Now or Never For Chavez's Foes

The Washington Post Friday, May 30, 2003; 7:15 AM

The long-sought beginning of the end of President Hugo Chavez's "Bolivarian revolution" is at hand. On Thursday, Chavez's government signed a plan brokered by the Organization of American States that could conclude his contentious reign by December.

The agreement, which some liken to a virtual suicide pact for the Venezuelan president, requires Chavez to submit to a binding referendum on his tenure. If he loses the referendum and is then not allowed on the ballot in a new presidential election, he will be out of office halfway through his current term. That is, if Chavez intends to comply and not simply use the agreement to dupe the international community into going away and further weaken his already battered opponents.

U.S. officials and others in the international community--as well as the Venezuelan opposition--say they will press Chavez relentlessly to abide by the outcome of the agreed-upon "electoral exit." And so they should. But this time they should really be careful not to overplay their hand.

With Chavez's political end in sight, the temptation for the opposition will be to denigrate anything and everything that he represents. But such actions risk alienating his supporters and ignore the opposition's own end of the bargain, which in both cases could help Chavez survive or give him an excuse to withdraw from the agreement.

Disillusioned with politicians that ignored their plight for years, millions of Venezuelans turned to Chavez and his promise to end the cruel irony of dirt-poor life in an oil-rich land. On these sentiments alone, Chavez remains popular among the disaffected. Personalizing opposition to him or offering little to the poor directly will cement their commitment to Chavez.

According to the agreement, the opposition must refrain from actions that may incite more violence, and also concentrate efforts to ensure that the media will play an impartial role in the events to come. Any backtracking by the opposition or Chavez will only make things worse for the country now.

The Bush administration's policy on Venezuela has caromed clumsily between two regrettable extremes: benign neglect and diplomatic blunder. More recently, it seems to be echoing the Venezuelan opposition's doubts that Chavez will stick to the plan if he believes he may not come out victorious.

With that in mind, some observers outside the administration have begun to suggest threatening an oil boycott to keep him from balking. After all, the thinking goes, the United States is Venezuela's No. 1 customer, and as such carries one "big stick" to pummel Chavez into compliance.

But so far there is no indication the Bush administration is considering such an ill-advised tactic that would mostly hurt those Venezuelans already at the bottom, those who already suspect that Washington never fully trusted their ballots democratically cast for Chavez.

Viewed from here, their situation has hardly improved under Chavez. His social vision had merit, yet after more than four years in office, often appearing more concerned with antagonizing his enemies than with governing, he has strayed far from the path of responding to popular needsand discontent.

Chavez has presided over the worst economic contraction in his nation's history. Last Friday, Venezuela's Central Bank reported a 29 percent drop in the country's gross domestic product during the first quarter of this year. At its worst, Argentina's GDP dropped 20 percent in four years.

A great measure of the blame also falls on the shoulders of the opposition that organized a destructive strike at the end of last year aimed at forcing Chavez out, regardless of the economic cost to the country. With elections imminent, now is the time for the opposition to prove that it stands for something and not just against Chavez.

Opposition forces have begun efforts to gain ground among Chavez's supporters and to show commitment to a social agenda. Yet the initial, tragic results have only proved the complications of the task. One person died and many others were injured during a rally organized by one opposition party last weekend in a Caracas slum.

Ironically, the first phase of Chavez's "electoral exit" may be the easier one for the opposition--winning the referendum. A scant 30 days later, opposition forces would then have to unite behind a candidate. If they fail, and if Chavez gets on the ballot through Supreme Court intervention, the opposition's actions might prove to be its own undoing. This week's agreement then would have been merely a beginning with no end in sight.

Marcela Sanchez's e-mail address is desdewash(at symbol)washpost.com.