College of Business Administration. "Some banks are refocusing away from Latin American trade financing. But it won't be like this forever."

<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela's Electronic News Posted: Tuesday, April 01, 2003 By: Patrick J. O'Donoghue

Interior & Justice (MIJ) Minister General (ret.) Lucas Rincon Romero has summonsed Sucre and Libertador mayors respectively to complain about the soaring homicide and crime rates in their jurisdictions. 

Rincon Romero has told both mayors that he wants to see a significant drop in  crime and more concern about public insecurity.

The Minister has announced he will use joint patrols consisting of police forces and the National Guard (GN) as well as the State Political & Security (DISIP) Police agents to beef up security, especially in Libertador municipality.

Critics reply that it is not enough and that the government has failed to draw up and propose a coherent public security plan.

PROVEA human rights group agrees that the government has neglected to enforce State policy in security matters ... "combined with the hike in crime, it shows the government's incapacity to exercise the monopoly of violence that puts governance at risk."

Jane's Intelligence Review Andrew Webb-Vidal

Two powerful bombs detonated in Caracas on 25 February in an unprecedented terrorist attack in Venezuela. The first left the Spanish embassy, in the La Castellana district, severely damaged. The second partially destroyed the Colombian consulate 2km away. Five people were injured in the explosions, but no one was killed.

For Venezuela, the so far unresolved incidents may signal the onset of a new, more violent, phase in the country's political conflict, with significant diplomatic ramifications.

Police say the blasts appeared to have been caused by C4 explosives, probably detonated by remote control or timers. Officers from the explosives unit of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services (DISIP) were on the scene within minutes and collected samples of the debris. However, over a month later they have yet to disclose the results of tests that might help identify the perpetrators.

At the scenes of both explosions pamphlets scattered by the two blasts referred to the 'urban militia' of the Bolivarian Force for Liberation (Fuerza Bolivariana de Liberación - FBL). The FBL is a little-known group based in the border states of Apure, Barinas and Táchira, and is alleged to receive logistical support from former officials in the government of President Hugo Chávez. The FBL is likely to have connections with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC).

The leaflets called for the expulsion from Venezuela of the US and Spanish ambassadors, and César Gaviria, a former Colombian president. He is now the secretary-general of the Organisation of American States (OAS), which is chairing talks between the Chávez government and opposition representatives. The US embassy also claimed to have received a security threat.

The bombings came less than two days after Chávez railed against the US and Spanish governments for siding with his opponents, who say that although elected, the former army officer is sliding towards authoritarianism. Washington and Madrid in turn criticised the previous week's detention of Carlos Fernández by the DISIP. Fernández is head of the Fedecamaras business chamber and, together with employees of state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and labour unions, co-led the strike in December and January.

These circumstances suggest the two bombs could have been planted by Chávez sympathisers. Analysts have speculated that sympathisers may have instigated the explosions in an effort to heighten existing tensions, and drive Chávez and his opponents further apart. Confidence in the authorities' ability, or willingness, to capture the perpetrators was undermined after the interior minister, General Lucas Rincón, said Chávez's assertion that investigators already had photographs of the suspects was untrue.

On the other hand, diplomats say that because the bombings do not obviously benefit Chávez, they may be the work of those aiming to discredit him internationally by associating him with terrorist actions. Those responsible could therefore be linked to dissident military officers, some of whom would also have experience of handling explosives.

The bombings occurred in the context of three key developments: deteriorating diplomatic relations with Colombia; the increased strength of Chávez relative to his opponents; and what appears to be the onset of a more aggressive foreign policy strategy from the US administration.

Shortly before the blasts, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's government stepped up its public criticism of Venezuela's 'ineffectiveness' in patrolling its border. It insisted that there are FARC training camps and combatants on Venezuelan territory. The Colombian military, and Venezuela's opposition, have long accused Chávez of harbouring ideological sympathies with the FARC, and suspected that a mutual non-aggression pact was agreed at the beginning of his presidency in 1999.

However, the accusations clearly mark a new, more forceful stance by Bogotá. Colombia's interior minister, Fernando Londoño Hoyos, directly accused Chávez of meeting frequently with FARC rebels, prompting Chávez to ask whether diplomatic ties with Bogotá should be severed. The accusations went further, as other Colombian officials claimed that FARC chief Manuel Marulanda was hiding in Venezuela. Uribe, who said his government will pursue the FARC "across borders" if necessary, has also begun to press Chávez into signing an agreement on joint anti-guerrilla operations by the military in border areas, something the Venezuelan president has refused to do for the past two years.

In response to the increased pressure from Colombia, Venezuela's army commander, General Jorge García Carneiro, said that allegations of a FARC presence in Venezuela were untrue, and that the army would repel any guerrillas or paramilitaries that crossed the border. "Neither the army, nor the armed forces in general, are going to let anyone use Venezuela as a hideout, and much less for irregular forces," he said. "The day Marulanda or any other irregular crosses the border, he is going to get a firm response from our military." Almost simultaneously, nine members of the FARC's 10th front were captured in the Venezuelan state of Apure, suggesting the Venezuelan authorities have reliable information on the location of at least some FARC fighters.

Being caught protecting international terrorists may indeed be the last thing on Chávez's mind, however, as he faces a range of serious problems that look set to exacerbate social and political tensions.

Due to the unprecedented collapse in oil production as a result of the strike, analysts expect Venezuela's economy to contract by some 20% this year, the sharpest contraction on record, bringing an increase in unemployment and poverty. Oil output has been recovering, and government officials say daily production has climbed back up to 3m barrels, the volume it was at before the strike. However, former PDVSA managers say daily output is at around 2m barrels, and levels are unlikely to surpass an average of about 2.4m barrels during the year.

Venezuela's economic woes have been compounded by the government's decision to implement foreign exchange controls, after regular sales of dollars from the central bank were suspended in January due to the rapid decline in international reserves as a result of the strike in the vital oil industry. The government has since said it will tightly control which businesses receive hard currency for essential imports, hitting companies already reeling after the strike.

Concerns are also growing that the Chávez government has begun a retaliatory crackdown against the strike's organisers for 'sabotaging' the economy, just as the government's human rights record is beginning to be challenged publicly in international forums. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), part of the OAS, said the government was not doing enough to prevent armed groups from intimidating opponents. The IACHR estimates that, between March 2002 and January 2003, 'extreme political polarisation' and violence between government and opposition supporters had left 40 people dead and more than 750 wounded.

In February, Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged the Venezuelan government to investigate the murder of four opposition supporters. The bodies of three junior military staff and a civilian who had joined dissident officers pressing for Chávez's resignation were found dumped on a roadside outside Caracas. "The circumstances strongly suggest that these were political killings," said José Miguel Vivanco, executive director of HRW's Americas Division. Shortly after the arrest of Carlos Fernández, Carlos Ortega, leader of the main labour confederation and a co-leader of the strike, went into hiding, claiming that government officials were planning to kill him. Ortega has since been granted diplomatic asylum by Costa Rica, and other key figures involved in the strike have also since gone 'underground'.

Reinforcing the gathering international concerns, Gen Hill told the US Senate Armed Services Committee in March that, in the wake of the strike, Chávez's "actions may portend a move toward greater authoritarianism. In my mind, that bears watching very carefully. I have directed my people to do that."

Fresh speculation over unease in sectors of the Venezuelan military has also surfaced in recent weeks, with reports that a group of active senior-ranking Venezuelan officers strongly opposed to Chávez had been 'in close contact' with US officials.

Diplomats are waiting to see whether Chávez will accept a referendum on his mandate after August, the mid-point of his term.

Chávez could find himself at the blunt end of a more aggressive US foreign policy in which war in Iraq was but the opening salvo, with Washington poised to intervene to pre-empt perceived threats from terrorism, or act against governments deemed to be 'tolerant' on terrorism.

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<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela Electronic News Posted: Thursday, March 27, 2003 By: Robert Rudnicki

According to Executive Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel, the government is now ready to sign an agreement to hold a revocatory referendum which could be held as soon as August, mid  way through President Hugo Chavez Frias' presidential term, as set out in the current Constitution.

However, Rangel insists that should the President lose the referendum then he would have the right to defend himself by standing in the general elections that would follow.

Although Rangel says the government has not actually agreed to sign such an agreement "there are no obstacles preventing it." As for the date of the possible vote, the Vice President says that this wouldn't be included in the agreement.