Embassy bombs mark new phase in Venezuelan crisis
Jane's Intelligence Review Andrew Webb-Vidal
Two powerful bombs detonated in Caracas on 25 February in an unprecedented terrorist attack in Venezuela. The first left the Spanish embassy, in the La Castellana district, severely damaged. The second partially destroyed the Colombian consulate 2km away. Five people were injured in the explosions, but no one was killed.
For Venezuela, the so far unresolved incidents may signal the onset of a new, more violent, phase in the country's political conflict, with significant diplomatic ramifications.
Police say the blasts appeared to have been caused by C4 explosives, probably detonated by remote control or timers. Officers from the explosives unit of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services (DISIP) were on the scene within minutes and collected samples of the debris. However, over a month later they have yet to disclose the results of tests that might help identify the perpetrators.
At the scenes of both explosions pamphlets scattered by the two blasts referred to the 'urban militia' of the Bolivarian Force for Liberation (Fuerza Bolivariana de Liberación - FBL). The FBL is a little-known group based in the border states of Apure, Barinas and Táchira, and is alleged to receive logistical support from former officials in the government of President Hugo Chávez. The FBL is likely to have connections with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - FARC).
The leaflets called for the expulsion from Venezuela of the US and Spanish ambassadors, and César Gaviria, a former Colombian president. He is now the secretary-general of the Organisation of American States (OAS), which is chairing talks between the Chávez government and opposition representatives. The US embassy also claimed to have received a security threat.
The bombings came less than two days after Chávez railed against the US and Spanish governments for siding with his opponents, who say that although elected, the former army officer is sliding towards authoritarianism. Washington and Madrid in turn criticised the previous week's detention of Carlos Fernández by the DISIP. Fernández is head of the Fedecamaras business chamber and, together with employees of state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and labour unions, co-led the strike in December and January.
These circumstances suggest the two bombs could have been planted by Chávez sympathisers. Analysts have speculated that sympathisers may have instigated the explosions in an effort to heighten existing tensions, and drive Chávez and his opponents further apart. Confidence in the authorities' ability, or willingness, to capture the perpetrators was undermined after the interior minister, General Lucas Rincón, said Chávez's assertion that investigators already had photographs of the suspects was untrue.
On the other hand, diplomats say that because the bombings do not obviously benefit Chávez, they may be the work of those aiming to discredit him internationally by associating him with terrorist actions. Those responsible could therefore be linked to dissident military officers, some of whom would also have experience of handling explosives.
The bombings occurred in the context of three key developments: deteriorating diplomatic relations with Colombia; the increased strength of Chávez relative to his opponents; and what appears to be the onset of a more aggressive foreign policy strategy from the US administration.
Shortly before the blasts, Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's government stepped up its public criticism of Venezuela's 'ineffectiveness' in patrolling its border. It insisted that there are FARC training camps and combatants on Venezuelan territory. The Colombian military, and Venezuela's opposition, have long accused Chávez of harbouring ideological sympathies with the FARC, and suspected that a mutual non-aggression pact was agreed at the beginning of his presidency in 1999.
However, the accusations clearly mark a new, more forceful stance by Bogotá. Colombia's interior minister, Fernando Londoño Hoyos, directly accused Chávez of meeting frequently with FARC rebels, prompting Chávez to ask whether diplomatic ties with Bogotá should be severed. The accusations went further, as other Colombian officials claimed that FARC chief Manuel Marulanda was hiding in Venezuela. Uribe, who said his government will pursue the FARC "across borders" if necessary, has also begun to press Chávez into signing an agreement on joint anti-guerrilla operations by the military in border areas, something the Venezuelan president has refused to do for the past two years.
In response to the increased pressure from Colombia, Venezuela's army commander, General Jorge García Carneiro, said that allegations of a FARC presence in Venezuela were untrue, and that the army would repel any guerrillas or paramilitaries that crossed the border. "Neither the army, nor the armed forces in general, are going to let anyone use Venezuela as a hideout, and much less for irregular forces," he said. "The day Marulanda or any other irregular crosses the border, he is going to get a firm response from our military." Almost simultaneously, nine members of the FARC's 10th front were captured in the Venezuelan state of Apure, suggesting the Venezuelan authorities have reliable information on the location of at least some FARC fighters.
Being caught protecting international terrorists may indeed be the last thing on Chávez's mind, however, as he faces a range of serious problems that look set to exacerbate social and political tensions.
Due to the unprecedented collapse in oil production as a result of the strike, analysts expect Venezuela's economy to contract by some 20% this year, the sharpest contraction on record, bringing an increase in unemployment and poverty. Oil output has been recovering, and government officials say daily production has climbed back up to 3m barrels, the volume it was at before the strike. However, former PDVSA managers say daily output is at around 2m barrels, and levels are unlikely to surpass an average of about 2.4m barrels during the year.
Venezuela's economic woes have been compounded by the government's decision to implement foreign exchange controls, after regular sales of dollars from the central bank were suspended in January due to the rapid decline in international reserves as a result of the strike in the vital oil industry. The government has since said it will tightly control which businesses receive hard currency for essential imports, hitting companies already reeling after the strike.
Concerns are also growing that the Chávez government has begun a retaliatory crackdown against the strike's organisers for 'sabotaging' the economy, just as the government's human rights record is beginning to be challenged publicly in international forums. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), part of the OAS, said the government was not doing enough to prevent armed groups from intimidating opponents. The IACHR estimates that, between March 2002 and January 2003, 'extreme political polarisation' and violence between government and opposition supporters had left 40 people dead and more than 750 wounded.
In February, Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged the Venezuelan government to investigate the murder of four opposition supporters. The bodies of three junior military staff and a civilian who had joined dissident officers pressing for Chávez's resignation were found dumped on a roadside outside Caracas. "The circumstances strongly suggest that these were political killings," said José Miguel Vivanco, executive director of HRW's Americas Division. Shortly after the arrest of Carlos Fernández, Carlos Ortega, leader of the main labour confederation and a co-leader of the strike, went into hiding, claiming that government officials were planning to kill him. Ortega has since been granted diplomatic asylum by Costa Rica, and other key figures involved in the strike have also since gone 'underground'.
Reinforcing the gathering international concerns, Gen Hill told the US Senate Armed Services Committee in March that, in the wake of the strike, Chávez's "actions may portend a move toward greater authoritarianism. In my mind, that bears watching very carefully. I have directed my people to do that."
Fresh speculation over unease in sectors of the Venezuelan military has also surfaced in recent weeks, with reports that a group of active senior-ranking Venezuelan officers strongly opposed to Chávez had been 'in close contact' with US officials.
Diplomats are waiting to see whether Chávez will accept a referendum on his mandate after August, the mid-point of his term.
Chávez could find himself at the blunt end of a more aggressive US foreign policy in which war in Iraq was but the opening salvo, with Washington poised to intervene to pre-empt perceived threats from terrorism, or act against governments deemed to be 'tolerant' on terrorism.
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