Venezuela’s disarray invites Washington to play a larger role

<a href=www.vheadline.com>Venezuela Electronic News Posted: Tuesday, March 25, 2003 By: Manuel Rueda

International affairs commentarist Manuel Rueda writes: On the 10th of March, Acting Assistant US Secretary of State J. Curtis Struble met with diplomats from Brazil Mexico, Chile, Portugal and Spain, in Brasilia to discuss the prospects for an electoral solution to Venezuela's simmering political crisis ... delegates from Venezuela’s government and opposition presented starkly different accounts of the crisis, as they vied for support for their electoral proposals.

Over the past few weeks, both sides have certainly raised eyebrows in Washington.

Venezuela’s political polarization and economic decay have increasingly tempted the Bush administration to play a bigger role in the negotiations, to better defend vital US interests in the region.

Venezuelan Ambassador to the OAS, Jorge Valero, who spoke on behalf of the Chavez administration, presented a report on the normalization of political and economic life in the country, including the stabilization of oil production. The government obviously was trying to present an image that Venezuela was now back to its old politically stable and oil-reliable self, in order to negate support for the opposition’s proposal to achieve elections through a constitutional amendment, which if passed would shorten the President’s and Congress’ terms from six to four years.

Furthermore, the amendment would immediately terminate Presidential and Congressional terms forcing elections for both levels of governance to take place within 30 days. This bold, if self-serving initiative would challenge the government’s grip on all elective offices. It is unlikely to find many supporters on the government side, which has repeatedly insisted that Constitutional amendments lie outside the scope of the current round of negotiations.

Timoteo Zambrano, a congressman and delegate for the opposition at the negotiations table, urged delegates to pressure the government to accept the opposition’s seemingly brash terms for elections, as he painted a stark picture of Venezuelan political realities.

Prior to the meeting, he informed the press that the government is staging a “political persecution” against the leaders of the Coordinadora Democratica (CD), which heads up the opposition group. His report strongly suggested that the government is blocking efforts to reach an electoral agreement by heightening political tensions surrounding the negotiations. Zambrano cited the law on media content, drafted by Chavez supporters in the National Assembly, and the arrest of several opposition leaders for their participation in the general strike, as acts that have sabotaged prospects for an electoral solution.

The opposition also demanded that the Group of Friends send permanent representatives to the negotiations, who would be in a position to pressure the government to accelerate the negotiations, and could possibly press for a Constitutional amendment. Furthermore, they asked that Secretary General of the OAS, Cesar Gaviria, convert his role as a facilitator into that of being a mediator, in which he could influence which items must be resolved on the agenda.

The government camp would most likely consider such action as an intrusion into Venezuela’s sovereign rights, mindful of the fact that President Chavez already has lashed out at such countries as Spain for criticizing the Fernandez arrest.

But the Chavez administration’s concerns with foreign intrusion were put aside when its delegates pushed once again for the Group of Friends to include countries such as Cuba, France and China, that maintain close political and economic ties with Caracas and may dilute the group of friends’ desire to take a pro-active stance in the negotiation rounds.

Rather than ask for aid in strengthening Venezuela’s democratic foundations ... such as reformation of its biased media or its flawed judicial system ... government and opposition delegates traveled to Brasilia to push for concessions that would facilitate their political agenda which, in the government’s case involves that status quo, while the opposition vies for radical changes in electoral rules.

It may appears to some that Washington officials are siding with the opposition’s call for reform. On Thursday March 6, for example, seven members of the US House of Representatives sent a letter to Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, in which they reminded him that they would not remain indifferent towards any actions in Venezuela’s democratic process that do not fully respect the opposition’s rights.

But do such acts come solely out of empathy for Venezuela’s embattled opposition?

After an ill-advised and embarrassing demand for immediate elections in the early days of the strike, the White House has avoided any high profile role in Venezuela’s conflict by throwing its support behind the OAS’ lengthy mediation efforts.

However, it is probable that the Bush administration might increase its involvement in Venezuela’s political strife as White House officials grow concerned that the decay and politicization of PDVSA ... Venezuela’s national oil company ... may threaten US energy interests in the region.

• Washington’s professed unrest isn’t necessarily a cover to blast Chavez for his leftist and nationalistic ideologies, or defend the interests of the local elite.

Oil has been the glue that has held Venezuela and the US together in the past 50 years. For decades, US administrations have tolerated various nationalistic measures taken by Venezuelan governments, even those appearing to be anti-American ... such as nationalizing oil production or imposing tariffs on US imports. Venezuela gained Washington’s trust by maintaining a reliable oil supply in times of both prosperity and crisis.

The Chavez administration was given similar treatment in its early days in office. Washington officials were prepared to discount the new President’s fiery rhetoric and praise for the Fidel Castro regime, as they rushed to assure the American public that his actions didn’t match his words and that there appeared to be no evidence that the Bolivarian revolution would threaten United States’ energy concerns in the region.

But PDVSA’s turmoil could give the US good reason to become more actively involved in negotiations towards resolving Venezuela’s political crisis. During the strike, PDVSA became increasingly politicized as mid-level as well as senior managers carried out an oil stoppage in consort with opposition leaders.

It is no secret that this alliance decimated PDVSA’s production levels and cut exports to the United States. As oil prices rise with a war in Iraq, US policy-makers are asking if Chavez’s embattled government will be able to supervise this fractured company and deliver oil in a reliable fashion.

• Venezuelan officials are eager to convince Washington that PDVSA will soon recover its full production and its reputation as a reliable supplier.

However, the US State Department is not altogether buying this optimistic projection. At a meeting on February 26 with Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez, US State Department officials told Venezuela’s officials that Venezuela cannot be considered a reliable oil supplier to the United States at the present time.

This sentiment is also shared by some members of the Bush cabinet.

Despite assurances from Ramirez that his country was producing 2.4 million barrels of crude daily in the last week of February, US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham told a Senate hearing it might be two to three months before Venezuelan oil production reaches its normal levels. Prior to the strike Venezuela produced 2.8million barrels of crude daily.

Chavez’s efforts to manage PDVSA efficiently are further complicated by the opposition’s negotiation strategy. Its representatives at the negotiations have demanded that Chavez reinstate thousands of PDVSA bureaucrats, technicians and managers who were fired for joining in the general strike ... or no electoral solution will be permitted to come about.

Such a demand could be an incentive for the United States to influence negotiations, as it would offer Washington an opportunity to play a hand in the restructuring of PDVSA, its main interest in Venezuela’s current strife.

Political instability in Venezuela also appears to be undermining Washington’s war on drugs. One of the main pillars of the Bush administration’s northern South American strategy is to widen Washington’s role in combating Colombia’s drug-trafficking rebel groups. Recent reports suggesting that important leaders of the FARC, including Manuel Marulanda, are hiding out in Venezuela, have damaged the standing of the Chavez administration in Washington. At the very least, they have led some US officials to ponder whether an embattled government hobbled by protests, unpopularity and constant challenges to its legitimacy is a worthy partner, willing and able to tackle the drug traffic issue with resolve.

• On February 27, Drug Czar John Walter’s expressed this concern at a House Committee on International Relations hearing, stating that “Venezuela’s political problems have created a haven for narco-terrorists to operate with impunity."

Washington’s invigorated policy is most likely designed to comply with its own regional agenda and not destined to support the government’s or opposition’s aspirations in the negotiating table.

Oil policy and anti-narcotics interests appear to be the primordial reasons for the United States to claim a bigger stake in the resolution of Venezuela’s political tensions.

Unfortunately, it seems that democratic reforms have not been enough of an incentive for Venezuela’s contending parties to push for a widely accepted electoral solution on their own accord.