Politics & Culture: An anthropological perspective on Venezuela's political confrontation
<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela's Electronic News Posted: Sunday, May 11, 2003 By: Joel Pozarnik
VHeadline guest commentarist Joel Pozarnik writes: The Venezuelan society is highly divided. It can be compared to the divisions of the French society during the Affaire Dreyfus, at the beginning of the 20th century. People have lost their own identity. They are no longer “Juan” or “Luis”, but only “Chavista” or “Anti-Chavista”” complains Dr. Manuel Barroso, a specialist of the Venezuelan culture. Families are divided. Some children blackmail their parents with not allowing their children to see their grandfathers again if those latter do not change their political opinion.
Since the beginning of the democratic period in 1958, the dominant Venezuelan culture has always been political. However, the political debate has not always been so tense. As I will try to suggest in this article, one of the causes of this division might be found in the strategies followed by President Hugo Chavez to control the ideational resources.
A second reason might be found in the images and representations that each political group has of itself and its opponents.
A third reason can be found in the presence of a profound culture of mistreatment within the Venezuelan society.
Both political groups claim to be antagonistic, and however, they behave quite similarly because they are inserted in the same culture. Finally, I will try to suggest that the actual political confrontation might be playing a very positive role in the emergence of a different culture in the country.
Political anthropologist Donald Kurtz mentions that “political power (…) derives fundamentally from the control of resources” and those resources can be subsumed “under material (tangible, human) and ideational (ideological, symbolic, informational) resources.”
Because he wants to be “the voice of the poor”, the Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez Frias cannot count on a strong tangible and economic support to remain in power. Since 1998, capital flight to foreign countries is sometimes evaluated up to US$35 billion ... that might be why he has devoted time and effort to control ideational resources ... “Ideational resources help leaders to convince others of the legitimacy of their authority and enhance (their) abilities to acquire additional material resources” also comments Donald Kurtz.
"Ideational" has been used by Kurtz, as a synthetic concept to designate ideology + symbolism + information. (Political Anthropology, D. Kurz, Westview Press, 2001)
A political ideology ... the first aspect of ideational resources ... can be described as a “system of hypotheses, principles, and postulates that justify the exercise of authority and power, assert social values and moral and ethical principles, set forth causal connections between leaders and the people they govern, and furnish guides for action," adds Daniel Kurtz.
President Chavez Frias claims to be inspired by the ideas of Simon Bolivar, Ezequiel Zamora and Simon Rodriguez, who belong to the glorious past of the Venezuelan nation. However, his agenda is modern and refers mainly to the anti-globalization issues, the economy being at the service of mankind in contrast with the “salvage neo-liberalism,” the representative and participative democracy in contrast with the dictatorship of political parties (“partidocracia” and “cogollocracia”), the right of the indigenous people and the use of land. He has labeled his movement as a “peaceful and armed revolution.”
It means that it is based on an alliance between part of the civil society and the military, so that a legal and institutional process within an ideological concept of non-violence can at the same time be strong enough to resist to any undemocratic attempts to stop it.
The use of the term “revolution” is not new in the Venezuelan history ... Delia Da Silva Nunez mentions at least 9 political movements called revolution since 1830. A political symbol, the second aspect of ideational resources “may be anything in the social and physical environments that helps to convince people to follow and support a leader or leadership structure.(…)(They) may establish and maintain a leader’s identity and intentions,” mentions Donald Kurtz.
President Hugo Chavez Frias uses very few visible symbols and he dresses differently according to the circumstances: he might use the red beret, reminiscent of the beret used by Che Guevara ... or a military uniform ... as a sign of power. He can dress in a very formal costume and tie, or in an informal, casual and sometimes folkloric way (The “liki-liki”). His symbolic image might consist of dressing like almost anybody else ... despite the fact that he is the President.
The informational strategy, the third aspect of ideational resources, both includes and produces knowledge. Hugo Chavez has become the “teacher” of his people. Through the Sunday program “Hello President” (“Alo Presidente!”), he explains, in simple terms, complex political, economic, social and international issues. He uses appropriate style and language to get the message understood by the 14-16 millions people who live in the slums (“barrios”). The middle class generally feels frustrated by this kind of communication because it uses other types of communication codes.
There is no doubt that in those program and in mass concentrations, President Hugo Chavez is a passionate orator, able to win the hearts and minds of his followers ... however, he can also speak in a much more sophisticated manner according to the audience. He has become the only credible channel able to transmit political, social and economic knowledge to the bulk of the population.
Before 1998, the Venezuelan population was attended by politicians mainly only during electoral periods ... they were sometimes offered some kind of material compensation for their vote. It seems that now, they are “educated” every Sunday by their “teacher,” the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela ... which might be interpreted, in itself, as a demonstration of care and respect.
By doing so, Chavez Frias himself has become a symbol. Leaders can become powerful symbols and embody the values and ideals of a political community. First of all, because he is a descendant of “Maisanta” ... a revolutionary leader of the past ... President Hugo Chavez Frias personally embodies the war against colonialism. Because he personally led the failed “coup d’etat” against President Carlos Andres Perez and his neo-liberal politics, he also embodies the fight of a people against foreign economic interests.
Surveys realized after the “coup d'etat” shows that 80% of the population was backing him ... and this event was then called “The Rebellion of the Angels” by author Angela Zago. Furthermore, the Presidents of the democratic era belonged in some way to the white European ethnic group, who was economically, politically and ideologically dominant in the country.
Hugo Chavez Frias belongs ethnically to the Black and Indian communities, who constitute the vast majority of the population ... and its poorest sectors. When addressing them, his generous and idealistic ideas, his capacity to generate “abundant emotions,” his sense of humor (“chispa criolla”), his popular expressions and his claims for social justice, reflect the life, the way of being and the aspirations of an important part of the population. He is not the first President to use numerous popular expressions: President Luis Herrera Campins (1978-1982) also used to mention expressions from the region called Los Llanos.
The problem is that the ideational resources, for their own nature, do not favor conciliation as much as tangible resources do. Through clientelism, the State was used to satisfy people from all political parties, because economic interest can always be managed in an appropriate way to smooth political differences. But in the ideational field, the individuals are challenged not only in their superficial material interests, but also in their profound conscious and unconscious beliefs, fears, representations, hopes and systems of values. Reactions might thus be much more radical in favor or against the proposed ideas.
By focusing on ideational resources, Hugo Chavez Frias has opened the gate to a highly emotional confrontation within the Venezuelan society. However, it might be legitimate to ask why the tensions have gone so far ... some economic interests have certainly been fragmented by some new policies ... but the anthropological point of view seems to suggest that the tensions the tensions also come from the antagonist and unrealistic representations and images each political side maintains of itself and “the others”.
The “Chavistas" see themselves as the “people” (“El pueblo”) ... the vast majority of the Venezuelan population ... in contrast with “The very few” (“Los Escualidos”) from the opposition. They even call themselves the “anti-few” (“Los Anti-Escualidos”), meaning that they define themselves in a clear opposition to the rest of the society.
However, social and political realities are more complex ... their social base is effectively made of unemployed and under-employed people which are the vast majority of the Venezuelan population. But President Chavez Frias has only been elected with 56.5% of the votes in December 1998 and his political alliance holds only a slim majority of seats in the National Assembly (AN). This difference between their perception of being an overwhelming majority and the real relation of political forces, might explain why they might tended to underestimate the force of their political opponents.
They describe their opponents as a corrupt oligarchy and middle class that have robbed the oil revenues from “the people” to their own particular benefits. Consequently, “the people” has to take the power and to fight against them if social justice has to come in the country.
Here again, realities are more complex ... even if corruption has plagued the society in general, the Venezuelan oligarchy has almost disappeared in the globalization movement. Most economic groups have sold their companies to foreign companies and sent their money abroad. The middle class is passing through a process of impoverishment and is now unable to reproduce the standard of living of the past generation. This tendency to name a scapegoat for the poor economic performance might hide some important obstacles to the economic development, that are to be found in the very culture, all across the society.
The “Anti-Chavistas” describe themselves as the “democrats.” They use expressions such as “Full liberty” (“Libertad Plena”) to name the organization in charge of their communications via email. One of their political associations is called “Democratic Coordination” (“Coordinadora Democratica”). Once more, realities are more complex.
Some of them have clearly participated and supported the “coup d’etat” in April 2002 and the so-called “general strike” of December 2002- January 2003. In fact, in a country that was still a dictatorship 45 years ago, democracy is still not yet a cultural conviction ... and particularly among the economic elite. That might be the reason why they have also overestimated their capacity to mobilize an electorate that has serious doubts about their democratic vocation.
They describe the President as a “communist” and a “dictator” and his supporters as “hooligans”, “chavistas hordes” (“hordas Chavistas”), “delinquents” (“delicuentes”), “scruffy” (“zarapastrosos”, “chusma”) and “killers” (“asesinos”). Some of them live in permanent fear that the “Chavistas” will one day come to kill them and to take their property away from them.
Once again, realities are more complex ... if the followers of President Chavez Frias are to be found in the poor rural and urban sectors of the population, some of his loyalists are also to be found in the middle class, the intellectuals and some productive sectors, while his opponents of the economic sector tend to belong to the import sector. Furthermore, some of his economic policies have been classical if not liberal, and the political situation in Venezuela has sometimes been much closer to a certain kind of anarchy than to a dictatorship ... this difference between the perception of their opponents and reality might explain their failure to gather sufficient support to bolt President Chavez Frias out of power.
In fact, in terms of images and representations, both sides are closer than they might imagine, because they belong to the same culture. Both have made an extensive use of the Venezuelan flag as a demonstration of their common pretext to represent and defend the interests of the country.
T-shirts, socks, shoes have appeared with the colors of the Venezuelan flag ... that might be a first cultural new trend generated by this confrontation ... Dr. Manuel Barroso considers that since the beginning of the democratic era, Venezuelan society had shown no strong interest for the State and the national interests.
The 80s generation was called the “stupid generation” (“generacion boba”) for its sole interest in material goods and superficial entertainment ... everything was about individual interests. It is almost the first time in modern history that the Venezuelan people seem to be identified with a larger national community. Even if it is still in a superficial manner, the movement might open the gate to new attitudes as responsible citizenship. Nationalism was basically a glorification of the past ... it might become a capacity to “assume ourselves as we really are,” to work for the common wealth, through education, health services, education, work, housing, personal security.
Both sides present very similar attitudes, because they represent themselves as the saviors of the nation, and the other as a danger that has to be dominated or even, eliminated.
The representation of the other, as somebody that must be treated in a harsh way, is very profound in the Venezuelan nature ... according to Dr. Manuel Barroso who comments that “the Venezuelan culture is a mixture of different ways of thinking and behaving that could be resumed in three main characteristics: the culture of lack of care, mistreatment (“maltrato”) and ignorance. All these generating a culture of poor self-esteem, also called the culture of exclusion (“marginalidad”).
Interpersonal relations are plagued with mistreatment at home, at school, university, work and also in the political system. An example of mistreatment and disqualification in the political sphere is to be found in in a short three column article published in “La Razon” where President Chavez is described as a “psychopath” and a “clown.” The “peaceful revolution” is called “rob-olution.” The General Attorney, Dr. Isaias Rodriguez ex Vice-President of the Venezuelan Bolivarian Republic, is qualified as “ignorant of the law” and as an “atrociously ridiculous” “lapdog.” The President of the state oil company, Dr. Ali Rodriguez Araque, ex General Secretary of OPEC, is called “Ali Baba” and is described as “robbing public funds with impudence and greed.” Another example is to be found in the pejorative way President Hugo Chavez Frias has referred to the population living in the residential areas of Caracas.
“Dialogue we need and dialogue we miss in the private and public spheres … there cannot be dialogue in a culture of low self-esteem, in a culture of exclusion” Dr. Manuel Barroso comments.
In fact, the confrontation might not only be political but also cultural ... “cultural creation and the formation of consciousness are political processes” linked to an “historical process and to class structures and relationships” comments William Roseburry.
The actual confrontation within Venezuelan society is not changing the dominant culture in the sense that it was, and still is, political. However, if an emergent culture is to include elements of the past that have been excluded, and to give new meaning to elements that have not be excluded, political confrontation might engender a new cultural reality.
“Chavismo” is trying to replace the North American cultural influence by national and holistic values, representative democracy by participative democracy, the growth of the country by the growth of its inhabitants, urban development by rural development, imports by national production, lack of self-esteem by the belief in the empowerment of the people, an admiration for foreign countries by a faith in their own country, the protection of corporatist interests by the protection of the interests of the people, the culture of exclusion by a more republican-type integration.
Along with an economic, political and social process of changes, “Chavismo” has challenged the dominant culture through new ideational resources, images and representations. It has generated violent and emotional reactions of approval and rejection. It has introduced an ideological debate in a commercial and materialistic society, as well as a “tender care” for the poor, in an individualistic society.
However, “Chavistas” and “Anti-Chavistas” are similar when they both maintain important gaps between their own images and representations, and the political reality on the ground. They have increased the common interest for the nation, as well as the political component of the Venezuelan culture. They both have remained prisoner of the Venezuelan culture of mistreatment, exclusion, ascription (“Amiguismo-compadrazgo”), imitation (“Copismo”) and facility (“Facilismo”).
Was it really avoidable?
Will they succeed to avoid it in the future?
...it might well be their common challenge.
Joel Pozarnik is the founder and director of Intelego, an independent risk management company specialized in Latin America. He is a researcher and consultant dedicated to the political, economic, social and cultural understanding of Venezuela. A graduate of the ESSEC French Business School; MSc. of LSE in Comparative Politics (Latin America); and The London University in Social Anthropology. He is starting a Doctorate in Political Science at the Institute of Advanced Latin American Studies (La Sorbonne). A native of Paris (France), he had residence in Venezuela 1982-2000 working with international companies for 10 years and in consultancy for 8 years on issues management, market analysis and organizational structure. He was general manager of the Venezuelan French Chamber of Commerce (1990-1992), and general secretary to the Federation of European Chambers of Commerce in Venezuela (FEDEUROPA). He is currently a member of the Issue Management Council (USA) and has published around 30 articles. You may email Joel Pozarnik at intelego@hotmail.com