The magical agreement

El Universal, Executive Daily News & Summary Alberto Garrido

As Enrique Mendoza, a leader of opposition umbrella group Democratic Coordinator, said it: "I think that some people were waiting for some kind of magical agreement, but we have to put our feet firmly on the ground when negotiating (a pact)." Asked about the date when a referendum to revoke president Hugo Chávez' mandate may be held, Mendoza said that the National Electoral Council (CNE) could change it, "because the law authorizes them to do so. CNE determines the deadlines and time required for activities related to any electoral process. So I think we have to be a little bit rational." Mendoza has his feet firmly on the ground. Some members of the Democratic Coordinator have announced that the recall referendum is to be held on August 19, while others have said that it would be made 90 days later, "in accordance with the law."

More than a year ago, on April 2002, Hugo Chávez defined Venezuela's current scenario. In the event that the country decided to have a referendum, the vote to terminate the president's mandate would be the last one to be held -elections to revoke the mandates of governors and mayors would had to be made first. Chávez later made clear that the agreement reached by the Negotiation and Agreement Table, which he claimed was a "political victory" for the Bolivarian revolution, would not automatically lead to "his" recall referendum. According to Chávez, for holding "his" recall referendum, a new CNE's board of directors must be elected, a new electoral register must be created, new signatures requesting the vote must be gathered, and the new signatures collected must be reviewed -just to begin with. Subsequently, other revoking votes may be conducted.

Chávez, as usual, has clear tactics. The Democratic Coordinator expects him to oppose to the revoking referendum, as this would be a good ground for the opposition to demand both the National Armed Force and the international agencies to intervene in the country's affairs. But Chávez will not oppose. Holding his Constitution in hand, he will manage to get a turtle to look like a hare.

Time for political bureaucrats is not time for a process that has to walk through the path of hegemony by destroying the political, economic, and social status quo in order to earn the qualification of revolution,. Besides, the Bolivarian revolution has to move fast, as the United States is creating a new list of priorities in its global war and is making its calculations based on the oil Chávez is -for the moment- selling to Washington.

Meanwhile, jobless people in Venezuela shall wither on the vine; the streets shall permanently belong to homeless children; poor patients will end up in the graveyard; shortages of basic items will be the rule; Colombia will no longer be just a reference about any kind of crimes; university professors will resort to barter by using the bonds handed to them as a compensation; mass media will no more be the media but the end of communication, and so on.

This is the third scenario of the national reality, which goes beyond the agreements signed by the government and opposition groups.

The revoking referendum is a commitment between Hugo Chávez' administration and the Democratic Coordinator. That is true. It should be held in a peaceful and democratic way. That is desirable. The Democratic Coordinator should fight so that the voting is held as soon as possible. That is its duty. The problem is that, beyond good intentions, a real revolution has never existed within the framework of a representative democracy. Agreements, as Mendoza said, are not magical.

Translated by Patricia Torres