Kirchner's Military Solution for Argentina
By Marcella Sanchez Subscribe to The Post Special to <a href=www.washingtonpost.com>washingtonpost.com Thursday, June 5, 2003; 10:00 PM
After winning an election in which the other candidate simply didn't show up, Nestor C. Kirchner wasted no time last week asserting his new powers as president of Argentina. Barely three days into his term, he forced the resignation of at least half of the military high command by naming loyal but low-ranking generals to head the armed forces.
It was a dramatic and unparalleled action that seemed likely to open old wounds in a country already in need of invasive surgery to repair massive economic and political ills. And it left many here scratching their heads. With an economy that contracted almost 11 percent last year, reining in the military isn't the highest priority, especially considering that the reputation of Argentina's military has been slowly recovering from the abuses and excesses of the past.
While the rationale for Kirchner's decree was unclear, Washington did not lack opinions about its possible consequences.
Human rights groups promptly welcomed it as an essential move to reaffirm military subordination to civilian authority. They hoped too that ultimately it would lead to the end of impunity for officers responsible for the atrocities of the "dirty war,: which led to the deaths or disappearance of nearly 9,000 Argentines during the 1970s and 1980s.
U.S. military officers and experts, on the other hand, feared it would reverse years of efforts to reform Argentina's armed forces. If those replaced were ousted because they were too close to Kirchner's opponents or because they were too interested in influencing judicial decisions against former military abusers, Kirchner has simply traded one kind of politicization for another. He would be sending military officers the message that cozying up to him will protect their jobs.
Both of those views, however, seem caught up in a distant and less relevant past. Kirchner, a little-known provincial governor from the south, was not seeking break from that past or even bring it back. His speeches last week suggest instead a plan to build a new military for the future. He seems to envision a military with civic roles in ways comparable to those of the U.S. National Guard or the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Kirchner arguably faces the most daunting reconstruction task of any Latin American leader. He may be joining the ranks of cash-strapped counterparts who have found in the military the only cheap, quick and obedient institution at hand to help implement urgent development priorities. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez already has tried it. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva plans to try it, too.
While the Bush adminstration has remained mostly silent about Kirchner's action, U.S. officials have spoken out in favor of military involvement in non-military activities for more than a decade, particularly encouraging increased roles in fighting drug trafficking.
Even after launching its global war on terrorism, Washington has continued, and in some instances increased funding for, the U.S. Southern Command's participation in joint civic operations with Latin American counterparts to build schools and roads, and provide health care and other services. Locals often view such programs suspiciously, yet some Latin American governments may now integrate them into comprehensive development strategies.
This would reverse a trend of the past decade. The end of dictatorships and internal conflict in several Latin American countries in the 1980s and 1990s led democratic governments to marginalize and strip the ranks and budgets of their militaries. Add to that the current economic woes and present day military leaders would only be too glad to take new orders--even orders not exactly in line with their traditional missions--as a new meal ticket.
Such transitions into traditionally civilian government functions are not without risk. Those who applauded Kirchner's move as progressive, or criticized it for politicizing the armed forces, would probably agree that a plan to call up military support with no clear strategy to call it off would be troublesome. Soldiers trained to kill are not ideal conscripts for civic duties--duties that, by the way, make them more vulnerable to patronage and corruption.
What's more, drafting them for non-military functions could detract from their primary security mission. Some U.S. military analysts say that is already happening in Venezuela where Chavez, a former army colonel, has practically turned the military into an all-purpose institution at the service of his government, while leaving Venezuela's borders susceptible to incursions by Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries.
In a country with Argentina's history, any proposed change in the role of the military mandates serious public debate, especially at a time when economic woes are likely to make labor unions and private businesses wary of potential jobs and opportunities lost under such an arrangement.
Kirchner has quickly shown that as president, he indeed is commander in chief. But he'll need much more than loyal military leaders to turn his armed forces into an effective, legitimate and progressive tool for his government.
Marcela Sanchez's e-mail address is desdewash(at symbol)washpost.com.